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Chapter III 
CLAIMS TO MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC 
ORDER ON THE OCEANS 
C hapter II demonstrates that attempting to preserve minimum public order in the Gulf during the Tanker War involved many participants with vary-
ing (sometimes mUltiple) perspectives in different arenas and situations with 
numerous coercive and persuasive strategies at their command.1 This and suc-
ceeding chapters examine claims to authority in the effective power process as part 
of the ongoing global social process.2 As McDougal and his associates have noted, 
international law as the effective global power process is subject to claims by par-
ticipants to optimize their goals in that process.3 In some instances these claims 
are part of the civic order, i.e., private orderings or private claims, as opposed to 
public order norms or claims to public order.4 But civic order claims, as will be 
seen, may have serious and strong impact on public order claims and claimants. 
For example, attacks on merchant ships caused phenomenal increases in insur-
ance rates; these in turn affected global oil prices, and rising oil prices undoubt-
edly influenced government decisionmakers.S By the same token, decisions of 
governments, based in their perception oflaw, undoubtedly influenced their con-
siderations on assisting one or both belligerents and their attitudes toward private 
parties who had dealings with belligerents. The tilt toward supporting Iraq that 
grew throughout the war, and a corresponding decline in support ofIran, although 
there were cross-currents the other way, is an example of this interrelationship.6 
Although Jessup argued for an interstitial transnational law,7 more recently 
Lowenfeld has made the point, as law of war manuals have for a sliding scale of 
conflict between war and peace,8 that there is a sliding scale relationship between 
public law and transnational law that governs matters between private actors and 
between private actors and States, sometimes an actor's own country and some-
times another nation.9 And while the Chapter III-VII analysis in this volume con-
centrates on public law analysis, the incidence of civic order relationships, i.e., 
transactions governed by transnational law, must be borne in mind. 
Because of the Charter's trumping effect on treaty law 10 and its strong influence 
on customary norms,11 and because several participants in the Tanker War, e.g., 
France and the United Kingdom, believed that the Charter and not the LOAC 
governed,12 analysis begins with study of Charter-related claims, particularly is-
sues of self-defense and neutrality. This Chapter ends with an examination of the 
law of treaties and its relationship with crisis and armed conflict. 
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Part A. UN Charter Norms; Related Issues 
The history of the Charter, and its drafting and record of negotiations, have 
been well-documented. 13 The general contours of practice under the Charter have 
also been chronicled.14 This is not the place to mine anew these lodes. What fol-
lows is a statement of provisions of the Charter, followed by summaries of claims 
and counterclaims 15 under the Charter and related sources oflaw, with conclu-
sions (outcomes) as to the current state of the law. 
1. Norms Stated in the Charter 
Five parts of the Charter are relevant to the Tanker War: i ts Preamble, Purposes 
and Principles; self-defense and related concepts in the Charter era; lawmaking 
under the Charter; pacific settlement of disputes; and action under the Charter to 
deal with l:hreats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. A half 
century of practice under the Charter has developed in some instances. In other 
cases pre-Charter norms still have force. 
a. The Preamble, Purposes and Principles of the Charter. The Charter Preamble 
initially expresses Member States' determination: 
to save succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar[;] ... to reaffirm faith in 
fundamental human rights, ... in the equal rights of ... nations large and small [;] to 
establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from 
treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained [;] and to promote 
social progress and better standards for life in larger freedom. 
To achieve these goals, UN Members have pledged: 
to practice tolerance and live together in peace ... as good neighbors, and to unite 
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the 
acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be 
used, save in the common interest, and to employ international machinery for 
[promoting] economic and social advancement of all people[.]16 
All Persian Gulf States, and all countries that were Tanker War participants, al-
though perhaps as States not parties to the conflict, are UN Members. Iran and Iraq 
are original Members.17 
Little use of the Preamble's statements have been made since 1945. One recent 
example, however, occurred during the Tanker War itself, when the Security 
Council noted "that Member States pledged together to live together in peace with 
one another as good neighbors in accordance with the Charter ... ,,18 The Preamble 
in other cases "reinforces, without being essential to, the propositions [founded on 
other parts of the Charter] being advanced,,19 There have been occasional uses of 
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the Preamble in other Council and General Assembly resolutions relevant to this 
study, however. The General Assembly's Uniting for Peace (UFP) Resolution dis-
cussions in 1950 referred to the Preamble.20 The General Assembly's Friendly Re-
lations Declaration ofl970 21 also employed Preamble language. To the extent that 
these resolutions have been incorporated by practice, e.g., by subsequent General 
Assembly-recommended peacekeeping operations under a UFP precedent,22 or 
have been incorporated by reference in later resolutions23 or authoritative pro-
nouncements, the Preamble has had added vitality. 
In any event, the drafters intended that all Charter provisions "being ... indivis-
ible as in any other legal instrument, are equally valid and operative." Each provi-
sion must be construed and applied together. 
(a) The "Preamble" introduces the Charter and sets forth the declared com-
mon intentions which brought us together in this Conference and moved 
us to unite our will and efforts, and made us harmonize, regulate, and or-
ganize our international action to achieve our common ends. 
(b) The "Purposes" constitute the raison d'etre of the Organization. They are 
the aggregation of the common ends on which our minds met; hence, the 
cause and object of the Charter to which member States collectively and 
severally subscribe. 
( c) The chapter on "Principles" sets, in the same order of ideas, the methods 
and regulating norms according to which the Organization and its mem-
bers shall do their duty and endeavor to achieve the common ends. Their 
understandings should serve as actual standards of international con-
duct.24 
Thus the Preamble is an integral part of the Charter as a statement of "motivating 
ideas and purposes," although it does not define UN Members' obligations. These 
ideas and purposes can be, and have been, used to evidence the Charter's ideas and 
purposes in considering the articles of the Charter. In effect, the Preamble is a se-
ries of pledges,25 fulfillment of which are in the Charter's Purposes, Principles and 
constitutive provisions. 
i. Purposes of the Organization: Articles 1(1), 1(2). Although the United Nations 
as contemplated under the Charter is "a multipurpose organization, ... mainte-
nance of [international] peace and security is the primary purpose of the Organiza-
tion and takes priority over other purposes." The order of listing the UN's 
Purposes, Charter article 1(1) stating the goal of international peace and security 
first, supports this view:26 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take ef-
fective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to 
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the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches 
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settle-
ment of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach 
of the peaceP 
Goodrich and his collaborators note the difference between Article l(1)'s lan-
guage, i.e., the United Nations may "take effictive collective measures" to prevent 
and remove threats to the peace, to suppress aggression or other breaches of the 
peace, the "measures" language of Articles 39, 41 and 42, Article 50's "preventive 
or enforcement measures," Article 5's "preventive or enforcement action," and the 
"enforcement measures" Article 2(7) mentions. This language difference has been 
cited as authority for the UFP Resolution; the Council might have a duty to take 
"measures" or action, but the General Assembly'S responsibility and powers under 
Article 10 should be determined by Article 1(1)'s twofold injunction for "effective 
collective measures" to maintain or restore peace.28 Article 1(1) also assumes that 
resolution of a dispute or situation will be in accordance with international law 
and "justice," a provision inserted to protect small States,29 a corollary to the sover-
eign equality of all UN Members.30 Implementing Article 1 (1), at least in terms of 
the Charter language, has been through Articles 2(3), 2(4), and Chapter VI-VIII. 
Therefore, analysis of the use of Article 1(1) will be deferred untillater.31 
Another of the UN's Purposes is "to develop friendly relations among nations 
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.,,32 Most 
analysis has focused on elevating self-determination to a human right,33 some-
times in mutilateral conventions,34 and often invoked in efforts to end colonial-
ism, the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples being a watershed.35 A collateral effect has been developing the idea that 
self-determination includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources 36 and a 
State's right to freely dispose of its natural wealth and resources.37 
Assembly and Council interpretations of Article 1(2) played a background role 
in naval matters after World War II. In the Algerian Civil War (1957-59) the As-
sembly referred to "the right of the Algerian people to self-determination,,38 after 
France gave Algerians the right to determine their status.39 The resolution passed 
after the French interdiction campaign 40 and had no impact on claims oflegality 
of that operation. Assembly Resolution 1514, declaring all peoples including those 
under cc10nial rule have self-determination rights, was incorporated by reference 
in Council resolutions on Rhodesia (1965-80).41 In this case the Royal Navy en-
forced Council-directed interdiction of Beira-bound tankers loaded with oil in-
voiced to Rhodesia.42 
Article 1(2) played no stated role in the Tanker War; self-determination was not 
an issue. However, the issue of "the inalienable right" of all States "freely to 
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dispose of their national wealth and resources,,43 was behind the desires of States 
like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to export petroleum, part of their "natural wealth," 
through their ports and all sea lanes. Shipping flagged under other States was en-
gaged in lifting petroleum from these ports and otherwise in legitimate trade 
within the Gulf.44 The Council condemned hostilities in "sea-lanes, navigable wa-
terways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct 
or indirect access to the sea .... ,,4S The Council later reaffirmed "the right of free 
navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping to and from all ports 
and installations of the littoral States ... not parties to the hostilities[.]" Iran had 
attacked commercial shipping en route to and from Kuwaiti and Saudi ports.46 To 
the extent that these attacks frustrated the rights of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and 
other Gulf States not parties to the war to dispose of their natural wealth, attacks on 
shipping carrying these exports could be seen as a violation of Article 1(3) as inter-
preted by the Assembly and the Council. 
ii. Principles in the Charter: Articles 2(3), 2(4). The principle expressed in Arti-
cle 2(3) is a logical corollary of the principle of Article 2(4), which prohibits threat 
or use of force against a State's territorial integrity or political independence, or in 
any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. Article 2(3) re-
quires UN Members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means so 
that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. A legacy 
from the League Covenant era, the language of Article 2(3) has been incorporated 
in many international agreements.47 Its substance, mingled with Articles 33-36's 
parallel policies,48 has been restated in many UN resolutions, including Security 
Council Resolution 479, the first Council action in the Iran-Iraq war.49 
Article 2(4) of the Charter "lays down one of the basic principles of the United 
Nations,"SO incorporating by reference Article l's Principles and declaring, "All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."Sl Article 
2(4) must be interpreted in the context of other Charter norms; i.e., it may be tem-
pered by other rights (e.g., of self-defense) under the Charter or general intern a-
tionallaw under a number of theories.S2 The point of difference is the relative 
scope of the right of self-defense and the extent to which the right of self-defense 
qualifies Article 2(4), an analysis deferred for consideration in the context of 
self-defense and related issues.S3 
Definition of terms lies beneath the problem of interrelationships between Ar-
ticle 2(4), which at least restates a customary rule,S4 and other claims. Two views 
have developed on what "threat or use of force" means: Does "force" mean only 
"armed force," or does it include economic or political pressure?SS Most commen-
tators say force means only armed force and does not include economic or political 
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pressure.56 Recent treaty negotiations support a narrow definition of "force." 
States have negotiated separate provisions prohibiting coercive economic or polit-
ical methods.57 Proponents of a clause to include economic coercion with military 
coercion as a ground for voiding a treaty, failed in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties negotiations.58 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organi-
zations also lacks such a provision.59 Although the General Assembly has adopted 
resolutions calling upon States to refrain from economic or political coercion, nei-
ther the Assembly nor the Council has determined that such coercion equates with 
use offorce under Article 2( 4).60 The Assembly may have come close with the 1970 
Friendly Relations Declaration, but analysis reveals that the line has not been 
crossed.61 Other examples are consensus approval of a definition of aggression 62 
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (NIEO).63 
Similar to the US position that aggression "cannot be so comprehensive as to in-
clude all cases ... and cannot take into account the various circumstances which 
might enter into the determination of aggression in a particular case[,],,64 the Res-
olution definition of aggression parallels Article 2(4): "Aggression is the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political in-
dependence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Char-
ter ... , as set out in this Definition.,,65 
A State's first use of armed force in violation of the Charter is prima facie evi-
dence of an act of aggression, although the Security Council may determine that, 
under the circumstances, no act of aggression has been committed.66 The Defini-
tion considers the following as acts of aggression whether or not there has been a 
war declaration: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces ofa State of the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such in-
vasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of an-
other State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another 
State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, marine 
and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another 
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the condi-
tions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such 
territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the dis-
posal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of 
aggression against a third State; 
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(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement 
therein.67 
The list is not exhaustive.68 Article 5(1) is the only direct reference to economic 
strategies: "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, 
military or othenvise, may serve as a justification for aggression.,,69 Thus eco-
nomic need cannot justify aggression, but that does not mean that a coercive eco-
nomic strategy is aggression. 
As with the 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration, NIEO Article 32 proclaims 
that "No State may use or encourage ... economic, political or any other ... mea-
sures to coerce another State ... to obtain ... subordination of the exercise of its sov-
ereign rights.,,70 Because of the vote on NIEO (118-6-10) and developed States' 
solid opposition, and NIEO's status as not being a first measure of codification and 
progressive development,71 it is unlikely that Article 32 recites custom. State prac-
tice under the Vienna Convention confirms this view.72 
One issue, for which there are no clearcut answers in Charter practice, is 
whether the "territorial integrity" phrase in Article 2(4) includes the "floating ter-
ritory" of a vessel flying a State's flag.13 The Corfu Channel Case settled the issue for 
warships; the judgment included an award for damage to the UK ships and for per-
sonnel injured or killed.14 Security Council resolutions affirmed freedom of navi-
gation in the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict 75 and in the Tanker War;76 in the past 
other resolutions approved interdiction of Beria-bound merchantmen as part of 
sanctions action against Rhodesia.77 The freedom of navigation resolutions con-
firmed vessels' right to be free ofbelligerent interference; the Rhodesia intercep-
tion resolution can be seen as a derogation on a right of "floating territorial 
integrity" in the sense of Article 2(4).18 
Even if a ship might not be considered part of a State's territory and therefore 
not subject to Article 2(4), attacks on individual merchant ships are acts of aggres-
sion and are subject to self-defense response(s) under Article 51. This issue was 
particularly relevant for the Tanker War. 
Although Article 2(4) does not cite aggression specifically, it does prohibit 
Members from acting "in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations" in their international relations. Article 1(1) states the UN's pri-
mary 79 Purpose as maintaining international peace and security through collec-
tive action to "suppress ... acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace .... " 
Therefore, UN Members have an obligation to refrain from acts of aggression 
against other States. And, as also developed under the self-defense analysis,80 the 
Nicaragua Case adopted the broader French-language version of the Charter, Arti-
cle 51. Article 51's English language version reads: 
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Nothing in the ... Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the ... Council and shall not in 
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the ... Council under the ... Charter 
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary ... to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
The French version reads: 
Aucune disposition de la ... Charte ne porte atteinte au droit naturel de legitime 
defense, individuelle ou collective, dans Ie cas ou un Membre des Nations Unies est 
l'objet d'une agression armee, jusqu a ce que Ie Conseil de Securite ait pris les mesures 
neccaires pour maintenir la paix et la securite internationales. Les mesures prises par 
des Membres dans l'exercice de ce droit de legitime defense sont immediatement 
portees a la connaissance du Conseil ... et n'affectent en rien la pouvoir et Ie devoir 
qu'a Ie Conseil, en vertu de la ... Charte, d'agir a tout moment de la maniere qu'il 
judge necessaire pour maintenir ou retablir la paix et la securite internationales.81 
The right of self-defense, however defined,82 arises when there is an "armed at-
tack," under the English language version, or under the French version when 
there is an "agression annee," which connotes a broader range of activity or situa-
tions triggering a right of self-defense. 83 
Both versions and those in the Chinese, Russian and Spanish languages are 
equally authentic.84 However, since the languages in which the drafting was done 
were English and French, Goodrich and his associates argue that more weight 
should be given the English and French texts and, if there is a discrepancy between 
the two, the interpretation most likely to be correct would be that based on the lan-
guage of the text that was originally adopted.85 Under this view, since Article 51 is 
the result of a UK, i.e., English language, proposal,86 the "armed attack" phrase of 
the English language version should prevail. 
Linnan has advocated using the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to 
guide analysis ofthe relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51. 87 The same ap-
proach might be taken for the situation of equally authoritative texts where words 
chosen for versions in differing languages have different meanings. The Vienna 
Convention, article 33, provides in pertinent part: 
1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is 
equally authoritative in each language .... 
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each au-
thentic text. 
4 .... [W]hen a comparison of the authentic text discloses a difference of mean-
ing which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning 
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which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the 
treaty, shall be adopted. 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Convention provide: 
31. General rule of interpretation 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for ... interpret[ing] ... a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the 
text, including its preamble and annexes[.] ... 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context ... 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules ofinternationallaw applicable in the relations between 
the parties. . 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the par-
ties so intended. 
32. Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances ofits conclusion, ... to confirm 
the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.s8 
There have been several theories for interpreting treaties,89 but Jimenez de 
Arechaga says Vienna Convention principles declare existing law.90 Although 
other approaches have appeal,91 the Convention's mainstream approach will be 
the principal path of analysis. 
Article 31(1) "establishes ... the 'golden rule' of interpretation[:],,92 Give a 
treaty its ordinary meaning in its context and in the light ofits object and purpose. 
Article 31 (2) further defines the context to include the treaty preamble. Along with 
the context these are relevant, for this purpose: subsequent practice establishing 
the parties' agreement as to its interpretation, Article 31 (3)(b ); and relevant appli-
cable rules of international law, Article 31(3)(a); and a special meaning to a term if 
the parties agree to such, Article 31(4). Therefore, the first task is to examine in-
trinsic evidence; the second is a gradual progression from this center to more pe-
ripheral evidence, with a concession to parties' specific intent "ifit is established," 
convincingly, "that the parties ... intended" such.93 The last qualification does not 
apply, since the problem lies with the meaning of Article 51's wording, for which 
there is no terminological consensus.94 The problem in terms of Vienna Convention 
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Article 31 analysis boils down to an issue of subsequent practice and relevant, ap-
plicable international law rules.95 
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of "armed at-
tack"-"agression armee" in Article 51 is the Nicaragua Case. The IC} accepted the 
broader French-language Article 51 version, stating in dictum that the Definition 
of Aggression Resolution, Article 3(g), stated a customary rule; sending armed 
bands, irregulars or mercenaries across a border would be armed attack justifying 
self-defense. (The Court went on to say, however, that supplying arms or other 
logistics across a border was not aggression and that therefore a US collective self-
defense claim under Article 51 was not admissible. )96 And since the same word-
"agression"-is used in Article 1(1) and Article 51, 97 the same meaning should be 
imported into Article 1(1) as incorporated by reference in Article 2(4). 
The narrow question is whether there can be armed aggression against ships. 
The Definition of Aggression Resolution, Article 3, declares: "Aggression is 
the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter ... as set out in this definition.,,98 Although it could be argued that "terri-
torial integrity" in Article 1 includes the "floating territory" of ships, the negotia-
tors did not address this possibility; they voted down amendments to refer to the 
territorial sea and airspace, although one State (Indonesia) added it by interpreta-
tive statement. Article 1 only covers armed aggression, and not economic or politi-
cal coercion; it does not cover threat of force, as distinguished from use of force.99 
Article 2 declares a first use offorce in violation of the Charter to be prima facie evi-
dence of aggression, but that the Security Council may determine that no aggres-
sion has occurred, perhaps because the act(s) or consequence(s) are not that 
serious. lOO The Definition also recites certain per se principles, subject to Article 
2's first-use and de minimis principles, in Article 3, which provides in part: 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in 
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the1and, sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another State ... 
Article 3( c) says that blockading coasts or ports by armed forces is aggression.lOl 
The ICJ has stated that article 3(g), denouncing sending armed bands across a bor-
der, states custom; one commentator says all of Article 3 probably restates custom, 
although others disagree.102 The Article 3 list is nonexclusive. 103 
An ambiguity remains as to the phrase "marine and air fleets." Does this in-
clude a single merchantman flagged under a target State's flag? Article 3( d) covers 
attacks on a warship, a warship formation, or a group of merchantmen, e.g., a 
fishing fleet. 104 Attacking a single neutral warship is never permitted in territorial 
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waters,105 and by well-established custom on the high seas as well. 106 Choice of the 
expression "fleets" for article 3( d) was done "advisedly, ... to exclude from the pur-
view of the Definition the use of force [by an attacking State] against a single or a 
few commercial vessels ... , especially when they enter [attacking State] jurisdic-
tion," according to Dinstein, who cites Broms, chair of the UN committee that 
produced the Definition. 107 Dinstein concludes that "A reasonable degree offorce 
(in the form of search and seizure) may be legitimate against foreign merchant 
ships even on the high seas.,,108 However, Broms did not refer to merchant ships 
generally; he and the Committee referred only to fishing vessels and fleets. 109 
Dinstein's view appears inconsistent with what the Committee actually decided. It 
is also clear that coastal States, engaged in legitimate policing of their coastal wa-
ters (e.g., territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ) do not commit aggression under 
article 3(d) when they pursue, and possibly attack, merchant ships for viola-
tionsYo 
The Dinstein view is inconsistent with what the UN Committee actually de-
cided. The UK Committee delegate pointed out during negotiations that Article 
3(d) would not impugn coastal State action "in accordance with intemationallaw for 
the legitimate enforcement of its authority." A saving clause describing coastal 
State rights had been omitted from Article 3(d). Including it would 
risk that such a clause might be taken to imply that any vessel ... which ventured 
within the jurisdiction of another State might be subjected to any degree of force-
even an armed attack-that the State might choose to inflict on it in the exercise of its 
own authority, which was not the ... Committee's intention.1 11 
Thus, far from indicating that attacks on independently-sailing merchant ships 
could not trigger a self-defense response, the Committee was trying to avoid the 
problem of unlawful attacks in the first place. There is no indication that the Com-
mi ttee even considered self-defense in this con text. The Committee did not in tend 
to exclude attacks on independently-steaming merchantmen from the Definition, 
for which self-defense or other legitimate response(s) might be appropriate. 
As incidents like the Mayaguez seizure demonstrate,112 to say that not all at-
tacks on merchant ships can result in an aggression claim justifying a self-defense 
response is dangerous business indeed. Even as a self-defense response that is not 
proportional can become aggression, 113 not every attack on an independently-sail-
ing merchantman should be shielded from an aggression claim. Some merchant 
ships, e.g., passengeriiners, are forbidden targets in any case; 114 even with modern 
commercial shipping's highly automated nature, and the resulting relatively low 
size of crews, a deliberate attack on a single cargo merchantman can involve many 
people's lives. The liner exception does not cover the situation of other vessels car-
rying hundreds of passengers, e.g., ferries or work-boats transporting employees of 
offshore drilling rigs, nor does it cover a common situation of cargo vessels with a 
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small passenger manifest. Moreover, the reality of merchant traffic on the seas is 
that no merchant ships, unless they are fishing vessels or tugs and tows, ever sail in 
company. A view that all independently-sailing merchant ships could be attacked 
without the attacking State risking being branded an aggressor would mean that 
no merchant ship would be safe, under any circumstances, since all sail independ-
ently.llS Presumably an all-out, simultaneous, world-wide attack on all ships 
flagged under the target State would qualify for Dinstein, but that hypothetical 
lacks reality. 
The "fleets" expression does not follow the principles of prior treaty law, 
whether ratified or not. These agreements point to coverage of attacks on single 
ships as enough to trigger a risk of a charge of aggression if the act or its conse-
quences are serious enough, under the Definition Resolution formula. 1l6 Charter 
era State practice buttresses this conclusion. The Resolution includes blockade as 
a qualified per se instance of aggression.1l7 As a practical matter, blockade runners 
do not try to avoid interception in groups. Ifit is assumed that the law of blockade 
still includes an ultimate right to attack and destroy merchant vessels trying to 
evade blockade, and it is submitted that this remains the case, 118 then illegal use of 
blockade includes the illegal destruction of blockade runners as part of unlawful 
aggression. And if such be true in the context of blockade, then it is likewise true 
that illegal destruction of a single merchantman, sailing independently, would be 
likewise susceptible to condemnation, if the situation is serious enough, 119 under 
the Resolution formula. Even if attacking a single merchant ship does not come 
under Article 3( d)'s "marine ... fleets" principle, prior treaty law and State practice 
since 1945 points toward a strong potential of a finding of aggression for such an 
attack.120 
The record of treaties negotiated before the Charter era and immediately after 
1945 is mixed as to whether attacks on shipping constitute aggression; no recent 
agreements have been concuded on the issue. Some multilateral and bilateral 
agreements categorize them as acts of aggression;121 many do not.122 For purposes 
of this analysis, however, it is most significant that Iran bound itself twice, and 
Iraq once, to multilateral agreements specifically defining attacks on "vessels or 
aircraft of another State" as acts of aggression. 123 Did "vessels" include merchant-
men as well as State ships? Contemporary USSR proposals in the League of Na-
tions, similar to the Definition list without the latter's non exclusivity clause, 
spoke of "knowingly attacking the naval or air forces of another State.,,124 Ap-
plying general principles for interpreting ambiguous treaty terms, it would seem . 
that the unmodified words, "vessels" or "ships," meant not only State vessels, i.e., 
warships, but merchantmen as well. The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Article 31(1) restates a customary rule: "A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms ... in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.,,12S The ordinary meaning 
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of "ship" or "vessel," unadorned by an adjective, is just that-it connotes all seago-
ing conveyance, military or commercial. This is reinforced by the context of the 
era. The USSR, a primary promoter of an aggression definition, was a socialist, 
command economy, in which the State owned all commercial ships through trad-
ing companies.126 At the time the USSR claimed an absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity,127 as distinguished from capitalist countries' acceptance of modified, 
restricted forms of immunity.128 Although the USSR might have advocated a 
more narrow theory for aggression in League debates, 129 when treaties were nego-
tiated with other, often capitalist, States, these conventions' coverage was broaden 
enough to cover all ships. Other countries' positions cannot be determined with 
certainty, but Comments to the Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States in Case of Aggression, proposed exclusively by US (and therefore capitalist) 
commentators,130 support a view that "vessel" or "ship" meant all vessels or ships, 
regardless of relationship with a registry State.131 Moreover, including attacks on 
merchantmen within a definition of aggression would further the treaties' policies 
in minimizing opportunity for legally-sanctioned violence. 
Language of multilateral agreements contemporaneous with the Charter were 
inconclusive or would appear to have drifted toward a view that only attacks on 
warships would constitute acts of aggression; however, examples given were 
non-exclusive. 132 Thus there is some support in treaties for a view that States have 
considered attacks on single merchantmen an act of aggression; this is particularly 
true for Iran and Iraq, whose treaty record is clearer than that of most States. 133 To 
be sure, the law of treaties says that treaties cannot create rights for third States un-
less these States accept them, but treaty rules can state custom.134 
State practice since 1945 supports a view that attacks on single ships can amount 
to aggression. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Syrian navy seizedRomantica, 
an Italian liner, later released upon the Italian ambassador's intervention. 135 Loss 
of the neutral Venus Challenger, sunk with all hands as a victim of an Indian missile 
during the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict, has been severely criticizedY6 The 
United States protested and responded with force to Cambodia's seizure of the 
US-flag Mayaguez in 1975, claiming self-defense.137 A US Court of Appeals found 
Argentina liable for its attack on Liberian-flagHercules outside a declared war zone 
during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War.138 
If today diminished in value because of failure of ratification 139 or acceptance 
of the final text, draft multilateral treaties or single-action proposals carry some 
weight as a secondary source because of their authors' eminence as scholars.140 
These sources support a view that "vessels" include merchantmen sailing alone. In 
this regard the 1933 USSR proposal is interesting; it would have said the first attack 
on another State's "naval or air forces" was an act of aggression. 141 The full League 
Committee's 1933 draft Act Relating to the Definition of the Aggressor changed 
this to the first attack on another State's "vessels or aircraft," 142 some indication of 
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accepting a broader definition of targets that could trigger a claim of aggression. 
The 1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Ag-
gression says that a single merchantmen, if attacked, could trigger a claim of ag-
gression.143 Few Charter era commentators 144 have expressed a view, 
independently of the "fleets" expression in Definition of Aggression, Article 
3(d),I4S perhaps because it is now obvious that an initial attack on a neutral mer-
chant ship, traveling alone, can be an act of aggression.I46 If we presume availabil-
ity of the 1977 Hague RecueilI47 or its equivalent in Baghdad and Tehran when the 
Tanker War began, the legal rationale for destruction and loss oflife may be predi-
cated on this view, at least in part. 
Appraisal. Although the record of claims and counterclaims is not clear, it is 
submitted that an attack on a merchant ship, steaming independently on lawful 
purposes, can be an act of aggression that can merit a self-defense response. An at-
tack on a man-of-war, sailing alone, can also be an act of aggression. Attacks on a 
formation of warships, or on a fleet of merchantmen (e.g., a fleet of fishing trawlers) 
can be aggression that will support a self-defense response. As McDougal and 
Feliciano and others have shown, 148 not every "attack" is serious enough to merit a 
self-defense response, and a self-defense response must be necessary and propor-
tional in any event. 149 A target State may choose to make no response, or to counter 
with retorsions or non-force reprisals, ISO perhaps in connection with self-defense 
measures. Moreover, some attacks may be subject to defenses, e.g., mistake, as in 
the Stark and Airbus cases. lSI Any proportional self-defense response to an assault 
perceived at the time 152 as an aggressive armed attack is legitimate. 
Thus, the logical corollary of the principle in Article 2(4), prohibiting the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State, 
or in any manner inconsistant with the UN's purposes,I53 is the principle ex-
pressed in Article 2(3): "All Members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that in ternational peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered." 154 A legacy from the League Covenant era, Article 2(3)'s lan-
guage has been restated in many international agreements. 155 The substance of 
Article 2(3), commingled with the parallel policies of the Charter, Chapter VI, Ar-
ticles 33_36,156 has also been restated in the Friendly Relations Declaration. IS7 
b. The Inherent Right of Self-Defense Under Article 51; Other Concepts. As noted 
above, Article 51's French language version (agression armee) connotes a broader 
meaning than the English language phrase, "armed attack."IS8 (Both versions, 
along with the other official languages, are equally authentic but a commentator's 
analysis may point to the English language version as the one to follow.)IS9 An-
other difference in meaning between Article 51 's two versions is the English lan-
guage phrase, "inherent right of ... self-defense," which in French becomes "droit 
naturel," i.e., the connotation of "natural right." Thus there is an "inherent" or 
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"natural" right to self-defense by a State whenever there is armed aggression 
against that State. The problem is compounded by use of English in important 
treaty negotiations for 20 years before the Charter negotiations. 
During negotiations leading to the Pact of Paris, which outlaws war as an in-
strument of national policy, 160 US Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg sent identi-
cal notes to participants, stating that the draft Pact did nothing to "restrict or 
impair in any way the right of self-defense inherent in every sovereign State and 
implicit in every treaty." Self-defense was characterized as "inalienable" and a 
"natural right," which "[ e ]very nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty 
provisions" to exercise.161 Great Britain had expressed a similarly broad view of 
the matter earlier,162 as had other States.163 Ultimately all parties accepted or 
"noted" the US interpretation when the Pact was signed August 27,1928. 
About a year earlier the PCIJ had decided the Lotus Case, which strongly recog-
nized States' sovereignty to act as they chose in the absence oflaw. l64 (State sover-
eignty, although occasionally assailed by some,165 remains a fundamental principle 
of internationallaw.)166 Under Lotus, States should have been as free to act within 
the law of self-defense as it then stood when their sovereignty was threatened by an 
act of war that was a violation oflaw; i.e., there was no law to support the act. Thus if 
it be assumed that the self-defense gloss on the Pact of Paris carries over into the 
UN Charter drafting less than a generation later, there is at least the possibility of a 
latent ambiguity, if Article 51's English or French version carries with it a differ-
ent and broader right of self-defense than the other, a right extending back into 
pre-Charter understandings of the scope of the right. The same issue lurks in the 
difference between "armed attack"-with its connotation of actual, physical as-
sault-and "aggression annee," "armed aggression," connoting a lower threshold 
for triggering a right of self-defense. 
We have seen how Linnan's analysis, employing interpretation methods in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, was helpful in determining the mean-
ing of "armed attack" - "agression annee" in Article 51.167 Since the same issues are 
at stake with respect to the point on the "inherent right" -"droit naturel" dichot-
omy, that method will be employed to determine the meaning of this phrase. 
The most recent authoritative pronouncement on the meaning of "inherent 
right" - "droit naturel" in Article 51 is the Nicaragua Case, where the ICI accepted 
the broader French version of Article 51 to state that the right ofindividual or col-
lective self-defense is a matter of customary intemationallaw, as evidenced in the 
Friendly Relations Declaration interpretation of Article 51. 168 Sohn has convinc-
ingly noted the similarity oflanguage between the understandings to the Pact of 
Paris and the "droit naturel" language of the French text of Article 51. 169 The Court 
accepted the broad view of "inherent right" advocated by Bowett and others.170 
\Vith respect to the "armed attack" - "aggression annee" issue, the Court agreed with 
the Definition of Aggression 171 that sending armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries 
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across a border was aggression, where this amounted to an actual armed attack by 
regular forces. In The Case involved incursions across land borders, but it is rea-
sonably clear that the Court accepted the French text's slightly broader defini-
tion.173 Therefore, it may be inferred that other forms of armed attack listed in the 
Definition, e.g., naval blockade,174 also declare customary law. And if this is so, 
there may be other forms of aggression that customary law now defines as such 175 
in a particular context to justify a self-defense response. The Court did hold, how-
ever, that cross-border assistance to rebels in providing weapons, logistics, or other 
support was only a threat of use of force or perhaps intervention into the affairs of 
another State, and therefore not enough to be characterized as an aggression so as 
to justify action by the target State in self-defense.176Two dissents pointed out that 
some situations involving logistics might be characterized as an armed attack, i.e., 
aggression.l77 The Court declined to consider anticipatory self-defense issues; the 
parties had agreed it was not an issue.178 
Although the Court's opinion is a secondary source and has no precedential 
value in the common-law sense,179 its recitation of customary principles is, how-
ever, entitled to great respect. Other Charter era instances of customary claims for 
national self-defense, particularly in the context of naval warfare, are ambiguous. 
The Definition of Aggression does not enlarge or contract the right of self-de-
fense: "Nothing in this definition shall be construed as ... enlarging or diminish-
ing the scope of the Charter, including its provisions concerning cases in which the 
use of force is lawful.,,180 States may respond to aggression in self-defense or by 
other appropriate means,181 e.g., retorsion or nonforce reprisals.182 
There is no evidence ofa special meaning given Article 51 by the intent of the 
parties.183 Thus recourse to supplementary means of interpretation under Vienna 
Convention Article 32 is necessary, i.e., examining preparatory works. To be sure, 
use of preparatory works should not be considered as a second phase or as a resort 
when ambiguity or obscurity remains,184 but they do assume increased impor-
tance when Vienna Convention Article 31 analysis yields mixed results.1SS 
The Charter drafters negotiated against a background of the League ofN ations 
Covenant and the interwar years. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Charter 
had no equivalent to Article 51,186 and the negotiating history of the conference 
that produced the Charter stated in part that "The unilateral use of force or similar 
coercive measures is not authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate self 
defense remains admitted and unimpaired.,,187 (The Nicaragua Case 188 has demol-
ished the opposing argument, that the right of self-defense is wholly confined to 
Article 51 which preempts any customary norm.)189 
If the right remains "admitted and unimpaired," reference must be had to the 
latest major agreement before the Charter concerned with the issue, i.e., the Pact of 
Paris still in force with about 69 parties as of January 1,1998,190 and negotiations, 
including general understandings, before signature and ratification.191 There 
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were no reservations concerning self-defense attached to the Pact; diplomatic cor-
respondence constituting part of that treaty's preparatory works were interpreta-
tions, i.e., understandings.192 Resort to analysis by analogy under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties 193 confirms that the diplomatic correspon-
dence 194 on the Pact contained understandings, not reservations. The Vienna 
Convention, Article 2(1)(d), says a reservation is "a unilateral statement, however 
phrased or named, made by a State when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving 
or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect 
of certain provisions ... in their application to that State." The US notes to pro-
spective parties were transmitted June 23, 1928, two months before signature of 
the Pact.195 Ratifications were exchanged much later.196 Moreover, since self-de-
fense was not mentioned in the Pact, the diplomatic notes, even if they might oth-
envise be considered reservations, could not "exclude or modify the legal effect of 
the treaty .... " In effect, then, the notes were "clarification[s] of the State[s'] posi-
tion," or "declarations of a purely explanatory character.,,197 The contemporary 
position of two US Secretaries of State was that the self-defense corollary to the 
Pact was an understanding, not a reservation.198 
Appraisal. The Nicaragua Case confirms that a separate customary norm for 
self-defense may exist alongside the Charter recitation in Article 51.199 Article 51 
says the right of individual and collective self-defense is "inherent," the same word 
used in the reservations 200 for the Pact ofParis.201 Such being the case, whether 
Article 51 applies to a situation, or whether a customary norm applies, the result is 
the same. The right of individual and collective self-defense as understood and 
practiced before ratification of the Charter continues unabated, subject to applica-
tion of conditioning factors, e.g., developing custom, perhaps stated in resolutions 
(the Definition of Aggression 202 comes to mind); treaties, and other sources of 
law,203 including jus cogens norms.204 If the right of individual and collective 
self-defense has risen to the status of ajus cogens norm, as some have claimed, e.g., it 
takes priority over other treaty norms like Charter provisions not havingjus cogens 
status.20S If anotherjus cogens norm,e.g., the right to territorial integrity and politi-
cal independence recited in Charter Article 2(4), is involved, ajus cogens right of 
self-defense must be balanced against the otherjus cogens norm(s).206 
i. Individual Self-Defense. When commentators' views and Article 51's interpre-
tation through treaty canons analysis are considered,207 a relatively broad right to 
self-defense has developed. "U.N. practice in Art. 51, composed as it is of scanty, 
vague and contradictory elements, says nothing, or at least nothing clear, about the 
grounds for self-defense.,,208 Besides maritime conflicts, only a handful of situa-
tions have involved published self-defense claims by a participant. In one of these, 
the Security Council rejected Israel's anticipatory self-defense claim for its raid on 
an Iraqi nuclear reactor.209 
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In the Corfu Channel Case, referred to the ICJ by the Council,210 the Court said a 
second passage of UK warships, ready for action if Albania again tried to use force 
to oppose passage, was not illegal because of Albania's prior Channel mining and 
resulting loss of British lives and ships.211 Waldock interpreted the Court's ap-
proving UK readiness for Albanian attack as legitimate preparation for imminent 
threat of attack.212 Using force to defend the formation would have been legal. 213 
(The case also decided that the United Kingdom could not invoke forcible 
self-help, i.e, necessity, to justify use of force; this was held not legitimate in the 
Charter era.p4The decision did not mention Article 51, 215 probably because Al-
bania was not a UN Member when the Court's jurisdiction was invoked.216 The 
decision was based entirely on customary law. Although this aspect of the case was 
little noticed, Corfu Channel predicted the Nicaragua Case result three decades 
later, when the case confirmed a parallel customary self-defense norm, in the latter 
decision coterminous with Article 51. 217 
In 1948 the Security Council heard Jewish Agency for Palestine claims, before 
Israel became a State, that Transjordan and Egypt were guilty of aggression. 
Transjordan (now Jordan) and the Arab League claimed self-defense to protect 
Jordanian and Arab nationals and to restore peace, security and law and order. Bel-
gium raised self-defense in the Council. Council resolutions did not mention 
self-defense.218 This was also true for Indian and Pakistani self-defense claims in 
the 1948 Jammu and Kashmir dispute.219 
The beginning of the Korean War in 1950 again illustrates the point, in the col-
lective security context. Although Council resolutions condemned North Korean 
aggression as a breach of the peace and called upon UN Members to assist UN 
forces and refrain from assisting North Korea,zzo the Council did not mention the 
right of self-defense. Similarly, the General Assembly's Uniting For Peace Resolu-
tion, passed when the USSR's return to the Council and subsequent Soviet vetoes 
made Council decisionmaking impossible, does not mention self-defense.221 (Ar-
ticle 51 provides for a right of collective as well as individual self-defense, and the 
United States ordered its forces to come to the aid of South Korea before the Coun-
cil acted.222 Hence, the Council could have, but did not, approve, disapprove or de-
fine South Korea's self-defense rights and other States' self-defense efforts for 
South Korea.) 
In 1951, the Council rejected Egypt's self-defense claim for closing the Suez Ca-
nal to, and asserting a right of visit and search of, Israeli merchantmen over two 
and a half years after hostilities had ceased. The resolution also noted that restric-
tions of passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israeli ports were denying 
valuable supplies to nations not connected with the conflict, and that these restric-
tions, together with Egypt's sanctions on ships that had visited Israel ports "rep-
resent[ ed] unjustified interference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas 
and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel[.],,223 
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(Commentators debate whether a right of visit and search during an armistice ex-
ists.)224 The resolution was not supported;225 there were more seizures and pro-
tests.226 The USSR vetoed a second Council resolution.227 Five years later the 
United Kingdom justified its Suez Canal intervention on self-defense, to protect 
its nationals; France, who combined with Britain in the sea-land operation, did 
not do so. The justification seemed to lack factual foundation; it has been said Gen-
eral Assembly rejection of the UK argument "cannot be regarded as conclusive to 
its validity in law.,,228 
From February-April 1957, however, US destroyers patrolled the Gulf of Aqaba 
and the Straits ofTiran to successfully prevent Egyptian interference with US flag 
merchantmen bound for Israel; other US warships evacuated US citizens and 
"friendly nationals" on a space-available basis from Haifa, Israel, and Alexandria, 
Egypt.229 During 1958-59 UK warships escorted and protected British fishing 
trawlers in waters Iceland claimed as territorial sea. The United Kingdom eventu-
ally withdrew from the "Cod War," and diplomacy resolved the issue.230 In 1960 
Belgium claimed a right to use force, but not based on self-defense, to extract its na-
tionals from the strife-torn Congo.231 
During the Algeria civil war France's self-defense claim for intercepting and 
boarding or diverting vessels whose cargoes were suspected to be bound for Alge-
rian rebels was protested vigorously by States whose flag the ships flew. France had 
declared a 20 to 50 kilometer (11-28 mile) customs zone off Algeria, but high seas 
interception occurred off Algeria; 45 miles off Casablanca, Morocco; in the Atlan-
tic Ocean; and in the English Channel. It is not clear whether protests were di-
rected at interceptions wherever occurring, or for those outside the zone, i.e., in the 
Atlantic and the Channel. Although a large-scale operation (4775 ships visited, 
1330 searched, 192 rerouted, 1 arrested in 1956), ships whose cargoes were seized 
were smuggling arms to the rebels. Although arms were imported from the sea off 
the Algerian coast, others were brought overland through Libya, Morocco or Tu-
nisia, and then across the Algerian border, perhaps through a third State, e.g., Tu-
nisia. Sometimes bogus shipping documents were used. Fishermen smuggled in 
arms.232 The Council did not pass a resolution related to the matter. 
In 1964 no Council resolution responded to a US self-defense claim in the Gulf 
of Tonkin (Maddox-Turner Joy) incident.233 From the US perspective, other as-
pects of the Vietnam War were actions in collective self-defense.234 
No Council decisions were in resolutions related to Israeli actions against Syria 
(1964, 1966) and Jordan (1966).235 Israel was condemned for attacks on Jordan 
(1966, 236 1969 237 ) and Lebanon (1968- 82 238 ), however.239 Although draft reso-
lutions were presented, the Council took no position during the 1967 Six-Day 
War.240 During that war Egypt's submarines sank innocent Greek freighters in the 
Mediterranean Sea, one off Alexandria and another further west.241 Britain 
warned it would join other States to assure Straits ofTiran right of passage. A UK 
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carrier group and the US Sixth Fleet were concentrated in the Eastern Mediterra-
nean, and a second UK carrier was in the Red Sea, but nothing came of the show of 
force. U.S.S. Liberty, a warship on the high seas in the eastern Mediterranean mon-
itoring Israeli transmissions during the Egyptian phase of the war, was damaged in 
an Israeli PT boat and aircraft attack. Israel later compensated the United States 
for loss oflife, crew injuries and damage to Liberty, without admitting fault. Liberty 
was configured like a merchant cargo ship but flew a US ensign, was painted haze 
grey like all US warships in the Mediterranean, and had traditional US white pen-
dant numbers on the bow and stern. The attack occurred during daylight. US 
forces were not allowed to retaliate. Israel had declared an imprecise exclusion 
zone, warning ships to keep away from "the coasts ofIsrael during darkness." As to 
what coasts (e.g., conquered territory also?), the warning was less than clear. An in-
formal private warning also had been given the United States.242 No self-defense 
claims were raised. The Liberty attack might be compared with the sinking of the 
Israeli destroyer Bilat, a belligerent warship steaming on the high seas, during re-
sumption of hostilities in October 1967 Bilat was destroyed by Styx missiles fired 
from an Egyptian patrol boat in Port Said harbor.243 The difference was that the 
Bitat attack occurred during a period of hostilities, whereas the Liberty incident 
came out of the blue. 
In 1968 North Korea seized USS. Pueblo, another electronic reconnaissance 
warship, on the high seas, outside of claimed territorial waters. The crew was re-
turned 11 months later. Other than diplomatic overtures, there was no US re-
sponse,244 and the United Nations did not act. 
In the 1965 India-Pakistan conflict, Pakistan declared war, published lists of 
absolute and conditional contraband, and established a prize court, asserting these 
measures were lawful exercises of self-defense. India's position was ambivalent; it 
responded with an absolute contraband list, but it is not clear as to whether India 
acknowledged existence of a war. Since India responded with its contraband 
lists,245 this at least indicated that India considered itself an object of an armed at-
tack (if Pakistan would be considered the aggressor), or entitled to respond to Pa-
kistan's actions, if the latter is taken as a self-defense response to Indian actions. 
Late in 1966 the General Assembly called on the belligerents to observe the rules of 
warfare.246 Apparently there were no self-defense claims. 
The 1971 India-Pakistan war was over in two weeks;247 this conflict also re-
sulted in attacks on and destruction ofinnocent merchantmen. After dark, neutral 
vessels were not allowed to approach the Pakistan coast closer than 75 miles. The 
Indian Navy sought to capture or destroy Pakistani merchant ships. More than 115 
neutral ships were inspected; India diverted neutral vessels to Calcutta if they car-
ried cargo of military significance after India discovered that ship markings and 
names had been changed. Three Pakistani merchantmen were captured; a Libe-
rian and a Spanish ship were also sunk. Two merchantmen were destroyed by 
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Indian surface to surface missiles while at anchor in Karachi roadstead, and the 
neutral inbound Venus Challenger was hit and sunk by a missile 26.5 miles off 
Karachi. All hands were lost. A Pakistani destroyer also went to the bottom that 
night, the target of a Styx missile attack. The cause of destruction of Venus Chal-
lenger was probably the missiles' "capricious behavior" and malfunction or inade-
quate operation of guidance systems. A week after destruction of Venus Challenger, 
the Bengal Chamber of Commerce published its 40-mile dawn to dusk warning.248 
Again, apparently there were no self-defense claims. 
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, international shipping was 
warned about entering the region of conflict, which first comprised Egyptian and 
Israeli territorial waters, but later further parts of the sea plus Egyptian, Libyan 
and Syrian ports. In October the Syrian navy captured and diverted a Greek liner, 
Romantica, which was released the next day after the Italian ambassador's inter-
vention. No further such incidents occurred, perhaps because of international 
protests, although Egypt regularly stopped, visited and searched neutral mer-
chantmen. Third States' reactions varied. African countries unilaterally sus-
pended or ended diplomatic relations with Israel; Arab countries boycotted oil 
exports to Israel and the United States. Britain embargoed arms, and this largely 
affected Israel; except for Portugal, other Western European nations refused to al-
low use of their territories for supplying or assisting any belligerent. Arab navies 
adopted a tactic of sheltering beside merchant ships in their harbors after firing 
missiles at Israeli warships. Egypt declared a blockade in the Red Sea and attacked 
but missed an Israel-bound tanker. In the Gulf of Suez Egypt acted to blockade the 
Abu Rudiers-Eilat route used by Israeli-chartered tankers carrying oil from the Is-
raeli-occupied Sinai fields to Eilat. Responding to Egypt's blockade of the Straits 
ofBab el Mandeb, Israel counter-blockaded the area.249 Protests regarding Syria'S 
attack on Romantica are an indicator that States considered the attack a delict and 
perhaps also subject to self-defense reaction by Greece if Greece had chosen to re-
spond with proportional force. 
In 1972 Iceland asserted a 50-mile fishing zone and cut a UK fishing boat's trawl 
wires. A UK frigate deployed outside the zone. The next year UK frigates entered 
the zone after continued Icelandic harassment. Incidents involving UK and Ger-
man trawlers continued through 1973. In 1972 Britain had sued Iceland in the In-
ternational Court of Justice, the Court indicated interim measures in 1973, and in 
1974 the Court held that Iceland could not bar Britain from historic waters. The 
parties were admonished to negotiate differences.250 At about the same time US 
fishermen experienced seizures of boats and crews, mostly off Latin America's 
west coast and in the Gulf of Mexico, by States claiming territorial seas or eco-
nomic zones beyond those claimed by the United States. The US reaction was an 
insurance system to secure crews' and boats' releases, coupled with US diplomatic 
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protests.2SI Some countries' fishing boats were attacked in Western Hemisphere 
waters.2S2 There were no claims of self-defense in responses. 
In 1973, responding to US assistance to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, 
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the 
"Line of Death") as Libyan internal waters. The United States and other countries 
protested; only a few States have recognized the claim since then.253 The United 
States began challenging the claim by warships' use of the Gulf, establishing a for-
mal Freedom ofN avigation (FON) program in 1979. 254 During a 1981 FON exer-
cise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy aircraft, which 
dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan planes. The United States asserted a 
right of self-defense. Libya escalated threats against US warships and praised ter-
rorists who hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro in 1985. Further US FON exer-
cises were undertaken in the Gulf, including one below the Line of Death. US 
NOTMARs and NOTAMs published these exercises. In 1986, after Libyan 
land-based missiles were launched against Navy aircraft flying in international 
airspace but below the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated an announced exercise 
area, the FON force commander declared any Libyan military forces leaving Lib-
yan territorial waters or airspace and threatening US forces would be considered 
hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed toward US forces, 
and Libyan shore-based target acquisition radars were activated "with the evident 
object of firing upon U.S. aircraft," the boats and radars were destroyed or dam-
aged. The boats were not attacked when seeking refuge alongside a neutral mer-
chantman or engaging in search and rescue operations. The United States claimed 
a right of anticipatory self-defense.255 
Although the United States notified the Security Council of its self-defense re-
sponses in the 1975 Mayaguez incident,256 when US naval aircraft were attacked by 
Libyan aircraft over the Gulf of Sidra in 1981, and in 1986 when the United States 
responded to Libyan patrol boat advances, the Council passed no resolutions on 
the situations.257 
In 1981 US forces operated under the recently revised Peacetime Rules of En-
gagement (ROE), which provided "word picture[s]" giving commanders listings 
of military indicators of hostile intent to consider in self-defense, i.e., when there 
was a demonstration of a hostile intent to attack that could justify response in an-
ticipatory self-defense. Although ROE might authorize units to respond to the 
limits of principles of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, reaction in 
a given situation might not rise to the line of permissible responses under the law 
of self-defense. To the extent permitted by law, national policy and operational 
plans and orders, force commanders also have discretionary judgment to make 
other responses. Although US ROE have been classified in most cases, it is com-
monly known that US force commanders always have the obligation to defend 
their unite s). Failure to observe restrictive national ROE in protecting a unit under 
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a legitimate claim of self-defense cannot result in a counterclaim of a violation of 
the law of self-defense.258 In other words, ROE-based responses may articulate a 
claim of self-defense; if the ROE response is more restrictive than the law of 
self-defense might permit, practice under the ROE cannot be interpreted as setting 
the boundaries of self-defense. ROE and the law of self-defense are therefore inde-
pendent variables, although ROE cannot exceed the boundaries of the law. 
During the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, although the United Kingdom based 
its military operation on Art. SI, no Council resolutions passed on the conflict took 
a clear position on the point.259 On April 7, 1982 the United Kingdom declared a 
200-mile Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ), to be effective April 12, for Argentine 
shipping around the Falklands/Malvinas. On April 23 the United Kingdom estab-
lished a Defensive Sea Area (DSA) or "defensive bubble" around its task force, 
warning that approach by Argentine civil or military aircraft, warships or naval 
auxiliaries would be dealt with "appropriately." On May 1, when fighting started 
in the islands, the MEZ was changed to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) for ships 
supplying the Argentine war effort. MEZ coverage was extended May 7 to sea areas 
more than 12 miles off the Argentine coast. Argentina had declared a 200-mile De-
fense Zone (DZ) offits coast and around the Falklands/Malvinas on April 13, after 
having protested the UK action. MEZ enforcement capability came on the day it 
was effective, April 12. 260 Presumably Argentina could have enforced its DZ if it 
chose to do so, but after the cruiser General Belgrano sinking, Argentine naval 
forces, except land-based naval aviation and possibly submarines, did not figure in 
the war. On May 11 Argentina declared all South Atlantic Ocean waters a war zone, 
threatening to attack any UK vessel therein. Apparently the only neutral-flag ship 
attacked by Argentina in the war zone was Hercules, a Liberian-flag, US inter-
ests-owned tanker in ballast. Although the USSR belatedly protested lawfulness of 
the UK TEZ, it did apparently not object to the Argentine DZ and observed the 
UK TEZ.261 The United States had published warnings to US vessels and ships 
owned by US interests, e.g., Hercules, two days before she was hit.262 On July 12, 
1982, active hostilities in the war ended, but the UK TEZ and economic sanctions 
were continued. Ten days later the TEZ was lifted, but the United Kingdom 
warned Argentina to keep military ships and aircraft away from the islands, declar-
ing a ISO-mile Protection Zone.263 The TEZ was relatively successful, although 
Argentina succeeded in airlifts to the islands until the last days of the war. Appar-
ently Argentine sealift efforts failed,z64 
In the Iran-Iraq war, although the Security Council recognized the right of free-
dom of navigation and called for protection of the marine environment 265 in a 
context of belligerent and other States' self-defense claims,266 there was no Coun-
cil action to take charge of the conflict by decision, as the Charter provides. 267 Both 
belligerents declared defense, war or exclusion zones,268 and aside from Council 
resolutions calling for recognition of freedom of navigation rights and protection 
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of the environment,269 the Council did not purport to regulate these. No Council 
resolution explicitly determined the validity of the self-defense claims of Iran or 
Iraq. 
Thus, at least in 1986 when Combacau's analysis was published on Security 
Council practice in defining self-defense, "whatever the official pretence, and per-
haps the legal situation, the international community is ... back where it was be-
fore 1945: in the state of nature; and ... the notion of self-defense makes no sense 
there.,,270 The latter part of Combacau's conclusion is overblown, for we may at 
least draw upon the understandings of the Pact of Paris, as its concepts were car-
ried forward into Article 51. 271 The 1990-91 Gulf War, the most serious challenge 
to the Council since the Korean conflict, shed no light on the issue. Council Reso-
lution 661 merely confirmed the right of individual and collective self-defense as 
stated in the Charter.2n As Combacau intimates, much of this is due to the struc-
ture and powers of Charter institutions. Action by the Council must be taken with 
permanent members' concurrence,273 and the Soviet veto was a regular feature of 
Cold War politics. However, other countries (including the United States) vetoed 
resolutions when allies, friends or interests were involved.274 Mindful of this, and 
the "sovereign equality of [UN] ... Members,,,275 it is no wonder that self-defense 
has not figured strongly in Council resolutions, which nearly always have been 
nonmandatory recommen,dations or calls for action.276 
The General Assembly record is also relatively meager. Except for certain com-
petences not relevant here, the Assembly's function is recommendatory and sub-
ordinate to the Council on matters related to international peace and security.277 
Article 12(1)'s requirement, that the Assembly cannot make a recommendation on 
a matter relating to international peace and security while the Council is seized of 
it, explains the Assembly record in part. Usually States will complain to the Coun-
cil first, as the Charter provides.278 While the Council debates the matter, the As-
sembly is impotent. If the Council acts, even through nonmandatory calls for 
action or recommendations instead of binding decisions under Articles 25 and 48, 
it remains seized of the matter. If vetoes stop Council action on a particular crisis, it 
may still remain seized of the matter, depending on its prior resolutions.279 On the 
other hand, if the matter comes to the Assembly first, the Assembly may make rec-
ommendations until the Council takes it up. 
The Assembly's nonmandatory resolutions may recite, and therefore strengthen, 
customary and treaty norms, or may lead to development of new norms, how-
ever.280 Certain of these resolutions have asserted claims relative to self-defense. 
General Assembly Resolution 378 (1950), companion to the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution passed during the Korean War, recites these recommendations: 
(a) That if a State becomes engaged in armed conflict with another State or States, 
it take all steps practicable in the circumstances and compatible with the right 
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of self-defence to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible 
moment; 
(b) In particular, that such State shall immediately, and in any case not later than 
twenty-four hours after the outbreak of the hostilities, make a public state-
ment wherein it will proclaim its readiness, provided that the States with 
which it is in conflict will do the same, to discontinue all military operations 
and withdraw all its military forces which have invaded the territory or terri-
torial water of another State or crossed a demarcation line, whether on terms 
agreed by the parties to the conflict or under conditions to be indicated to the 
parties by the ... United Nations; 
(c) That such State immediately notify the Secretary-General, for communica-
tion to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations, of the 
statement made in accordance with [(b)] ... and of the circumstances in which 
the conflict has arisen; 
(d) That such State, in its notification to the Secretary-General, invite the appro-
priate organs of the United Nations to dispatch the Peace Observation Com-
mission to the area in which the conflict has arisen, if the Commission is not 
already functioning there; 
(e) That the conduct of the States concerned in relation to the matters covered by 
the foregoing recommendations be taken into account in any determination 
of responsibility for the breach of the peace or act of aggression in the case un-
der consideration and in all other relevant proceedings before the appropriate 
organs of the United Nations[.]281 
That same year the "Peace through Deeds" resolution "reaffirm[ ed] that ... anyag-
gression ... is the gravest of all crimes against peace and security" and "That 
prompt united action be taken to meet aggression wherever it arises[.],,282 The 
1970 Friendly Relations Declaration again condemned the threat or use of force, 
declared a war of aggression to be a crime against peace, and added that "States 
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use offorce." The Declara-
tion added, however, that "Nothing in [its terms should] be construed as enlarging 
or diminishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning 
cases in which the use offorce is lawful,,,283 i.e., in self-defense.284. 
Specific situations occurring in the Charter era offer little additional guidance 
to the meaning of self-defense. The 1950 UFP Resolution has been discussed.285 In 
1966 the Assembly belatedly called upon India and Pakistan to observe the rules of 
warfare, but only as the war wound down.286 The Assembly condemned the USSR 
Afghanistan invasion in 1982 287 and US action in Grenada the next year.288 
Thus it might be said, apart from occasional forays into the field or general 
statements, e.g., the Friendly Relations Declaration, that General Assembly prac-
tice, even during the UFP Resolution era occasioned by permanent Council mem-
ber vetoes, has been spotty. The result is that the definition of self-defense remains 
as it was in 1945 when the Charter was negotiated in the context of the Pact of Paris 
and other midcentury agreements. We are thus left with arguments from history, 
analysis of commentators, and rhetoric from some of the latter. 
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ii. Collective Self-Defense. Article 51 of the Charter permits collective self-de-
fense under the same terms as the right of individual self-defense. Certain aspects 
of collective self-defense differ from the issue of individual self-defense. However, 
if the foregoing analysis for the right of individual self-defense is correct, i.e., that 
ultimate resort to the context of the Charter's drafting is necessary, then similar 
analysis is necessary to appraise collective self-defense. 
Unlike individual States' right of self-defense, which is of ancient lineage, the 
notion of collective self-defense in the sense of the Charter began with the Con-
gress of Vienna system (1815) established at the end ofthe Napoleonic wars and 
continues on a parallel path to this day.289 Although there have been numerous 
collective self-defense agreements concluded since 1945, none of these were di-
rectly at issue in the Tanker War. North Atlantic Treaty countries operated to-
gether during the conflict, but the territorial limits of the Treaty 290 meant they 
operated under principles of "informal" self-defense, analyzed below. Similarly, 
two ANZUS Pact members, Australia 291 and the United States, were Tanker War 
participants; ANZUS did not apply, covering only Pacific area defense.292 Warsaw 
Pact countries were participants, the USSR through naval deployments, aid and 
diplomacy and other Soviet Bloc nations through weapons sales to belligerents,293 
but there was no perceived direct threat to or attack on any Pact party except for at-
tacks on USSR-flag merchantmen, and the Pact was not invoked.294 Many Arab 
League States were involved in the war, but a combination of internal dissension 
within the League, at least at the beginning of the Tanker War,295 and an apparent 
interpretation that this regional defense treaty 296 pointed only toward outside ag-
gressors resulted in its not being invoked against either belligerent. The Arab 
League seems to have functioned during the Gulf War as a regional arrangement 
that attempted to maintain international peace and security pursuant to Article 52 
of the Charter.297 Although late in the Tanker War the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Summit approved a comprehensive security strategy that some have said amounts 
to a collective self-defense pact,298 there has been no formal publication of this ar-
rangement as a treaty. The strategy can be viewed as an example ofinformal collec-
tive self-defense, also permissible under the Charter.299 
The Charter thus "contains the first real attempt to reconcile the imposition of 
duties to maintain international peace and security with the problem posed by the 
freedom which each sovereign State normally would have[,] to decide when and 
how such a duty may be fulfilled.,,300 Given the context of the preparation of Arti-
cle 51 while the Act ofChapultepec was going forward to signature,301 McDougal 
and Feliciano are correct in saying that the essence of the right of collective self-de-
fense lies in maintaining international peace and security through collaborative 
arrangements among States.302 
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1. Other Regional Organizations: Article 52 of the Charter. The structure of the Charter 
and practice since 1945 confirm the McDougal-Feliciano view. Article 52(1) of the 
Charter provides: 
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements 
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations. 
Thus, "the Charter basis of collective self-defense arrangements in Article 51 does 
not exclude the possibility that other provisions of the treaties and activities of the 
agencies in question came under Article 52.,,303 Indeed, "[f]rom the discussions 
leading up to the approval of the Charter, ... regionalism was considered primarily 
in connection with the maintenance of international peace and security.,,304 
Although formed for other purposes in 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council had 
moved from its initial stated goal of cooperation to protect internal security to a 
policy of cooperating in economic and defense security by the end of the war.305 By 
the end of the war GCC members were cooperating among themselves for mine 
suppression and other measures, and with other States with navies in the Gul£306 
The Arab League also partook of a collective defense treaty and economic coopera-
tion system.307 
II. Practice During the Charter Era; «Informal" Collective Self-Defense. Prior practice 
confirms the view that a right ofinformal self-defense, besides Article 51's confir-
mation of the inherent right of collective self-defense, exists in the Charter era. 
Although there was some objection to the concept of regional defense arrange-
ments,30S a number of these agreements, articulating the principle that an attack 
on one member is an attack on all, have been concluded and remain in force.309 
State practice has also confirmed regional arrangements, sometimes ad hoc, to deal 
with threats to the peace, aggression or other forms of breaches of the peace. There 
have also been bilateral or multilateral assertions of collective self-defense, often 
without formal prior treaty arrangement. 
Lack of a definition of self-defense by the Council or the Assembly in the Ko-
rean War has been noted.310 Ifit is assumed that UN operations (primarily US di-
rected) after Soviet vetoes began in 1950 could not have been grounded in the UFP 
Resolution, since General Assembly resolutions have no binding effect,311 one 
theory of the multilateral operations in Korea after the USSR veto is "informal" 
collective self-defense, i.e., cooperating countries pooled forces to resist North Ko-
rea's continued aggression and the PRC incursion. The same might be said for 
contemporaneous US naval operations between Taiwan and the China 
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mainland.312 For the United States and South Korea or Taiwan, bilateral defense 
treaties replaced informal arrangements in 1953 and 1954 respectively.313 
The 1951 ANZUS Pact was memorialized Australia-New Zealand-US practice 
after World War II and during the Korean War, another example ofinformal col-
lective self-defense.314 
In 1962, OAS countries, under US leadership, relied on Charter Article 52, 
which permits regional organization resolution of disputes,31S to enforce a naval 
quarantine around Cuba during the Missile Crisis. The US proclamation estab-
lishing the quarantine, besides citing the Rio Treaty, also relied on a US Congres-
sional resolution recognizing the threat. The proclamation was specific as to 
cargoes to be halted, e.g., missiles, bombs, bomber aircraft, warheads, and support 
equipment, "and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secre-
tary of Defense [to] effectuate" the proclamation. It exempted other cargoes, e.g., 
foodstuffs and petroleum, and declared neutral rights would be respected. No 
blockade was declared, and the proclamation limited use of force to situations 
where directions under the quarantine were disobeyed if reasonable efforts were 
made to communicate directions to an interdicted vessel, "or in case of self-de-
fense." (The Rio Treaty authorized "partial or complete interruption of economic 
relations or of ... sea communications; and use of armed force[,]" among other 
measures, parallelling Charter Articles 41-42). 316While some said self-defense was 
the proper claim,317 and others later asserted that the Nicaragua Case would have 
held the quarantine action a matter of anticipatory self-defense,318 the OAS-US 
1962 claim was based on Article 52 and not Article 51. The point is that Article 52 
organizations can organize for informal collective self-defense in situations threat-
ening regional security without benefit of an Article 51 collective self-defense 
treaty. The Missile Crisis thus might arguably be further precedent for informal 
self-defense under the Charter. 
The 1964 attacks on U.S.S. Maddox and Turner Joy (the Gulf of Tonkin Inci-
dent) h:we been ana1yzed.319 The conflict connecting these incidents, the Vietnam 
War, is an example of a claim of informal collective self-defense. The US position 
during the Vietnam War was that it and South Vietnam (RVN) were jointly resist-
ing North Vietnamese aggression and therefore were acting in self-defense. (There 
were other views; e.g., it was a civil war.)320 During the conflict, patrol areas for Op-
eration Market Time, which sought to deny seaborne supplies to RVN opponents, 
was extended to 30 miles off the South Vietnamese coast. Initially Market Time 
operations took place in a 12-mile defensive sea area. North Vietnam used small 
coastal fishing vessels to support military logistics in the South. Fishermen and 
coastal traders were allowed to pass when on legitimate business. 321 In 1972 a mine 
quarantine program in North Vietnamese waters sought to seal North Vietnam 
ports.322 Its antecedent had been the RVN's attempted quarantine to stop sealifted 
supplies coming to the Viet Cong through the Gulf of Siam and the Mekong Delta. 
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A RVN destroyer sank a North Vietnamese trawler, believed to be carrying ammu-
nition, in 1972 during these operations.323 
During the war the United States used Military Sealift Command vessels, US 
flag charters and occasionally foreign-flag vessels to deliver war material. Several 
ships were hit; two were sunk by Viet Cong attacks while in South Vietnamese 
coastal waters. The Viet Cong seem not to have discriminated between vessels car-
rying war material and civilian-oriented cargoes, e.g., cement.324 US antisubma-
rine protection was given high value ships, e.g., troop carriers.325 While some have 
claimed SEATO may have applied, and its formal treaty obligations remain in ef-
fect, its supporting organization had been dismantled by 1975,326 and US assis-
tance to South Vietnam might be characterized as another example of informal 
collective self-defense. 
On the face of it, the Tanker War was a bilaterial conflict. However, as analyzed 
above,327 some States or groups of States acted to favor one (or in some cases both) 
of the belligerents throughout the war. As in the case ofthe Falklands/Malvinas 
War (1982) and unilateral US help for Britain and the multilateral EC embargo on 
Argentine goods,328 this kind of participation arguably could be said to recognize 
an interim state of nonbelligerency in the Charter era. 329 The same sort ofinformal 
participation and influences or attempted influences came through organizations 
aligned along geographic lines (the Gulf Cooperation Council), common defense 
interests elsewhere (NATO), common economic interests (the EC and the Group 
of Seven), and ethnic or religious commonality (the ICO and the Arab League).330 
States also had informal arrangements among themselves. Italy's bilateral mine 
clearing agreements are an example.331 The US statement that US Navy protection 
was available to third-State merchantmen, upon request and if US naval commit-
ments permitted, is another.332 The clearest example of informal self-defense ar-
rangements was the December 1987 comprehensive security strategy adopted by 
the Gulf Cooperation Council.333 
The belligerents also made arrangements that did not rise to the level of a for-
mal Article 51 self-defense agreement or an Article 52 regional arrangement, at 
least on the public record. A notable example was the belligerents' financing their 
war through petroleum sales and their importing war goods through third coun-
tries.334 Arms and other sales to belligerents335 might be seen as another example 
of an informal arrangement. Below these governmental efforts were the effects of 
organizations, e.g., the General Council of British Shipping, seafarers' unions, and 
the marine insurance industry.336 
III. Appraisalfor the Tanker War. No formal agreements like the multilateral or bi-
lateral defense treaties of the Cold War era were involved in the Tanker War. How-
ever, as with prior conflicts since 1945, e.g., Falklands/Malvinas, States or groups 
of States aided one side or the other. When States that were not belligerents 
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concerted together, these amounted to informal collective defense assistance ar-
rangements, sometimes with a belligerent and sometimes among other countries 
not party to the conflict. There was precedent for this action before and during the 
Charter era.337 It is arguable, for example, that the 1990-91 coalition assembled 
against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was governed by principles of informal 
self-defense, to the extent that there were no formal collective self-defense treaties 
among coalition countries, before the Security Council authorized force in November 
1990. 338 After and to the extent the Council became seized of the matter, coalition 
actions were governed by Security Council decisions.339 
Whether claims of informal collective self-defense amount to a resurgence of 
the pre-Charter concept of an interim legitimate stage of nonbelligerency, between 
belligerency and neutrality,340 is an open question. Many States recognize only 
neutrality or belligerency.341 It would seem, however, that it is possible that 
nonbelligerency may have crept in through the door of practice under the Charter 
between 1945 and 1988, before the end of the Cold War. Whetherthis will continue 
with revitalization ofthe Security Council since 1989 and the USSR's collapse is 
only a guess. If the Council continues relatively powerless, by the veto or adoption 
of nonbinding recommendations or calls for action, or if the UFP Resolution pro-
cedure is revived with a veto-paralyzed Council, that door remains open. 
It would seem, however, that a distinction between belligerency and neutrality 
can be retained by referring to informal collective self-defense for some situations, 
e.g., US and EC support of Britain during the Falklands/Malvinas War.342 Whether 
informal collective self-defense can sustain actions in all situations must be left to 
speculation. The problem lies in a definition of the contours of the doctrine. It is 
fairly clear, for example, that there is a customary right for formal treaty partners to 
consult before action, and that consultation can include preparation for anticipa-
tory collective self-defense. It is also fairly clear that the inherent right to collective 
self-defense includes a right of anticipatory self-defense, however that might be 
limited by principles of necessity, proportionality and admitting of no alternative 
in a particular situation.343 Presumably informal collective self-defense includes a 
right of consultation, but does it include a right of anticipatory response? If the re-
cord ofinformal collective self-defense is sparse in the Charter era, claims to a right 
of anticipatory response appear to be even more scarce. There are few reports of it 
in the century and a half of prior practice;344 there may be many, particularly in the 
maritime arena since 1914,345 but the record of State practice is not clear on the 
point. Lack of media interest, space considerations and relative importance in di-
gests of national practice like Whiteman, lack of commentary by scholars, or na-
tional security, may have resulted in no or only episodic reportage. 
There is one critical difference between collective self-defense claims, whether 
anticipatory or otherwise, published in treaties and those asserted under a right of 
informal self-defense. Today most treaties are published, perhaps first in informal 
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sources, e.g., International Legal Materials, but nearly always later in national series, 
e.g., United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, and perhaps in the 
United Nations Treaty Series, although International Legal Materials is selective in 
publication and the latter two may be decades behind in printing. Some agree-
ments are never published, due to national security considerations,346 and these 
may often deal with defense issues. However, at least for published treaties, there is 
some public notice of their terms,347 perhaps qualified or explained by practice. By 
definition, there is no similar method of notice by publication of informal collec-
tive self-defense arrangements, except what might be deduced from government 
notices or the media. It would seem, however, that to avoid claims of unprovoked 
aggression under Article 2(4) of the Charter, States should notify informal collec-
tive arrangements except where security considerations militate against publicity. 
Notices to Mariners. (NOTMARs) and Airmen (NOTAMs) were employed dur-
ing the Tanker War to publicize defense, war or exclusion zones and warnings of 
self-defense action.348 Even as a requirement of treaty publication is qualified to-
day, e.g., for national security considerations,349 States in informal collective 
self-defense arrangements should consider publishing their terms. 
iii. Reporting Self-Defense Measures to the Security Council. The Charter also 
requires that "Measures taken by Members in [the exercise of this right of] self-de-
fense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any 
way affect the authority and responsibility of the ... Council under the ... Charter 
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.,,350 There is little ambiguity in this requirement, 
which is not part of customary international law, according to the Nicaragua Case, 
which added that failing to report "may be one of the factors indicating whether 
the State in question was itself convinced that it was acting in self-defense.,,351 The 
question might be raised, particularly in view of the Court's position that a parallel 
customary law of self-defense has developed alongside Charter criteria in Article 
51,352 how reporting could be a "factor" for a customary law of self-defense if the 
reporting requirement is not a part of customary law. Use of "this right of self-de-
fense" in Article 51353 underscores requiring reporting only in Article 51-gov-
erned situations. Whether an Article 51 reporting requirement applies in cases of 
informal collective self-defense, also permissible under the Charter,354 is not 
known and perhaps depends on whether a State claims a right to informal collec-
tive self-defense under Article 51 or under customary law. 
In any event, the Article 51 reporting requirement appears to have been hon-
ored more in the breach.355 A commentator has argued, however, that failure to re-
port at least indicates that measures taken are not defensive in nature.356 
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iv. Anticipatory Self-Defense. The Caroline Case is the classic statement of the 
right of anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a target State may resort to self-defense be-
fore an actual armed attack where the necessity for that defense is "instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The 
action then taken must not be unreasonable or excessive, i.e., it must be propor-
tional to the threat; it must also be necessary. The Tokyo and Nuremberg tribunals 
recognized a right of anticipatory self-defense, holding the Netherlands could rely 
on it to justify attack on Japan before a formal war declaration but that Germany 
could not rely on it to justify attack on Norway.357 
Does the right of anticipatory self-defense carry forward into the Charter era, or 
must a State "take the first hit" before responding in self-defense, i.e., is only "reac-
tive" self-defense permitted? Commentators 358 and countries 359 divide sharply 
on the issue. Commentators 360 and countries 361 may also divide on when self-de-
fense, anticipatory or reactive, is appropriate. The Charter is silent on the point, 
except to say that UN Members retain the "inherent" right of individual and col-
lective self-defense.362 The Nicaragua Case did not rule on the issue.363 Some com-
mentators,364 and undoubtedly some States, have seemed to change views. Others 
have taken no clear position.365 
If the methodology of treaty interpretation is employed, practice under Article 
51 has been ambiguous. Bowett notes the UN Atomic Energy Commission's initial 
report, which said a right of self-defense would arise where a party to a nuclear 
arms treaty committed a "grave" violation of the treaty.366 He also cites the Secu-
rityCouncil discussion over the Kashmir invasion, justified by Pakistan on antici-
patory defense grounds, where only India argued against the view.367 In 1952 the 
UN Sixth Committee heard four States argue that a State threatened with impend-
ing attack might be justified to respond in self-defense.368 
The Definition of Aggression resolution includes specific examples not involv-
ing armed attack on a State but which are nevertheless considered aggression un-
der the Charter: blockade of ports or coasts which, if complied with, results in no 
use offorce, merely a threat of use offorce; "use" of armed forces of a State, within a 
host State's territory by the host's agreement, but contravening conditions in the 
agreement initially entitling the visiting armed forces to be there, which might re-
sult when such forces are "used" in nonforce situations.369 The enumeration is not 
exclusive 370 and could include other circumstances involving threat of force that 
could trigger a potential for self-defense response. If acts of aggression can justify a 
proportional self-defense response, it is implicit in the Assembly's approval of 
these as per se acts of aggression by which an anticipatory self-defense response 
could be triggered. 
The case of blockade is illustrative. When blockade is declared against a target 
State, no armed attack will occur if there are no ships to intercept. There is no way 
to determine the blockade's effectiveness until interceptions occur or ships 
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successfully evade blockade. If a target State acts to end the blockade before its 
goal-intercepting and possibly destroying target State ships-occurs, a target 
State would be exercising anticipatory self-defense. Thus if armed aggression-
the French version of "armed attack" in Article S1371-includes blockade as cus-
tomary law,372 then target State action to end a blockade may include anticipatory 
self-defense. 
The division of commentators and countries on admissibility of anticipatory 
self-defense as an option has been recited.373 Dinstein offers an intermediate posi-
tion of"interceptive" self-defense, permitted if a State "has committed itself to an 
armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way. Whereas a preventive strike [i.e., an-
ticipatory self-defense] which is merely 'foreseeable' (or even just 'conceivable') an 
interceptive strike counters an armed attack which is 'imminent' and practically 
'unavoidable.' 374 He cites a scenario based on theJ apanese task force ordered to at-
tack Pearl Harbor in 1941: 
[h]ad [it] been destroyed on its way to Pearl Harbor, this would have constituted 
not an act of preventive war but a miraculously early use of counter-force .... [Pluto .. 
another way, the self-defence exercised by the United States (in response to an 
incipient armed attack) would have been not anticipatory but interceptive in 
nature.375 
Dinstein thus justifies Israel's first opening fire in the 1967 Arab-Israeli con-
flict.376 The hypothetical interception to end a naval war in 1941, before the Char-
ter era, is undoubtedly true today, if the Japanese task force was past the point of no 
return (i.e., it could not be recalled) and it was reasonably clear from facts available 
to the United States at the time.377 The same can be said ofIsrael's 1967 attack on 
Egypt. 
Dinstein's analysis does not mention Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear re-
actor, condemned by the Security Council and others, arguing that the raid came 
during a continuing state of war between Iraq and Israel,378 nor does he mention 
two tactical aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Israeli attack on the U.s.S. 
Liberty, and destruction of the Israeli destroyer Eilat by missiles.379 Liberty was a 
US warship operating in international waters of the Mediterranean Sea, gathering 
intelligence for the United States, when it was attacked by Israeli aircraft and PT 
boats. The attack clearly violated international law and, as an act of aggression, 
could have subjected Israel to US proportional self-defense responses. 
Eitat's loss, also on the high seas, due to an Egyptian gunboat'S Styx missiles 
launched in Port Said harbor occurring during a resumption of the conflict, illus-
trates the change in naval warfare between 1941 and 1967. 380 (This attack could 
not raise the self-defense issue, since it occurred during hostilities, rather than at 
the beginning of hostilities.) Rather than a battleship and carrier formation steam-
ing at 20-30 knots to a position off Hawaii where it could launch raids flown by 
140 The Tanker War 
aircraft with top speeds of 400 miles an hour, thus giving days or at least hours for a 
target State to anticipate and deliver an interceptive strike, missile attacks from the 
same range come in minutes. Moreover, a missile attack is nearly always fatal. One 
can compareEilat's loss in 1967, the sinking of Venus Challenger and a Pakistani de-
stroyer during the 1971 India-Pakistan war,38 1 losses ofH.M.S. Sheffield and other 
ships during the Falklands/Malvinas war,382 and U.S.S. Stark's near loss during 
the Tanker War,383 with survival of many ships during the World War II 
Kamikazi attacks, where hundreds of manned Japanese suicide planes crashed US 
warships. Aside from aircraft carriers and battleships, World War II men-of-war 
were smaller and equally fragile, yet they took many hits before sinking, and most 
survived.384 New occasions teach new duties and responsibilities,385 and ifinter-
national law is to remain credible, it must parallel technical developments.386 
(That, of course, is the function of custom as opposed to a potentially rigidified 
. )387 treaty reglme. 
Dinstein's interceptive defense theory seems but another phrase for anticipa-
tory self-defense in the Pearl Harbor attack hypothetical. He is less than clear 
about the situation of an anticipated attack on an independendy-steamingwarship 
before armed conflict begins. However, as events in the Tanker \'{Tar and previous 
incidents demonstrate, some States have asserted a right of anticipatory self-de-
fense 388 or interceptive defense as Dinstein would formulate it. 
1. Libya-US Confrontations. Libya-US confrontations from 1973 through 1986 il-
lustrate the two views of the scope of self-defense. 389 
In 1973, responding to US assistance to Israel during the Yom Kippur War, 
Libya declared the Gulf of Sidra below 32 degrees 30 minutes North latitude (the 
"Line of Death") as Libyan territorial waters. 
The United States challenged the claim by warships' use of the Gulf of Sidra, es-
tablishing a formal Freedom ofN avigation (FON) program in 1979. In 1981, dur-
ing a FON exercise, two Libyan air force jets launched missiles against Navy 
aircraft, who dodged the missiles and downed the Libyan aircraft with missiles. 
Under anyone's view of the right of self-defense, the Navy aircraft had a right to 
fire in response to the prior Libyan missile attack; it was an example of reactive 
self-defense. 
Tensions again mounted in 1985-86. Libya escalated threats against US war-
ships and praised the terrorists who had hijacked the Italian liner Achille Lauro. 
New US FON exercises were ordered off Libya, including one below the Line. US 
NOTMARs and NOT AMs publicized the operations. After Libya launched 
land-based missiles against Navy aircraft flying over international waters below 
the Line, and Libyan aircraft penetrated the announced exercise area in interna-
tional waters, the FON force commander declared that Libyan military forces 
leaving Libyan territorial waters or airspace and constituting a threat to US units 
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would be considered hostile. Thereafter, when Libyan missile patrol boats headed 
toward US forces, and Libyan target acquisition radars activated with a likely ob-
ject of firing on US aircraft, the Libyan boats and radars were attacked and dam-
aged or destroyed. In these cases the US claim was anticipatory self-defense, i.e., 
taking action to protect ships or aircraft after hostile intent (e.g., closing US ships 
in an attack profile or illuminating US aircraft with target acquisition radar) was 
manifested. There was, of course, no obligation for US forces to attack or desist 
from attacking the Libyan vessels or aircraft, but there was the option to do so, sub-
ject to limitations of self-defense, i.e., necessity and proportionality.390 Indeed, US 
forces did not fire on Libyan missile patrol boats when they sought refuge along-
side a neutral merchantman or were engaged in legitimate search and rescue opera-
tions, which illustrate these principles. 
In April 1986 US Navy and Air Force planes bombed terrorist operations cen-
ters in Libya after two US citizens were killed in a Berlin disco terrorist bombing. 
The US hard evidence was that Libya was responsible for the disco bombing and 
was planning further terrorist attacks on US military and diplomatic facilities in 
Europe. The United States claimed self-defense conditioned by necessity and pro-
portionalityas the basis for the operation. French, UK and US vetoes blocked a Se-
curity Council resolution condemning the raid.391 
II. The Tanker War. The Tanker War produced numerous examples of reactive 
self-defense, i.e., self-defense after an initial attack, as well as anticipatory self-
defense, both individual and informal collective self-defense.392 
Iraq responded to Iran's shelling ofIraqi towns in 1980 with a three-front inva-
sion ofIran, claiming self-defense.393 If it is true that the shelling was not respon-
sive to Iraqi invasions, Iraq's claim of self-defense was legitimate. On the other 
hand, if Iranian shelling responded to prior Iraqi acts of aggression, the shelling 
was a proper self-defense response by Iran, and the Iraqi invasion could not be 
claimed as self-defense. In the latter situation, the invasion was a clear violation of 
Charter Article 2(4). Use or threat of use of force in response to legitimate self-
defense action cannot be claimed as self-defense. Since UN Security Council Reso-
lution 479 was a "call" for cessation of hostilities, 394 and not a "decision,,,395 there 
was a strong political, but not a legal, obligation on the belligerents to comply. 
Both belligerents declared war zones.396 After the Iraqi invasion, Iran declared 
its coasts a war zone, closed the Shatt al Arab, refused access to Iraqi ports, and 
warned of retaliation if other countries gave Iraq facilities. Iran said the zone decla-
ration was for defense and for safety of shipping. Iraq's war zone was north of 
29-30N in the Gulf and was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian war 
zone declaration. 
Iran's war zone declaration was legitimate for Iran's coasts, which were part of 
its territory.397 Although the Shatt aI-Arab and Iraqi ports were part of the area of 
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conflict, unless Iran had occupied the area or they were vital to its defense, Iran 
could not lawfully announce their closure to States not party to the conflict. Still 
less could Iran issue a generalized warning of retaliation against these States if they 
gave Iraq facilities, unless States were parties to a collective defense agreement or 
arrangement with Iraq and employed this treaty arrangement to assist Iraq as the 
aggressor. Since Iraq had withdrawn from the Baghdad Pact,398 and was not a GCC 
member,399 Iran could not claim that these regional arrangements were assisting 
Iraq. Iraq was a party, with Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Arab 
States, to the Arab Joint Defense Treaty,400 and it may have been to this Treaty ar-
rangemen t that Iran directed its warning. It would have been entirely legitimate, if 
Iran committed aggression by shelling Iraqi communities, for the Treaty States to 
have collaborated with Iraq in collective self-defense.401 Although Iran could warn 
of retaliation, this did not deprive the Treaty States of their right to assist Iraq with 
collective self-defense responses. The Treaty States might have paid consequences, 
e.g., by bombing raids on their territory if they did, but they could not be deprived 
of theirtreaty obligation by the Iranian warning. On the other hand, ifIraq was the 
aggressor, e.g., by invading Iran, the Treaty States could not aid Iraq pursuant to 
the Treaty.402 Under no circumstances could Iran claim a right of retaliation 
against States not party to any defense treaty or other similar arrangement with 
Iraq, e.g., States whose shipping sailed the Gul~ or whose shipping interests used 
the Gulf, e.g., France, Liberia, Panama, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the 
. United States. 
Whether the Iraq war zone declaration was a legitimate reprisal, or was legal in 
'terms of area, duration, etc., is addressed later in this chapter 403 and in Part F of 
Chapter V. IfIran was the aggressor when it shelled Iraqi communities, then the 
Iraq war zone, later named the Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone (GMEZ), was a le-
gitimate self-defense measure, subject to proportionality, etc., considerations.404 
The same is true for the zone's extension, again subject to the same limitations.40S 
On the other hand, ifIraq was the aggressor, then the war zones, and the GMEZ, 
were not legal self-defense measures. 
The GCC's establishment in 1981, with a goal of coordinating, integrating and 
interconnecting, inter alia self-defense, among its six western Gulflittoral mem-
bers,406 was legitimate under Charter Articles 51-52, even though its self-defense 
terms were never spelled out like most collective defense treaties. This too is an ex-
ample of a legitimate "informal" multilateral collective self-defense arrange-
ment.407 Similarly, it was legitimate for Saudi Arabia to request US Air Force 
AWACS aircraft surveillance, and for the United States to agree to the operation, 
in 1981. 408 This is an example of a legitimate informal bilateral self-defense ar-
rangement.409 In neither case, however, could these informal arrangements be 
used to aid an aggressor. 
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The shuttle convoys carrying oil as part ofIran's warfighting, war-sustaining ef-
fort down Iran's Gulf coast and through the Iraqi zone were given Iranian naval 
protection.410 These vessels were entitled to self-defense protection by Iran. IfIran 
was correct in asserting that it was a target ofIraqi aggression, these fleets of ves-
sels, if attacked by Iraq, were also targets of aggression.4ll Even if they sailed alone, 
perhaps with naval escort or perhaps independently, these vessels would be con-
sidered targets ofIraqi aggression,412 ifIraq is deemed to have been the aggressor 
at the beginning of the war. If, on the other hand, Iran was the aggressor, the at-
tacks were subject to the law of naval warfare.413 
The same analysis applies for Iranian visits, searches and diversions 414 or at-
tacks on vessels bound for Iraq with military equipment, e.g., the Danish flag vessel 
Elsa Cat,41S or from Iraq with warfighting or war sustaining cargo (i.e., oil) aboard, 
ifIraq was the aggressor. Similarly, ifIraq was the aggressor, and if Kuwait was as-
sisting Iraq, and if, e.g., a Kuwaiti survey vessel 416 was assisting the Iraqi war ef-
fort, it was properly subject to search, seizure or detention as part of Iranian 
self-defense. These ships were also subject to search, seizure or detention as part of 
the law of naval warfare ifIran was the aggressor.417 
Security Council Resolutions 514, 522 and 540 of 1982 and 1983, calling for a 
ceasefire, refraining from any action that might endanger peace and security, ces-
sation of military operations against civilian targets, observing humanitarian law, 
and affirming the right offreedom of navigation, were not Council decisions pur-
suantto Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter. They did not speak to the self-defense is-
sue. The effect of incorporation of humanitarian law, etc., by reference in these 
resolutions elevated them to Charter law. At least insofar as conflicts between trea-
ties and the resolutions and practice under them, and perhaps insofar as there was a 
difference between custom paralleling the treaties, the Charter practice held pri-
macy.418 The same is true of other resolutions; they may have condemned action, 
advocated observance of the LOAC, freedom of navigation, or protection of the en-
vironment, but in no case did they remove a State's right of self-defense, which un-
der the Charter trumped any treaty law and perhaps also customary norms.419 
In January 1984 the United States announced new defensive measures for its 
warships in NOTAMs and NOTMARs. These procedures, a "defensive bubble" or 
«cordon sanitaire" around the shipes) for a stated distance on the surface of the sea 
and above the vessel(s) in the air, were justified on self-defense grounds when Iran 
protested.420 The UK Armilla Patrol, deployed in the lower Gulf since the begin-
ning of the war, never published use of a defensive envelope.421 In terms of self-de-
fense, the US cordon sanitaire was legitimate; although other navies' warships did 
not have benefit of a defensive bubble declared by their governments, they could 
take self-defense measures if threatened or attacked. If a US warship proceeded in-
dependently or in formation without an announced cordon sanitaire, which was the 
situation early in the war, that ship and the formation could also take self-defense 
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measures.
422 The US cordon sanitaire's validity in terms of area, duration, etc., is 
considered separately.423 
The Armilla Patrol accompanied UK flag merchantmen in the lower Gulf from 
the beginning of the war; these merchantmen were on their own as they proceeded 
northward.424 In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchant-
men. A French warship positioned itselfbetween the Ville d'Angers and an Iranian 
warship, warning the Iranian that if it attempted to intercept Ville d'Angers, the 
warship would use force to prevent the interception. (French ROE declared French 
warships would fire on forces refusing to break off attacks on neutral merchantmen 
under attack; the result was a drop in attacks near French men-of-war.) 425 In Janu-
ary 1986 the United Kingdom stated that a right of visit and search of neutral mer-
chantmen, believed carrying cargo to or from a belligerent port, was an aspect of 
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter.426 In March 1986 the United States 
recognized a basis in international law for belligerent searches of neutral mer-
chantmen.427 Nevertheless, in April 1986 a US destroyer warned an Iranian war-
ship off what may have been a planned boarding of President McKinley, a US flag 
merchantman.428 When the Soviet flagPyotr Emtsov, bound for Kuwait with arms 
ultimately destined for Iraq, was fired upon, stopped and searched by an Iranian 
warship in September 1986, the USSR protested.429 
The apparent divergence of views among States depends on the law deemed ap-
plicable to the interception, or the interpretation of it. If Article 51 and Charter law 
in general applied,430 and if Iraq was the aggressor, Iran could intercept, search 
and under some circumstances attack third-flag State unarmed merchant ships 
bound for Iraq, and believed to have warfighting or war-sustaining goods aboard as 
a self-defense measure. Treaty law to the contrary would be trumped by the Char-
ter.431 The only general treaty 432 applying to visit, search and diversion or de-
struction of merchantmen is the London Protocol, which provides in Article 22 
that 
... The following are accepted as established rules of international law: 
(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to 
the rules of international law to which surface vessels are subject. 
(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly 
summoned, or active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface 
vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a mer-
chant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in 
a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the 
existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity ofland, or the presence 
of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.433 
The Tanker War belligerents were party to the treaty, and among naval powers op-
erating in the Gulf, Belgium, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia, USSR, the United 
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Kingdom and the United States were also parties.434 No other GCC States were 
party.435 Although the London Protocol bound many naval powers in the Tanker 
War, it could not supersede the Charter 436 and its Article 51 self-defense norms, 
particularly if Article 51 states ajus cogens norm.437 However, the Protocol, orprin-
ciples similar to it, could inform the content of self-defense under Article 51. 438 
Whether the Protocol applies as customary law or has been superseded by practice 
since 1936, at least insofar as an unqualified duty to place those aboard a merchant-
man in safety is concerned, has been debated by commentators and govern-
ments,439 and since the Charter does not address the issue of custom conflicting 
with a Charter provision, the question arises as to whether practice is sufficient to 
offset specific London Protocol rules as custom. The issue also arises if there is a 
parallel, and different, customary self-defense standard to be applied, the situation 
in the Nicaragua Case.440 The San Remo Manual would restate the rule: 
Merchant vessels flying the flag of neutral States may not be attacked unless they: 
..• (f) othenvise make an effective contribution to the enemy's military action, e.g., 
by carrying military materials and it is not feasible for the attacking forces to first 
place passengers and crew in a place of safety. Unless circumstances do not permit, 
they are to be given a warning, so that they can re-route, off-load, or take other 
precautions. 
The Manual permits attacks on enemy-flag merchantmen as a legitimate military 
objective if, inter alia, they "otherwise mak[ e] an effective contribution to military 
action, e.g., [by] carrying military materials.,,441 Whether flying an enemy flag or 
flying a neutral flag but characterized as enemy because ofits activity,e.g., carrying 
war materials to aid the enemy, both classes of merchantmen are subject to rules of 
discrimination, military objective and proportionality.442 Certain merchant ships, 
e.g., coastal fishermen, are exempt from attack unless they lose exemption by aid-
ing the enemy.443 This standard, whether observed in the context ofinformingthe 
content of self-defense or as a law of naval warfare norm, is appropriate. It balances 
realities of modern technologies available to merchant ships, which might decide 
to advise the State whose war cargo it carries of an attacker's presence, entitling an 
attacking platform to treat a ship as directly aiding the enemy and subjecting it to 
destruction on that account,444 and Protocol humanitarian considerations. 
If Charter law did not apply to a State's actions, the same rules should have been 
applied as the law of armed conflict.445 This would be the case for Iraq, ifIraq was 
the aggressor; even though perhaps guilty of aggression, Iraq was bound to apply 
the LOAC in prosecuting its actions. If the reverse is true, i.e., Iran was the aggres-
sor and Iraq properly asserted self-defense, the result is the same. Iraq would be 
governed by the law of self-defense as applicable to its actions against merchant 
shipping, and Iran was required to apply the LOAC even though it might be guilty 
of aggression. If neither party was entitled to claim self-defense for these actions, 
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i.e., because Charter law including the law of self-defense did not apply, LOAC 
principles applied to both belligerents.446 Depending on the view of the Tanker 
War by States not party to the conflict, i.e., whether the Charter applied or not,447 
these States were also required to apply the LOAC as incorporated into Charter 
law, if they perceived that the Charter applied, or the LOAC if their view was that 
the law of armed conflict, and not Charter law, applied. 
These principles apply to States' protection of their flag shipping on the high 
seas that was destined for other than belligerents' ports. It was therefore legitimate 
for the United States to organize convoys of reflagged tankers or to escort single 
merchantmen, for France and the United Kingdom to accompany UK flag mer-
chantmen, and for France to interpose its warships against belligerents' threat-
ened hostile action against these merchant ships if they were not carrying goods to 
sustain a belligerent's war effort.448 IfIran had attacked escorted or convoyed mer-
chantmen as it threatened,449 convoying or escorting men-of-war could have re-
sponded in self-defense. It was legitimate self-defense for these States to operate, 
individually or perhaps informally as a collective group,450 to protect against or re-
move the mine menace from the high seas of the Gulf.451 It was legitimate for the 
United States to remove the Iran Ajr as a minelaying menace for this reason;452 
mines threatened merchantmen and warships alike, as damage to U.S.S. SamuelB. 
Roberts attests.453 The United States attacked Iranian platforms used as a gunboat 
base in response to the Iranian missile attack on the US-flagged Sea Isle City with 
US nationals in the crew,454 and Iranian gunboats that had attacked a Pan-
ama-flag, Japanese-owned tanker with US nationals among the crew.455 This 
followed from the policy behind the1986 Libya raid, mounted to destroy State-
supported terrorist bases in Libya after two US nationals were killed in a Berlin 
disco.456 If the US view is correct, that self-defense measures against those who 
attack American nationals is lawful, these were legitimate excercises of self-
defense. The Sea Isle City response, like the response to the Berlin disco bombing, 
was anticipatory self-defense, in that more threats from these sources could rea-
sonably be expected in the future. The reactive response to the Panama-flag vessel 
attack and the Sea Isle City response involved US nationals aboard, and Sea Isle City 
was US flagged.457 The United Kingdom committed to a similar response if a ves-
sel, although foreign flagged, had more than half UK beneficial ownership. 458 For-
eign-flag vessels could request US protection, which would be given if US forces 
were in the area and operational commitments allowed it.459 This too was a legiti-
mate exercise of self-defense, i.e., informal collective self-defense. The request and 
acceptance was enough to complete a collective self-defense arrangement.460 How-
ever, the practice of some masters in tailing convoys or simulating a convoy 461 
would not have entitled those vessels to self-defense protection by warships of 
other nations unless it had been agreed upon.462 
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Warship protection was also subject to the law of self-defense. The collective 
and individual States' responses to mines has been noted.463 It was proper for US 
and other countries' warnings to declare a defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire 
around their warships to respond to attacks on them. It was also proper for Gulf na-
val forces to cooperate, perhaps informally as the UK Armilla Patrol did, with 
other navies for mutual protection.464 It was proper for the United States to re-
spond to attacks on its seaborne helicopters,465 to the platform-based attack on Sea 
Isle City as a possible threat to its combatants in the Gulf,466 and to the mining at-
tack on Samuel B. Roberts.467 Although a US helicopter did not return fire when a 
Greek flag tanker shot at it,468 returned fire might have been appropriate ifthat 
would have been necessary and proportionate under the circumstances, which are 
less than clear from the record. 
There were several examples of mistaken fire in the Gulf War. The first was the 
Stark attack.469 US forces fired on several small boats or dhows after the defensive 
bubbles were announced.470 The reason for these latter errors can be attributed to 
the real and continuing threat ofIranian small boat attacks on merchantmen and 
warships.471 The U.S.S. Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655. 472 
In the Stark and Airbus cases claims were paid and settled without admitting lia-
bility.473 The United States expressed regret over the other losses and probably 
compensated for injuries, loss oflife and damage.474 Whether the attacking Iraqi 
aircraft observed proper qualifying principles of discrimination and proportional-
ity is unknown; therefore, whether this was a proper exercise of self-defense is 
sealed in Baghdad's archives. Whether US forces observed discrimination or pro-
portionalityprinciples in firing on the small boats is likewise not clear from the re-
cord; certainly if the commanders reasonably believed that these were Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard speedboats, they were correct in opening fire to protecttheir 
ships. The same is true for the Airbus tragedy.475 However, if these were reason-
ably perceived threats, the attacking platforms could fire in self-defense. On the 
other hand, if the targets were reasonably perceived to be carrying warfighting or 
war-sustaining goods, they were legitimate targets under the law of naval war-
fare.476 
The Tanker War thus strengthens the case that a right of anticipatory self-de-
fense exists in the Charter era as before. To be sure, States are not unanimous in 
this position, but at the least under the principle of sovereignty 477 States adhering 
to the use of anticipatory self-defense may continue to advocate it until there is an 
authoritative decision to the contrary. This is particularly true if, as analyzed 
above, Iran had a right of visit and search as a means of self-defense.478 IfIran had 
the right to stop and search a ship under a self-defense theory to check for 
warfighting/war-sustaining goods that might not be used for some time against 
Iran, this could only be under a theory of anticipatory self-defense, as distin-
guished from reactive self-defense. The same can be said for Iraqi attacks on ships 
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carrying warfightinglwar-sustaining goods for Iran. These in terceptions were sub-
ject to self-defense limitations, e.g., necessity and proportionality.479 And if such 
be the case, then those States protecting, escorting, accompanying or convoying 
these ships also had a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, if 
Iran or Iraq chose to attack instead of visiting and searching merchantmen not car-
rying warfightinglwar-sustaining goods to a belligerent.480 These States' warships 
also had a right of self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, of their 
units.481 
The Tanker War strengthens the precedent for informal collective self-defense 
among States opposed to the belligerents' sink-on-sight policies. Gulf naval forces 
developed these ad hoc coalitions to clear mines,482 to protect each other,483 and to 
protect merchantmen flagged by States other than their own.484 
The foregoing has proceeded on a theory that the Charter governed these inter-
actions. As will be seen in Chapter V, if certain aspects of the Tanker War were not 
governed by the law of the Charter, e.g., Iranian visit and search procedures, those 
procedures were strengthened through practice. 
v. Necessity. As noted above,485 a criterion for invoking self-defense, whether in 
the anticipatory defense mode or in the reactive mode after armed attack, is 
whether a response with force is necessary, i.e., admitting of no other alternative. 
Necessity is an accepted principle of international law conditioning the right of 
self-defense.486 It applies to war at sea.487 Alternatives to self-defense run the 
gamut from nonforce reprisals,488 retorsions,489 diplomatic protests 490 or other 
diplomatic initiatives,491 use of an adjudicative srrategy,492 orperhaps doing noth-
ing at the time, to await a more propitious moment for asserting a claim, perhaps 
along with others, in a general adjudicative, diplomatic or other resolution.493 The 
difficulty with these choices is that an inappropriate signal may be sent to the ini-
tial actor or other participants in the world community. The strategy of force, or al-
ternatives to it, may be used alone, in combination, and in varying degrees.494 
Today the general principle is that self-defense through force is justified only if a 
goal of compelling compliance with international norms violated in the initial at-
tack cannot reasonably be achieved by other means, i.e., "[F]orce should not be 
considered necessary until peaceful measures have been found wanting or when 
they clearly would be futile.,,495 As the San Remo Manual expresses it, 
The effect of these principles [of necessity and proportionality] is that the State 
which is the victim of an armed attack is entitled to resort to force against the attacker 
but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to achieve such defensive goals as 
repelling the attack, recovering territory and removing threats to its future 
security.496 
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Commentators differ on whether Charter self-defense norms apply after war be-
gins.497 However, since LOAC and Charter law necessity principles are virtually 
the same,498 and LOAC principles may inform Charter standards if the principles 
are in a treaty 499 or if Article 51 statesjus cogens norms,SOO the analysis assumes that 
standards are the same, or should be, in any case. 
Brownlie and Dinstein advance a hypothetical case of a target State's submarine 
depth-charged by another State's destroyer on the high seas, stating that necessity 
permits immediate counterattack by the submarine. The same would be true for a 
destroyer against whom a submarine fires a torpedo, and for neutral merchantmen 
attacked while under individual or collective defensive warship protection, e.g., 
while convoyed or steaming independently and being accompanied or escorted,SOl 
the Tanker War situations.S02 On the other hand, if a destroyer drops a hand gre-
nade-if reasonably perceived by a submarine as an unfriendly irritant and not an 
attack-or if a frigate tickles a submarine hull with sonar as an unfriendly but 
nonthreatening act, no right of self-defense by a submarine would arise. S03 By the 
opposite token, if a frigate indicates hostile intent to a submarine, e.g., by using ac-
tive, attack-mode sonar and maneuvers demonstrating reasonable probability of 
attack, or if a submarine behaves similarly, e.g., by setting up a firing solution 
flooding torpedo tubes and opening torpedo tube doors, the target could take im-
mediate self-defense action as a matter of necessity. 
These hypothetical cases illustrate necessity in a case of anticipatory self-de-
fense and are similar to Dinstein's hypothetical, justifying interceptive self-de-
fense to destroy the Japanese task force headed toward Pearl Harbor.S04 As with 
Israel's 1981 raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor,SOS a critical anticipatory self-defense 
issue is the qualification of necessity. The submarine-destroyer hypotheticals, 
where no weapon has been fired when self-defense action is taken, are relatively 
easy cases, and fall into the same category as situations involving missiles, includ-
ing the over-the-horizon variety. If anticipatory self-defense (or interceptive 
self-defense as Dinstein has it) is a principle of international law, then target 
shipes) can respond if necessary for self-preservation. 
The Japanese task force, as Dinstein recites it hypothetically, mayor may not 
have been subject to destruction in self-defense. Other alternatives, e.g., interpos-
ing a superior US fleet between it and Hawaii at a point beyond flying range of its 
targets on the high seas, might be considered a reasonable alternative, at least in 
the 1941 context. If the task force, known to be bound for an attack on Hawaii, 
would have proceeded onward after warning, the US fleet would have been justify-
ing in destroying it in anticipatory self-defense. If the Japanese task force inten-
tions were not known or there was no reason to believe that attack on Hawaii was 
planned, there would be no necessity for anticipatory self-defense. When its inten-
tions became known, e.g., through positive intelligence, and there was no reasonable 
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alternative to forestall attack, the US fleet would have been justified in acting in 
anticipatory self-defense. 
The fleet hypothetical also articulates the problem of national, as opposed to 
unit, self-defense. 506 Although beyond the scope of the Tanker War analysis, the 
problem of national survival (as distinguished from survival of a destroyer, for ex-
ample) may call forth different considerations ofnecessity.507 Nations' survival, 
because of their need for Gulf oil, was a policy behind the Carter Doctrine.508 De-
struction of single tankers could not be pegged on national survival, but necessity 
could be predicated on a need to save human life endangered during illegal at-
tacks.509 Accumulating these "pinpricks" to justify a massive attack on a belliger-
ent might have provoked claims of disproportionality.510 
What distinguishes one situation from another in the context of the necessity 
component is considering all relevant factors known to the target at the time,511 
e.g., participants, their perceived goals, methods of attack and response, conditions 
at the time, and probable effects.512 "The most important condition ... is the de-
gree of necessity as that necessity is perceived and evaluated by the target-claimant 
and incorporated in the pattern of its expectations-which, in the particular in-
stance, impels the claimant to use intense responding coercion," i.e., military 
force. The necessity standard-"great and immediate," "direct and immediate," 
or "compelling and instant"-has been carried over from customary law into the 
Charter era.513 
The Tanker War illustrates several examples of necessity in the self-defense 
context. 
US announcements of a defensive bubble or cordonsanitaire 514 were cases of pu-
tative necessity. The warning area was advance announcement that unidentified 
vessels or aircraft not responding to warnings and threatening US warships were 
subject to being destroyed out of necessity for a ship's self-protection. 
Applying the principle of self-defense to Iranian visits and searches of mer-
chantmen suspected of carrying warfighting or war-sustaining cargoes for Iraq is 
another example of necessity. It was necessary for Iran to visit and search on the 
high seas if the offending goods were to be seized; once the cargo was ashore, it 
would be difficult to stop its delivery to Iraq. Attempts to bomb truck convoys in 
Iraq might have resulted in collateral destruction and more deaths and injuries 
than in a properly executed visit and search. Iraq, which had no effective navy, re-
sorted to air attacks on shipping moving Iranian warfighting or war-sustaining 
cargoes. The choice was to permit the cargoes to arrive or to attack on the high seas. 
A case can be made that the Iraqi attacks were necessary. The same can be said for 
Iranian attacks on Iraq-bound cargoes. Whether the belligerents exercised proper 
target discrimination or proportionality is another issue. 515 Whether viewed from 
a self-defense or LOAC perspective, the standards were the same as under the 
LOAC for visit and search or attacks. 
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Convoying and other protective measures for innocent merchantmen were also 
necessary, in view of repeated belligerent attacks on these ships, regardless of cargo 
or flag. 
Another example of necessity was the US capture and destruction ofIranAjr. 516 
Given repeated illegal mining in Gulf shipping lanes, it is clear that Iran would 
have continued to lay mines. A sure way to end the problem was to end a source of 
mines, Iran Ajr. The same considerations justified States' mine clearance opera-
tions, necessary to remove the mine menace, regardless of origin.517 
Operation Praying Mantis, the destruction ofIranian frigates employed in at-
tacks on neutral merchantmen and of offshore oil platforms serving as a base for 
speedboats preying on merchant shipping and warships, was also a case of neces-
sity. If the frigates were allowed to continue their deprivations, merchant shipping 
would continue to suffer attacks, and if the oil platforms were not destroyed, they 
would have continued as a haven for the boats.51S Likewise, firing on attacking 
speedboats engaged in shooting up merchantmen was necessary. If there had been 
no such response, it is ludicrious to think that other action by naval powers (e.g., 
verbal radio warnings) would have stopped an ongoing attack. Diplomatic pro-
tests, often long after the fact, would have availed nothing to resurrect dead crew-
men, restore a burnt-out hull, or raise a sunken ship. 
Given evidence of a strong possibility of an Iranian suicide plane or conven-
tional attack on US warships engaged in self-defense at the time, Vincennes' de-
struction of Flight 655 519 was necessary from a self-defense perspective, if 
tragically mistaken in result. 
The same might be said for US responses to Libyan attempts to forcibly inter-
cept US ships, or to shoot down US aircraft.520 It takes little logic to justify force 
responses if missile have been deployed, or hostile intent has been clearly demon-
strated, under the circumstance of Libya's challenges to freedom of navigation. 
vi. Proportionality. In both anticipatory self-defense and self-defense after armed 
attack (reactive self-defense) response must be proportional. 
(I) Introduction. The limiting principle of proportionality, like necessity, in a 
self-defense response is well established in custom.521 It applies to naval war-
fare.522 The proportionality principle applies whether self-defense responds to 
armed attack or other armed aggression, or whether self-defense measures are an-
ticipatory to imminent armed attack or other armed aggression. However, "re-
sponsibility ... for a war of aggression may be incurred by the target State, should it 
resort to comprehensive force in over-reaction to trivial incidents.,,523 This is a 
decisionmaker dilemma when confronted with an event that reasonable evalua-
tors would say is an act of aggression. The problem is further compounded by a 
view that a single so-called trivial act may be rolled into a collection of other 
pin-pricks, with the result that a self-defense response against the sum of them all 
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may be proper.524 Responses with force that seem disproportionate to a present 
pin-prick carry a risk that the target of the response might argue that the response 
is disproportionate, is in effect an armed reprisal, and is therefore an armed attack 
by the responding State.525 "Genuine on-the-spot reaction [would have closed the] 
incident,,526 and may be a preferable course in many, if not most, situations. "The 
effect ... is that a State which is the victim of an armed attack is entitled to resort to 
force against the attacker but only to the extent necessary to defend itself and to 
achieve such defensive goals as repelling the attack, recovering territory, and re-
moving threats to its future security.,,527 
The analysis for necessity, i.e., whether Charter self-defense principles and lim-
itations on them govern throughout a war, or whether the LOAC applies once a 
war has begun so that different standards are then employed, also applies to pro-
portionality issues. If proportionality principles are in treaties, the Charter's 
clause paramount provision trumps them. If self-defense norms arejus cogens, they 
trump custom or treaty based proprotionality norms. Whether a customary pro-
portionalitynorm can supersede a Charter norm is not clear. Customary and treaty 
based proportionality norms can, and should, inform any binding Charter or jus 
cogens norms.528 This analysis takes the position that proportionality norms limit-
ing a right of self-defense and those developed under the LOAC should be the 
same. 
(II) The Elements or Indicia of Proportionality. The foregoing comments on a 
self-defense measure's relative position on a time-line between attack (or immi-
nence of attack, for anticipatory self-defense) and the defensive measure(s) taken is 
but one index of whether the action is proportional under the circumstances. 
Another major factor is the methodology and intensity of the coercion.529 Be-
sides the now threadbare (and refuted) argument that a massive conventional at-
tack cannot be met by a non-conventional (e.g., nuclear) response, i.e., there must 
be response in kind,530 there are finer gradations of the problem. US destruction of 
IranAjr in response to Iranian minelaying in shipping lanes 53 I_in effect, going to 
the source of the illegality and eliminating it-is one example. Another example is 
destruction ofthe oil platforms from which Iranian speedboats had operated.532 
There need not be identical or even similar response to satisfy the proportionality 
requirement. 
Moreover, such proportional response, as Ago and others have pointed out, 
need not necessarily be proportional in response to force used in the initial aggres-
sion or attack. 
The requirement of the proportionality of the action taken in self-defence ... 
concerns the relationship between that action and its purpose, namely-and this can 
never be repeated too often-that of halting and repelling the attack or even, in so far 
as preventive self-defence is recognized, of preventing it from occurring. It would be 
mistaken, however, to think that there must be proportionality between the conduct 
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constituting the armed attack and the opposing conduct. The action needed to halt 
and repulse the attack may well have to assume dimensions disproportionate to those 
of the attack suffered.533 
Put another way, force used in self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, 
must be "strictly confined to the object of stopping or preventing the infringement 
[of the target State's rights] and reasonably proportionate to what is required for 
achieving this objective.,,534 Or, as Dinstein comments in a context of full-scale 
war, once a war has started, "it can be fought to the finish.535 ... An aggressor State 
may lose its appetite for continuing ... hostilities, but the defending State need not 
be accommodating.,,536 Individual or collective self-defense may carry responses 
to the source of the aggression, beyond driving the aggressor back to the line 
(whether geographic or theoretical) until there is total victory 537 if necessary to 
achieve proportional response in the sense of achieving the objective of ending the 
source of aggression.538 
Thus, it was proper under pre-Charter law, for US insistence on Japan's uncon-
ditional surrender.539 It was likewise proper for the Netherlands, which declared 
war on Japan on December 8,1941 as anticipatory defense with invasion ofthe 
Dutch East Indies imminent,540 to also insist on Japan's unconditional surrender. 
It would have been proper for Iran, if invaded by Iraq in 1980 to start the war, to 
have carried the war to the complete destruction ofIraq,541 if this were a propor-
tional response necessary to force Iraq to comply with the law.542 The same is true 
with respect to Iraqi responses to Iran, ifIran was the aggressor.543 (As events had 
it, both sides agreed to a UN-sponsored ceasefire, effectively ending the conflict, 
including its Tanker War aspects.)544 Proportionality applies to all levels and in-
tensities of conflict or potential conflict, from anticipatory response to pin-pricks 
to general war.545 
O'Connell and Greenwood advance a view that self-defense must occur in the 
theater of operations generating the claim. In a regional confrontation, a target 
State would be limited to responding there. For example, in the Falklands/ 
Malvinas War, Britain would have been limited to attacks on military units in the 
South Atlantic Ocean; a lone Argentine frigate in the Pacific could not have been 
attacked unless it gave clear evidence of launching an attack.546 The US Navy 
could not have responded to North Korea's Pueblo seizure except by attacking 
North Korean assets in Korean waters.547 Under this view, Iran could not have at-
tacked the Iraqi frigates in the Mediterranean Sea, or perhaps the Atlantic and In-
dian Ocean off South Africa if after being launched in Italy 548 they had sailed 
through the Mediterranean and either through Suez or around Africa. 
This thesis, while appealing in simplicity and symmetry, lacks reality. To be 
sure, proportionality means an amount of force necessary to achieve a goal of pre-
ventive (i.e., anticipatory) self-defense or repulsing attack.549 A hypothetical case 
from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War illustrates the fallacy of the position. 
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If a UK warship encountering an Argentine frigate in the Pacific, thousands of 
miles from the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War theater of operations, in terms of 
ship-to-ship combat, what would have stopped the Argentine-as USSR men-
of-war might have during the Cold War-from tailing the other and firing later 
(e.g., after dark or in bad weather), when the UK warship could not sense a poten-
tial for attack? To take the other extreme, from either antagonist's geopolitical 
world view, a frigate represented a potential asset, wherever located, for prolong-
ing (and perhaps enlarging) the conflict. It might be argued the frigate could only 
be attacked when it was apparent it was proceeding to contribute to the war. The 
first question is how that could be determined, since most belligerents do not will-
ingly hand over intelligence, or they may distribute disinformation; recall the 
cruise of the Goeben into Turkish waters during World War I. The second is a 
surveillant power's problem: Must it follow the frigate once located across the Pa-
cific to be sure it does not reappear at the scene of hostilities? To borrow a phrase, 
"Use it or lose it"; if ordnance is not used on the frigate in hand, the opportunity 
(and the frigate) will be lost, only to reappear in a theater of operations. Despite sat-
ellite and similar reconnaisance advantage for certain countries (e.g., the United 
States), not all States are so equipped for worldwide tracking, and in a world of 
smaller navies and nations less attuned to alliances and friendships, such a State 
(even if it is the victim of aggression in the first place) may find itself in a situation 
worse than Britain's attempt to locate surface raiders in World Wars I and II or a 
wounded Leviathan like Bismarck during World War II. And if targets should be 
limited in a full-scale war, how can other military aspects of proportionality-geo-
graphical scope, weapons used, etc.,-be limited? It is incongruous that worldwide 
economic sanctions were asserted against Argentina550 -some of which had clear 
reprisal overtones 551_and yet military options would be limited territorially un-
der the proposed analysis. 
The third practical aspect deals with the nature of wars as belligerents have seen 
them. Most since 1945 have been symmetrical, two-State affairs where belligerents 
had about the same quality and quantity of forces.552 Most conflicts since1945 
have not been wars of national survival. A problem for proportionality, from a mil-
itary perspective, arises when some or all of these conditions do not exist. What 
may be a routine, middle to low-level conflict for one belligerent may be a war for 
national survival for the other, particularly if two or more middle-level States' 
forces are opposed to one State's forces, which might have been able to contend 
with some but not all opponents. Forthe sole State, the war is a high-intensity con-
flict; for its opponents, it may be low or medium intensity. During the Korean 
War, given other States' overt and covert relationships with North and South Korea, 
it was initially a war of national survival for the South, and then for the North.553 
Israel, nearly always surrounded by opponents, has claimed its wars 554 were mat-
ters of national survival; it is doubtful whether its opponents always perceived 
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them thus. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, of which the Tanker War was a part, 
was a war of national survival, or nearly so, for both sides. These might be com-
pared with, e.g., Falklands/Malvinas,555 or the India-Pakistan conflicts,556 where 
neither side seriously considered it was involved in a war of national survival. If 
one side-perhaps because of allies arrayed against it, or for other valid rea-
sons-would validly consider it was fighting a war of national survival where de-
stroying every warship of opponentes) would make a difference, would this mean 
that in the hypothetical of the frigate in the Pacific,557 one side could shoot on 
sight because it had to do so to survive, while the other would have to wait for evi-
dence ofimminent attack, because it had a low-intensity conflict on its hands? The 
situation is even more egregious if the force-heavy State was a target of aggression 
and would have to await another "first hit" from a State initially in the wrong. 
In terms ofinternationallaw, the theater of operations view may be correct from 
a perspective for force proportionality, but if proportionality is considered in 
terms of the object,558 i.e., righting the wrong, then the analysis is askew. If rectify-
ing the situation-i.e., inducing end to aggression-means destroying the Pacific 
Ocean frigate, then the frigate is fair game for that reason alone. In terms of a war of 
national survival by a target State, proportionality with respect to the object 
sought-maintaining political independence and territorial integrity of equal, 
sovereign States, all Charter Purposes 559 -necessarily rises to an ever-higher level 
of permitted violence to preserve these Charter goals for the State affected. More-
over, in a collective self-defense context, the level of military coercion the Charter 
permits is that necessary to assure survival of a State threatened with annihilation 
by aggression. Thus in the 1990-91 Gulf War self-defense agreements with the 
United States,560 it was the force necessary to assure Kuwaiti survival, not survival 
of the United States, Kuwait's alliance partner. 
There is no precedent for the theater of operations argument.561 Iran could have 
attacked the Iraqi warships, once launched and on their way to Iraq through the 
Mediterranean Sea and either the Red Sea and Indian Ocean or the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans. Conversely, Iraq could have attacked Iranian military assets wher-
ever it found them. During the last year of the Tanker War, Iranian speedboats and 
military aircraft operated in the lower Gulf and the Strait ofHormuz, near the Ara-
bian Sea, a part of the Indian Ocean. Iraq could have attacked these platforms in 
the Indian Ocean as well as striking oil facilities near the entrance to the Persian 
Gulf.562 
The proportionality principle was demonstrated during the Tanker War. 
Announced US defensive measures that could be expected if an unidentified 
aircraft or ship ventured within the defensive bubble for US warships 563 were pro-
portional. The only object of response would be the intruder, and the warning 
area-up to five miles on the surface and relatively low altitude-was minimal. To 
be sure, there were mistakes, e.g., when US ships fired on small boats that wandered 
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into the bubble, but if they appeared to display hostile intent, the US response was 
proportional under the circumstances. The United States expressed regret over 
these accidents and undoubtedly offered compensation.564 
Iranian visit and search procedures for merchantmen suspected of carrying 
cargo for Iraq's war effort were also proportionate, in that the ship would be re-
leased if no offending goods were found. However, it is not clear whether ad-
judicatory procedures were established for detained vessels until late in the war.565 
Whether Iran could detain ships after the ceasefire 566 depended on terms of the 
ceasefire and practice under it. For detained ships, the response may not have been 
proportionate in terms of time. On the other hand, the belligerents' indiscriminate 
firing at or mining merchantmen and neutral warships alike, or neutral military 
helicopters, where there was no evidence that they were aiding the enemy, lacked 
any semblance of proportionality.567 
Belligerents' attacks on ships in neutral territorial waters or neutrals' oil facili-
ties 568 were clear violations of the Charter.569 Either the littoral State or the State 
of the vessel's flag could respond proportionally in self-defense. The coastal State 
could respond proportionally for attacks on its facilities.570 
Belligerents' attacks on their opponent's oil tanker convoys, oil platforms and 
coastal petroleum facilities in self-defense were legitimate, since belligerents' oil 
sales financed the war.571 However, attacks had to be proportional; it is doubtful 
whether some (e.g., Nowruz)572 were. 
US destruction ofIranAjr and the offshore oil platforms were also proportional. 
IranAjr was caught laying mines, and its destruction eliminated a source ofIran's 
illegal action.573 Oil platforms supported the Iranian speedboats attacking mer-
chantmen; while the response may not have destroyed the same platforms that 
supported a particular attack or mode of attack in the case of their destruction in 
response to the Silkworm attack on Sea Isle City,574 this response was also legiti-
mate; it was confined to the kind of platform that could have launched the attack 
and was in response to attack on onlythattanker. Proportionality contemplates re-
sponses parallel in intensity to an initial aggression and designed to discourage fu-
ture attacks. If the launch platforms were destroyed, there could be no future 
attacks from them. There was no need to respond to the particular platform that 
launched the attack on Sea Isle City. 575 
Defense against Iranian speedboats or warships attacking merchantmen, US 
military helicopters or US warships was also proportional. As in the case of the an-
nounced defense measures, the only targets were the attacking craft or their bases, 
the oil platforms.576 The United States was not required to respond, as it chose not 
to do in the case of the Stark attack.577 Any response to the Stark attack would have 
had to have been proportional in nature, however. From a self-defense perspective, 
laying aside the mistaken identity issue, Vincennes' destruction of Flight 655 578 
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was proportional. The perceived threat was an aircraft, mistakenly thought to be 
an F-14; only the aircraft was targeted, and only the aircraft was brought down. 
Responses to the Libyan aircraft that fired at US aircraft, or electronically 
locked on to them, and to Libyan missile boat forays, were also proportional. Only 
those aircraft or boats were targeted and hit. Similarly, the 1986 raid on Libyan ter-
rorist bases was proportional. To be sure, there was collateral damage as in any 
bombing operation, but the targets were the terrorist operations that had caused 
the Berlin disco bombing.S79 
(III) Forbidden Targets: Per Se Disproportionality. Under the law of warfare (jus in 
bello) certain targets are forbidden objects of attack, no matter how proportionate 
the response in other respects, and even if proportional armed reprisal is appropri-
ate under the circumstances.S80 The Corfu Channel Case authoritatively stated 
that the general principle of humanity condemned mining of an international 
strait with resultant loss of life and UK naval vessels S81 when these ships at-
tempted straits transit passage S82 in a nonwar context. Although the law of naval 
warfare has developed a relatively concrete list of forbidden targets for armed con-
flict situations,S83 there has been little Charter era practice for immunity claims 
for these targets in the self-defense (anticipatory or otherwise) context. Neverthe-
less, the Corfu Channel principle should apply to deny amenability of these objects 
as legitimate targets regardless of how proportional or necessary a self-defense re-
sponse might othenvise be.S84 The LOAC should inform the law of self-defense 
under these circumstances.S8S 
vii. "No Moment for Deliberation." Anticipatory self-defense, unlike reactive 
self-defense, carries a third requirement, from the Caroline Case: there can be no 
moment for deliberation. S86 This principle is often lumped with necessity; the 
Tanker War illustrates the difficulty of application as a discrete concept. 
US defensive measures announcements and actions under themS87 are rela-
tively straightfonvard examples. Given the relatively high speed of aircraft or 
small boats, whether carrying shipkilling missiles or on a suicide mission, and a 
high risk to a warship of small boats carrying Exocets or the like, it is easy to see 
that there can be no time for deliberation-i.e., careful consideration up a chain of 
command-before action must be taken. 
Where analysis begins to break down under current views of anticipatory 
self-defense is in the situation ofIranian visits and searches.S88 If"no moment for 
deliberation" means time for investigation by other means, then the concept slides 
semantically into necessity. On the other hand, if the phrase means no other means 
for investigation, the result is the same. The same comments could be made as to 
States that ordered or accepted (acquiesced in) convoying or other forms ofprotec-
tion,S89 if that is considered anticipatory self-defense. 
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The Vincennes incident,590 if considered an anticipatory self-defense case, illus-
trates the weakness (or elasticity) of the concept as a separate requirement. 
Vincennes' commanding officer had five minutes to deliberate, but was that real 
"deliberation"? He never knew, due to erroneous information, about Flight 655's 
true identity; he thought it was an F-14 homing on his ship. In a sense, he had time 
to deliberate, but only enough time to decide that it was imperative, i.e., necessary, 
to defend the ship. Under this analysis, there was no moment for deliberation, 
and Vincennes' downing Flight 655 satisfied the third principle of anticipatory 
self-defense. 
Thus the third principle of anticipatory self-defense, "no moment for delibera-
tion," if it exists as a separate concept, was met in these incidents of the Tanker 
War. 
viii. Rules of Reprisal; Retaliation. Reprisals, i.e., use of force or other methods 
(e.g., economic coercion) otherwise illegal to confront a State engaging in illegal 
conduct (e.g., aggression) to force compliance with international norms, has been 
characterized as a kind of self_help591 or sanction.592 Most say that reprisals in-
volving force where States are not engaged in armed conflict are illega1.593 Post-
1945 practice tends to confirm this view. Anticipatory reprisal using force is for-
bidden.594 
The Corfu Cannel Case dismissed the UK argument that directing mine clear-
ance of an international strait was an act oflawful self_help.595 Israel responded 
with massive reprisals against Syria for its repeated armistice violations. These too 
were condemned.596 
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration stated that "States have a duty to re-
frain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force," which the Resolution as-
serted was declaratory of internationallaw.597 "Subject only to the proviso that 
'force' ... be taken to mean military force, the Western States [agreed] on the ques-
tion of reprisals.,,598 
Even massive economic coercion does not justify a force response, according 
to the majority view.599 On the other hand, nonforce reprisals (e.g., economic sanc-
tions or "economic warfare") remain legitimate in the Charter era.600 There can be 
collective nonforce economic reprisals, like those the European Community im-
posed during the Falklands/Malvinas war.601 Although many States or their na-
tionals aided one belligerent or the other, or both, there was no apparent declared 
system of economic reprisals during the Tanker War. 
Even if justified, reprisals cannot be inflicted against third States. The Cysne ar-
bitration held that although Germany might have been justified in reprisals 
against Great Britain during World War I, Germany could not destroy a neutral 
Portuguese vessel carrying goods covered by the reprisal declaration to Britain.602 
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All reprisals are subject to three requirements, carried forward from the 
pre-Charter era and stated in the N aulilaa Arbitration and the Cysne Case: previ-
ous deliberate violation of international law by the other State, an unsuccessful de-
mand for redress, and the reprisal must be proportional to the injury suffered.603 
Some objects cannot be an object of reprisals, whether economic or otherwise; 
commonly these are considered in the context of the LOAC (jus in bello) and will 
be analyzed in that situation.604 However, such reprisals are be subject to the gen-
eral principles of humanity in the context of "peacetime" reprisals, discussed here, 
on the same theory that these objects are barred as self-defense targets.60S 
Security Council decisions can, at least in theory, go beyond customary limita-
tions for sanctions amounting to reprisals.606 A State not injured by illegal actions 
of another state might be directed to apply sanctions. Sanctions that some might 
perceive as disproportionate to an illegal action might be imposed. Third States 
might be harmed by Council decisions, although Charter Article 50 allows a State 
confronted with special economic problems arising from carrying out those mea-
sures a right to consult with the Council for solution of those problems.607 The 
Council can be informed by humanity principles and other sources oflaw, but it 
can override treaties to the contrary, and its resolution might state a jus cogens 
norm.60S 
Sanctions against South Africa, which began in 1977, are an example of the po-
tential for overriding general reprisal sanction principles.609 The earlier Rhode-
sian embargo, which had law of naval warfare overtones, is another example. In 
1965-66, as part of the governance transition from Southern Rhodesia to inde-
pendent, majority-rule Zimbabwe, the Council passed a series of resolutions, de-
nouncing the white Rhodesian government as illegal, and calling on States to 
refrain from assisting the white minority regime and to institute an oil embargo. 
One resolution requested that the United Kingdom enforce the embargo. Because 
the resolution only spoke in terms of embargo and did not authorize blockade or 
similar measures, the Royal Navy could not order tankers inbound for the 
Mozambican port ofBeira, Rhodesia's access to the sea, to divert. A later resolution 
specifically authorized diversion, and the Royal Navy ordered diversion when 
other tankers tried to call at Beira.610 While the oil interdiction operation had an 
entirely laudatory purpose, ifit is assumed that Rhodesia had no additional petro-
leum sources, and there were essential needs of the civilian population-e.g., gaso-
line for ambulances, diesel oil for hospital emergency generators, etc.,-a violation 
of humanitarian law principles might have occurred, and interdictions might be 
said to have gone beyond customary LOAC rules.611 
The 1990-91 Gulf War, which erupted after the Tanker War ended, is a third sit-
uation where Council sanctions overrode customary law.612 Resolution 665 autho-
rized Coalition interception of vessels bound for Iraq or occupied Kuwait on 
August 15, 1990, without reciting humanitarian exceptions.613 A month later, 
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Resolution 670 imposed an air embargo but permitted food and medical supplies 
shipments, subject to Council supervision.614 At least in theory, the Council could 
be said to have overridden humanitarian principles denouncing deprivation of the 
civilian population of food and medical supplies 615 by the omission in Resolution 
665. (It was partly cured a month later by Resolution 666, permitting foodstuffs 
shipments under certain conditions, but the Resolution said nothing about medi-
cal supplies.)616 
ix. The Temporal Problem: When Does Liability Accrue?617 Convictions at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo were based on what the defendants knew, or should have 
known, when they made decisions to invade other States.618 Since then there has 
been no authoritative statement on whether liability accrues on what decision-
makers knew, or should have known, when a state responds in reactive or anticipa-
tory self-defense. Commentators seem to have been tempted to justify opinions, at 
least in part, on evidence available after a self-defense decision, perhaps years 
later.619 
The developing law forjus in bello confirms that the appropriate time for predi-
cating liability is what a decisionmaker knew, or should have known, at the time an 
operation is authorized. Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the time are often 
clouded with the fog of war 620 or crisis. 
Four countries' declarations of understanding 621 to Protocol I 622 to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions state that as to protection of civilians in Article 51, 623 protec-
tion of civilian objects in Article 52,624 and precautions to be taken in attacks, 
stated in Article 57, 625 a commander should be liable based on a commander's as-
sessment of information available at the relevant time, i.e., when the decision is 
taken.626 Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention's four protocols 
have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound by information available when 
a decision to attack is made.627 
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons Conven-
tion are well on their way to wide acceptance among States.628 These treaties' 
common statement that commanders will be held accountable based on informa-
tion they had at the time for determining whether attacks are necessary and pro-
portional has become a nearly universal norm. The San Remo Manual has 
recognized it as the standard for naval warfare, and in 1999 the Second Protocol to 
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention also adopted this standard.629 It can 
be said with fair confidence that this is the customary standard forjus in bellum. It 
should be the standard forjus ad bellum. A national leader directing a self-defense 
response, whether it be reactive or anticipatory in nature, should be held to the 
same standard. That leader should be held accountable for what he or she, or those 
reporting to him or her, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision 
to respond in self-defense is made. 
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There is no public record of what those who initiated self-defense measures, 
whether in reaction to an attack or in anticipation of one, knew or should have 
known, as was the case in the Nuremberg or Tokyo trials.630 Therefore, there can 
be no appraisal ofwhetherthe temporal standard was met during the Tanker War. 
2. Related Issues 
a. State o/Necessity and Self-Preservation in the Charter Era. State of necessity 
and the now-outmoded concept of self-preservation have often been confused, 
sometimes with the notion that necessity as a component of self-defense or the 
LOAC may be so intense that in a situation involving survival of the State that ne-
cessity overrides all other factors to permit any action by the target State. This 
claim of self-preservation, or self-help, is now inadmissible. A state may, however, 
respond in self-defense.631 
There is, however, a separate, distinct concept of necessity, apart from a similar 
term that is a conditioning factor for self-defense or the LOAC, in that in a separate 
claim of state of necessity, a State against whom action is taken ("a third State") has 
committed no wrong against a State that takes the action (an "acting State"), and 
an acting State does not consider itself the third State's target. In self-defense, a tar-
get State seeks to defend against aggression by a country in the position of a third 
State, i.e., the aggressor.632 State of necessity can be invoked "to preclude the 
wrongfulness of conduct adopted in certain conditions ... to protect an essential 
interest of the [target] State, without [the latter'S] existence being in any way 
threatened.633 There remain cases "where a ... [right] of a [third] State can be sac-
rificed for the sake of a vital interest of the [target] State which would otherwise be 
obliged to respect that right.,,634 
Not all commentators agree on the state of necessity doctrine today.635 How-
ever, LOS Convention, Article 221 allows States "to take [proportionate] mea-
sures, in accordance with international law, beyond the limits of the territorial 
sea" to protect their coastline "or related interests, including fishing, from grave 
and imminent danger" from pollution or the threat of pollution. The Intervention 
Convention is to the same effect.636 These provisions would have vindicated UK 
action in bombing the derelict Torrey Canyon after that Liberian-registered vessel 
grounded off Britain, threatening the English coast and its population.637 Al-
though frequently decided on other grounds, ICI decisions and international arbi-
trations have recognized the doctrine in many contexts.638 
The record of State practice and other sources is thus less than clear, but the In-
ternational Law Commission Special Rapporteur summarizes state of necessity 
and its scope today, provided a target State invoking state of necessity acts propor-
tionally to a peril: 
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Article 33. State of necessity 
1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for preclud-
ing the wrongfulness of an act of that State not in conformity with an in-
ternational obligation of the State unless: 
(a) the act was the only means of safeguarding an essential interest of the 
State against a grave and imminent peril; and 
(b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State to-
wards which the obligation existed. 
2. In any case, a state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground 
for precluding wrongfulness: 
(a) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of general international 
law; or 
(b) if the international obligation with which the act of the State is not in 
conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly or implicitly, 
excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity with re-
spect to that obligation; or 
(c) if the State in question has contributed to the occurrence of the state 
of necessity. 
The Commission draft also says: "[W]rongfulness of an act of a State not in confor-
mity with an international obligation of that State is precluded if the act consti-
tutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter ... ,,639 
Tanker War participants did not claim state of necessity for their actions, but they 
could have. 
The primary example is US and other States' protecting third-State crews 
from attacks by Iranian speedboats and aircraft. Self-defense permitted protect-
ing vessels flagged under the ensign of a covering warship or aircraft or protec-
tion of nationals of the same State and, upon request, third-State crews.640 States 
have a general obligation to act to preserve life at sea, independent of an ongoing 
armed conflict.641 This obligation carries with it a right to engage in necessary 
and proportionate response, in the nature of self-defense, with respect to such 
ships and personnel. The right to respond could also be based on a theory of state 
of necessity. 
A clearer case involved the Nowruz oil slick created by Iraqi attacks in 1983. 642 
Although the slick dissipated without any State's having taken action, littoral 
countries threatened with loss of coastal fisheries or desalination plants could have 
acted proportionally with force to eliminate the leakage from Iranian platforms. 
Similarly, if petroleum leakage from vessels hit on the high seas of the Persian Gulf 
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was serious enough and threatened a coastal State's shore or other interests, that 
State could have acted to intervene. Precedent for this is clear.643 During the 
1990-91 war, US aircraft, as a defensive measure, bombed oil manifolds at termi-
nals in occupied Kuwait opened by Iraq. Besides risk to coalition warships, there 
was risk to western Gulf coastal fisheries and desalination plant intakes.644 Kuwai-
ti permission was undoubtedly given, but ifit had not, the strikes could have been 
justified by the state of necessity doctrine. 
b. Retorsion. A retorsion, or retortion, is a lawful but unfriendly response of a tar-
get State to another state's unfriendly practice or act whether illegal or not, to co-
erce the latter to discontinue that practice or act.645 Commentators agree that a 
retorsionary response must be proportional.646 
During the Tanker War, the US defensive bubble or cordon sanitaire warnings in 
NOT AMs or NOTMARs may have seemed unfriendly acts, but they were legiti-
mate warnings of the right of self-defense if an aircraft or vessel came within 
range.647 Accompanying, escorting or offering protection to merchantmen not 
carrying warfighting or war-sustaining goods to belligerent ports, including out-
bound cargoes of Kuwaiti or Saudi petroleum, may have seemed unfriendly, ifle-
gal, acts to the belligerents, particularly Iran.648 Iran's naval maneuvers in its 
territorial sea were legal,649 but they may have seemed unfriendly acts to its neigh-
bors or to some navies. These retorsions were proportional. 
Part B. UN Mechanisms for Breaches of the Peace, Threats to the 
Peace, and AggreSSion 
If there has been uneven development of Charter norms as a coherent body of 
law for States' individual or collective responses to breaches of the peace, threats to 
the peace, or aggression, the UN record as an Organization has been even less clear. 
This Part first examines the methodology of UN lawmaking and then sketches the 
organizational framework for UN lawmaking and in other groups permitted by the 
Charter in the context of situations involving the law of naval warfare. 
1. Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The Security Council 
Aside from General Assembly competence for UN Membership, the budget and 
trust territories,650 the only source of positive, primary-source 651 norms is the Se-
curity Council. Under Charter Articles 25 and 48, Members agree to carry out "de-
cisions," particularly those related to action to maintain international peace and 
security.6S2 However, the Charter also gives the Council authority to make 
nonbinding "recommendations" for pacific settlement of disputes,653 and "recom-
mendations" on issues involving breaches of the peace, threats to the peace or ag-
gression.654 It may "call upon" parties to resolve a dispute, whether it threatens the 
peace or not,655 and it can "call upon" Members for measures to assist in enforcing 
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decisions.656 Recommendations and authority to "call upon" Members for action 
are nonbinding, although "call upon" connotes a stronger prescriptive principle 
than recommendations; if a call for action is coupled with a decision, the call is 
binding.657 A further restriction on Council practice is that Article 2S decisions 
can only be taken under Chapter VII, dealing with breaches of the peace, threats to 
the peace and aggression,658 and with an Article 39 determination to that effect.659 
Thus although Article 2S appears in the Charter just before Chapter VI, stating the 
Council role in pacific dispute settlement,660 it has been used along with Article 48 
for Chapter VII decisions. 
The narrow problem is whether the Council has made a decision. The Namibia 
opinion declared principles of resolution interpretation; there must be reference 
to "terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Char-
ter provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in deter-
mining the legal consequences of the resolution ... ,,661 In other words, when is a 
Council resolution a binding decision?662 Or, perhaps more important for this 
analysis, when is what appears to be a binding decision nothing more than a 
nonbinding recommendation, although not so styled? 
Analysis of Council decisionmaking-in the broad, nontechnical sense of the 
word-reveals a trend toward establishing norms affecting law of naval warfare 
standards. 
a. The Korean War. Bailey has aptly summarized Council actions for the Korean 
War: "The ... Council decisions on military enforcement ... were not binding and, 
indeed, were only possible because of the fortuitous absence of the Soviet Un-
ion.,,663 Resolution 82, calling for ceasing hostilities, calling upon North Korea to 
withdraw north of the 38th parallel and calling upon Members to assistthe United 
Nations,664 was recommendatory, being issued under Articles 39_41.665 The Sec-
retary-General felt there had been only a threat to the peace, the United States 
charged aggression had occurred, and the Council toned down the Resolution to 
find a "breach of the peace.,,666 Resolution 83 followed two days later, recommend-
ing that Members assist South Korea "to repel the armed attack and to restore in-
ternational peace and security in the area," finding North Korea had breached the 
peace.667 Besides welcoming assistance given South Korea, and "Recommend[ing]" 
that Members make forces and assistance available to the United States as head of a 
unified command, Resolution 84 followed the pattern.668 The only decision of the 
war was a Council invitation to the PRC to be present for its discussion of a UN Ko-
rean command special report.669 With the USSR's return and its veto in the Coun-
cil, UN lawmaking potential shifted to the Assembly.670 
b. Arab-Israeli Conflicts. The Arab-Israeli conflicts generated positive lawmaking 
before and after the Korean War. 
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After hortatory resolutions based on Articles 39 and 40,671 Resolution 50 (1948) 
called upon Governments and authorities to stop importing or exporting war ma-
terial into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan 
or Yemen during a recommended ceasefire. It "Decide[ d]" that if this resolution 
were rejected, or later repudiated or violated, "the situation ... [would] be recon-
sidered with a view to action under Chapter VII," i.e., for possible measures involv-
ing force.672 This, the Council's first attempt to define and regulate warfightingl 
war-sustaining material,673 was only recommendatory. The only decision was for 
further action if the parties rejected the resolution's terms. Later resolutions "Or-
der[ ed)" a cease-fire, "Decide[d]" the belligerents' responsibility under the cease-
fire, and "Decide[d]" on an armistice.674 After a recommendatory call upon the 
belligerents for a ceasefire late in 1948, the Council "Reaffirm[ed]" its prior "or-
der" for ceasefire and obeying armistice agreements.675 These were binding in na-
ture. When fighting broke out again in 1951, the Council called upon parties for a 
ceasefire, reminding them of Chapter VI obligations to settle disputes by peaceful 
means.676 In September 1951 Resolution 95 "not[ed] ... present practice of 
[Egypt's] interfering with the passage through the Suez Canal of goods destined for 
Israel" and "[found] further that such practice [was] an abuse of the exercise of the 
right of visit, search and seizure[.]" The Resolution "Further [found] that the 
practice in the prevailing circumstances cannot be justified on the ground that it is 
necessary for self-defence[,]" and noted that 
... restrictions on the passage of goods through the Suez Canal to Israel ports are 
denying to nations at no time connected with the conflict in Palestine valuable 
supplies required for their economic reconstruction, and that these restrictions 
together with sanctions applied by Egypt to certain ships which have visited Israel 
ports represent unjustified inferference with the rights of nations to navigate the seas 
and to trade freely with one another, including the Arab States and Israel[.] 
The Resolution concluded by "Call[ing] upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions 
on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez 
Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond 
that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canalitself and to the observance of ... 
conventions in force.,,677 Because it ended with a recommendatory "call" upon 
Egypt under Article 40, the Resolution could not be considered binding. However, 
the Resolution declaration that seizures in the Canal abused traditional rules had 
evidentiary weight as to a norm.678 Resolution 101 (1953) similarly "[found] that 
the retaliatory action at Qibya taken by ... Israel on 14-15 October 1953 and all 
such actions constitute[d violations of the ceasefire, the armistice] and the Char-
ter .... " Israel was censured.679 In 1955 Israel was "Condemn[ed] for a similar at-
tack as inconsistent with [the armstice] and under the ... Charter.,,680 The next 
year an attack on Syria was "Condemn[ed]" after Israel experienced interference 
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using Lake Tiberias by Syria in violation of the armistice.681 In 1962, after ex-
changes of fire between Syria and Israel, Resolution 171 "call [ ed] upon the two 
Governments ... to comply with their obligations under ... the Charter by refrain-
ing from the threat as well as the use offorce." The Council reaffirmed its prior res-
olution condemning retaliatory breaches of the armistice, and determined that 
Israel's attack on March 16-17 was "a flagrant violation of that resolution.,,682 A 
"grave Israel military action" in southern Hebron against Jordan in 1966 earned 
Israel a censure. The Council "Emphasize[ d] ... that ... military reprisal cannot be 
tolerated and that, if ... repeated, the ... Council [would] consider further and 
more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of 
such acts.,,683 
When the 1967 war broke out, the Council called upon the belligerents for a 
ceasefire and ceasing military activities, on the model of the opening of the Korean 
War.684 Later resolutions "Demand[ ed]" a ceasefire and observance of it.685 Reso-
lution 237 only "Recommend[ed]" compli~ncewith the Third Convention,686but 
Resolution 242 "Affirm [ ed] ... the necessity ... [f] or guaranteeing freedom of navi-
gation through international waterways in the area[.],,687 Resolutions 248 and 256 
condemned the "large-scale and massive" or "large scale and carefully planned" at-
tacks on Jordan in response to Jordanian violations of the ceasefire in 1968. 688 A 
1969 resolution condemned similar "preplanned" Israeli air attacks on Jordanian 
population centers as a "flagrant" violation of the Charter and the cease-fire resolu-
tions. It repeated a previous resolution's warning, that the Council would meet 
again "to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to 
ensure against repetition of such attacks.,,689 
The 1973 war precipitated a Council call for ending hostilities and a ceasefire.690 
In 1981, while Iraq was heavily committed in its war with Iran, Israeli aircraft 
struck an Iraqi nuclear facility near Baghdad. Israel claimed a right of anticipatory 
self-defense in that the facility was manufacturing nuclear weapons to be used 
against Israel. 691 Upon Iraq's complaint,692 the Council cited Charter Article 2(4) 
and "[s]trongly condemn[ed] the military attack by Israel in clear violation of the 
Charter ... and the norms of international conduct." The Council called upon Is-
rael to refrain from any such acts or threats in the future and stated that Iraq was 
entitled to "appropriate redress, responsibility for which has been acknowledged 
by Israel.,,693 
In 1982, the Council "[ d]emand[ ed] that ... Israel lift immediately the blockade 
of the city of Beirut ... to permit the dispatch of supplies to meet the urgent needs 
of the civilian population and allow the distribution of aid" by UN agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations, particularly the ICRC. The resolution referred to 
other resolutions citing the 1949 Geneva Conventions and "regulations attached 
to the Hague Convention of 1907.,,694 
World Public Order 167 
c. Rhodesia: 1965-79. The Rhodesia decolonization process, which included em-
bargo and maritime interdiction before Zimbabwe independence was assured, be-
gan with General Assembly action. Assembly resolutions noted "a threat to 
freedom, peace and security in Africa," and called upon States to refrain from ren-
dering assistance to Rhodesia.695 Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence, 
and the Assembly "[i]nvite[d]" the United Kingdom to implement the Assembly 
resolutions and "Recommend[ed that] the ... Council ... consider [the] situation 
as a matter of urgency.,,696 
Condemning the independence declaration, the Council first "[ d]ecide[ d] to 
call upon all States ... to refrain from rendering any assistance to this illegal re-
gime.,,697 Resolution 217 called upon the UK Government to quell the rebellion 
and "to take all other appropriate measures which would prove effective in elimi-
nating the authority of the usurpers ... " The Council also called upon States to de-
sist from providing arms to Rhodesia and to break economic relations, "including 
an embargo on oil and petroleum products." Continuance of the rebellion was de-
termined to be "in time a threat to international peace and security.,,698 Thereafter 
the United Kingdom declined to intercept Beira-bound tankers.699 The Council 
then passed Resolution 221, which "[c]all[ed] upon" Portugal to deny pier and 
pumping facilities and "[c]all[ed] upon all States" to divert their vessels "reason-
ably believed to be carrying oil destined for ... Rhodesia which may be en route for 
Beira." The Council also "[c]all[ed] upon" the United Kingdom "to prevent, by 
the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be 
carrying oil destined for ... Rhodesia." Specific authority was given to arrest and 
detain Joanna V upon departure from Beira if she discharged petroleum cargo 
there.1°o The United Kingdom acted upon this resolution, stopping possible 
blockade runners.1°1 
A month later the Council, "Acting in accordance with Articles 39-41" ofthe 
Charter, determined the Rhodesia situation was a threat to international peace and 
security. The Council "Decid[ed] that ... Members ... shall prevent:" 
(a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, 
tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather origi-
nating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present 
resolution; 
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are 
calculated to promote the export of these commodities from ... Rhodesia and 
any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodi-
ties originating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the 
present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to ... Rhodesia 
for such activities or dealings; 
(c) Shipment in vessels ... of their registration of any of these commodities origi-
nating in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present 
resolution; 
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(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are 
calculated to promote the sale or shipment to ... Rhodesia of arms, ammuni-
tion of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and mate-
rials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in ... 
Rhodesia; 
(e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are 
calculated to promote the supply to ... Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor 
vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or 
maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in ... Rhodesia; the shipment in 
vessels ... of their registration of any such goods destined for ... Rhodesia; 
and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or 
are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor ve-
hicles in ... Rhodesia; 
(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in 
land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registra-
tion in the supply of oil or oil products to ... Rhodesia; notwithstanding any 
contracts entered into or licenses granted before the date of the present 
resolution[.] 
Members were "[r]emind[ed]" of obligations under Article 25; the resolution also 
"[c]all[ed] upon" them to carry out "this decision of the ... Council.,,702 
Resolution 253 followed in 1968; "[r]eaffirming its determination that the ... 
situation in ... Rhodesia constitute[ d] a threat to international peace and security 
[and a]ctingunder Chapter VII of the Charter ... ," the Council "[ d]ecide[ d] that ... 
Members ... shall prevent": 
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating 
in ... Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution 
(whether or not the commodities or products are for consumption or process-
ing in their territories, whether or not they are imported in bond and whether 
or not any special legal status with respect to the import of goods is enjoyed by 
the port or other place where they are imported or stored); 
(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which would promote 
or are calculated to promote the export of any commodities or products 
from ... Rhodesia; and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in 
any commodities or products originating in ... Rhodesia and exported there-
from after the date of this resolution, including ... transfer of funds to ... 
Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings; 
(c) The shipment in vessels ... of their registration or under charter to their na-
tionals ... of any commodities or products originating in ... Rhodesia and ex-
ported therefrom after the date of this resolution; 
(d) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories of any commodi-
ties or products (whether or not originating in their territories, but not in-
cluding supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, educational 
equipment and material for use in schools and other educational institutions, 
publications, news material and, in special humanitarian circumstances, 
food-stuffs) to any person or body in ... Rhodesia or to any other person or 
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body for ... any business carried on in or operated from ... Rhodesia, and any 
activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calcu-
lated to promote such sale or supply; 
(e) The shipment in vessels ... of their registration, or under charter to their na-
tionals, ... of any such commodities or products which are consigned to any 
person or body in ... Rhodesia, or to any other person or body for the purposes 
of any business carried on in or operated from ... Rhodesia[.] 
Members were again reminded of Article 25 obligations. The Council established 
a Committee to receive reports and obtain information.1°3 In 1970 the Council 
"[d]ecide[d]," in accordance with Article 41, "that Members would inter alia, 
sever all trade and transportation ties with Rhodesia; the Council" "[r]equest[ ed]" 
the UK government to rescind all trade, etc., agreements with Rhodesia and 
"[R]equest[ed]" that Members "take all possible further action under Article 41 of 
the Charter [i.e.,options not involving the use offorce], ... not excluding any ... 
measures provided in that Article[.],,704 
In 1972 Resolution 314 deplored the failure of States to abide by the embargo 
sanctions and declared that any national legislation to the contrary "would under-
mine sanctions and would be contrary to the obligations of States.,,70S In 1973 
Resolution 333 "[c]all[ ed] upon" States to enact legislation "providing for the im-
position of severe penalties" for evasion or breach of sanctions. It also 
5. Request[ed] States, in the event of their trading with South Africa and Portu-
gal, to provide that purchase contracts with those countries should clearly 
stipulate, in a manner legally enforceable, the prohibition of dealing in goods 
of ... Rhodesian origin; likewise, sales contracts with these countries should 
include a prohibition of resale or re-export of goods to ... Rhodesia; 
6. Call[ed] upon States to pass legislation forbidding insurance companies under 
their jurisdiction from covering air flights into and out of ... Rhodesia and in-
dividuals or air cargo carried on them; 
7. Call[ed] upon States to undertake appropriate legislative measures to ensure 
that all valid marine insurance contracts contain specific provisions that no 
goods of ... Rhodesian origin or destined to ... Rhodesia shall be covered by 
such contracts; 
8. Call[ed] upon States to inform the Committee established in pursuance of reso-
lution 253 (1968) on their present sources of supply and quantities of chrome, 
asbestos, nickel, pig iron, tobacco, meat and sugar, together with the quanti-
ties of these goods they obtained from ... Rhodesia before the application of 
sanctions.106 
The economic noose was tightened further in 1976 by Resolution 388, decided un-
der Chapter VII of the Charter, that Members would ensure that their nationals 
and persons in their territories did not insure: 
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(a) Any commodities or products exported from ... Rhodesia after the date of the 
present resolution in contravention of ... resolution 253 (1968) which they 
know or have reasonable cause to believe to have been so exported; 
(b) Any commodities or products which they know or have reasonable cause to 
believe to be destined or intended for importation into ... Rhodesia after the 
date of the present resolution in contravention of resolution 253 (1968); 
(c) Commodities, products or other property in ... Rhodesia of any commercial, 
industrial or public utility undertaking in ... Rhodesia, in contravention of 
resolution 253 (1968)[.] 
The Council also decided that 
... Member States shall take appropriate measures to prevent their nationals and 
persons in their Territories from granting to any commercial, industrial or public 
utility undertaking in ... Rhodesia the right to use any trade name or from entering 
into any franchising agreement involving the use of any trade name, trade mark or 
registered design in connexion with the sale or distribution of any products, 
commodities or services of such an undertaking[.f07 
The same approach (graduated embargo, Committee reporting system) under 
Chapter VII of the Charter was employed with respect to South Africa?08 
Majority rule came in 1979, and the sanctions were lifted that year?09 
The General Assembly also played a role in the transition to Zimbabwe. Besides 
passing nonbinding 710 resolutions within its sphere,711 the Council cited the As-
sembly's prior law-declaring resolutions, e.g., the Declaration on Granting ofln-
dependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.712 
d. India-Pakistan: 1965, 1971. The 1965 naval war was part of a renewed conflict be-
tween India and Pakistan. The Security Council, as in other situations, "[ c ]al1[ ed]" 
upon the belligerents to take steps for a cease-fire and to respect the frontier line at 
issue?13 The 1971 war was over so quickly that Council Resolution 307 only noted 
the Pakistani agreement to a cease fire and "[ d]emand[ ed]" compliance with it.714 
e. Falklands/Malvinas: 1982. Two Council resolutions impacted this relatively 
brief conflict. Resolution 502 was stronger than many initial responses to a crisis. 
Finding "a breach of the peace," the Council "[ d]emand[ ed]" immediate cessation 
of hostilities and withdrawal of Argentine forces from the Falklands/Malvinas and 
"[ c ]all[ ed] on ... Argentina and the United Kingdom ... to seek a diplomatic solu-
tion ... and to respect fully the purposes and principles of the Charter. ,,715 The sec-
ond resolution "[u]rge[d]" parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General's good 
offices efforts.716 
f. The Iran-Iraq Conflict and the Tanker War, 1980-88. As Charter era conflicts 
went, the Iran-Iraq war was a long, eight-year affair with heavy losses all around. 
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Security Council action was relatively minimal: 17 resolutions 717 in that time. 
Several bear upon the Tanker War and the law of naval warfare. 
Resolution 479 (September 23, 1980, issued shortly after the war begani18 
"[e ]all[ed] upon" the belligerents to refrain immediately from further use of force 
and to settle the dispute "by peaceful means and in conformity with international 
law," echoing Charter Article 33. The resolution"[u ]rge[d]" Iran and Iraq to accept 
mediation, conciliation, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other 
peaceful means. It "[e ]all[ed] upon" States to exercise restraint and to refrain from 
anything to further escalate and widen the conflict. The Secretary-General's offer 
to suggest good offices was supported.719 Although it did not mention freedom of 
navigation, Japan and the United States stressed the primary importance of that 
principle.720 Iraq accepted Resolution 479, denying it had any territorial ambi-
tions; Iran rejected it, demanding condemnation ofIraqi aggression.721 In Octo-
ber, however, Iraq rejected a UN good offices offer to allow 70 merchantmen 
trapped in the Shatt aI-Arab by the war to depart under a UN or perhaps an ICRC 
flag; Iran accepted the proposal.722 
Nearly two years later, Resolution 514 again "[e]all[ed]for" a ceasefire and bel-
ligerent forces' withdrawal. The Council "[d]ecid[ed] to dispatch a team of [UN] 
observers to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal." Con-
tinuing Secretary-General mediation efforts was "[u]rge[d]." Other States were 
again asked to abstain from action that might contribute to continuation of the 
conflict.723 An October 4,1982 resolution was in the same vein, and welcomed a 
"part[y's]" (Iraq's) acceptance of Resolution 514's terms and "call[ed] upon the 
other [Iran] to do likewise[.],,724 
Resolution 540 (1983) deplored mutual destruction of civilian lives, cities, 
property and economic infrastructures. The Council condemned violations ofhu-
manitarian law, particularly that stated in the First through the Fourth Conven-
tions, and called for "cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, 
including city and residential areas[.]" Resolution 540 "[alffirm[ed]" 
... the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, call[ ed] on 
all States to respect this right and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to cease 
immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all sea-lanes, navigable 
waterways, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports with direct 
or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other littoral States[.] 
It also "[e ]all[ed] upon both parties to refrain from any action that [might] endan-
ger international peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the 
Gulf.,,725 
In June 1984 Resolution 552 responded to a letter from the GCC States (Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE)726 complaining ofIranian acts of 
aggression on the freedom of navigation to and from their ports. Although Iran 
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justified its attacks on reaction against aid to Iraq by States in the region and on 
other bases, the Council heard States and the Arab League's complaints concern-
ing ship attacks and the right of freedom of navigation,727 and passed Resolution 
552. The Council, 
Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as 
good neighbours in accordance with the Charter ... , 
Reaffirming the obligations of Member States with respect to the principles and 
purposes of the Charter, 
Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, 
Taking into consideration the importance of the Gulf region to international peace 
and security and its vital role to the stability of the world economy, 
Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from 
the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, 
Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the 
area and have serious implications for international peace and security, 
1. Call[ed] upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the 
right offree navigation; 
2. Reaffirm[ed] the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes 
for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral 
States ... not parties to the hostilities; 
3. Call[ed] upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States ... not 
parties to the hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain 
from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the 
conflict; 
4. Condemn[ed] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the 
ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; 
5. Demand[ed] that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be 
no interference with ships en route to and from States ... not parties to the 
hostilities; 
6. Decide[ed] in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet 
again to consider effective measures ... commensurate with the gravity of the 
situation ... to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area[.] 
The Council requested the Secretary-General to report on progress in implement-
ing the resolution.728 
Resolutions 540 and 552 had no lasting effect. In February 1986 Resolution 582 
"[d]eplore[d] ... escalation of the conflict, especially ... attacks on neutral shipping 
or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws 
of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the 
Geneva Protocol." It also "[e ]all[ed] upon ... Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate 
cease-fire, a cessation of all hostilities on land, at sea and in the air," to withdraw 
their forces behind their borders, and called upon the belligerents to submit the 
conflict to mediation or other peaceful settlement methods. The now-familiar 
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provision, calling upon other States to refrain from escalating or widening the con-
flict, was also included.729 Resolution 588 (October 1986) expressed alarm over the 
continuing and intensifying conflict and called upon the belligerents to imple-
ment Resolution 582. 730 
Resolution 598 Guly 1987) again "[d]epZore[d] ... attacks on neutral shipping or 
civilian aircraft, the violation ofinternational humanitarian law and other laws of 
armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the 
1925 Geneva Protocol[.]" Citing Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, the Council 
"[a]ct[ed]," "[d]emand[ing] that ... Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-
fire .... " Other States were admonished notto escalate or widen the war. The Secre-
tary-General was requested to explore, in consultation with the belligerents, en-
trusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and a 
report to the Counci1.731 This was the first time the Council cited Chapter VII of 
the Charter (threats to the peace, etc.) during the war. Iraq accepted Resolution 598 
almost immediately.732 The European Community, the Arab League, NATO 
countries and the GCC passed resolutions supporting Resolution 598, the GCC 
urging the Security Council to implement it. The U~ Secretary of State and other 
foreign ministers referred to the binding nature of Resolution 598. 733 
During 1987 a UN naval force was discussed; Italy and the United States had 
supported the idea, the United Kingdom was unenthusiastic, and the United 
States was willing to consider it but only if a collective action concept was spelled 
out clearly. The United States would not support a UN force replacing US and 
US-aligned forces. The idea got nowhere734 
Resolution 612 again condemned chemical warfare in May 1988. 735 Iran ac-
cepted Resolution 598 in August 1998, and a ceasefire ended hostilities736 Subse-
quent resolutions, 1988-91, condemned use of chemical weapons, called upon 
States to control export of such to the belligerents1_established the UN Iran-Iraq 
Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) to supervise the ceasefire, and disbanded 
UNIIMOG in 1991 with intensification of the crisis over Kuwait737 
g. Appraisal of Security Council Lawmaking. Security Council intervention with 
binding or recommended norms affecting war at sea has been episodic and often 
limited. There are several reasons for this. 
Use of the veto, at first largely by the USSR and later by other permanent Coun-
cil members (France, Great Britain, United States),738 has affected lawmaking for 
some maritime conflicts. Permanent members filed vetoes on these maritime inci-
dents or wars: Corfu Channel, 1947; Korean War; Arab-Israeli conflicts; India-
Pakistan, 1971; Rhodesia; Falklands/Malvinas739 In some cases, Council agenda 
items have been withdrawn, or the problem has disappeared with time740 Time 
has been a critical factor in some, but not all, modern conflicts; the Arab-Israeli 
Six-Day War and the 1971 India-Pakistan conflict are two examples where military 
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action was over within weeks.141 Even though the Council may be "organized ... 
to function continuously,,,742 perhaps with the most modern telecommunications 
facilities, the relatively rapid pace of events can outstrip deliberation, debate and 
resolution negotiations and drafting.143 
Whether the Council can consider a matter depends on discretion of UN Mem-
bers (whether Council members or not), countries that are not UN Members, the 
General Assembly, or the Secretary-General, in bringing matters involving inter-
national peace and security to the Council's attention. The Council can initiate its 
own investigation, but that involves discretion before acting on a resolution.144 
The Secretary-General could perhaps report through his or her inherent power as 
head of the UN Secretariat.145 And while this list may seem impressive, there is 
nothing to stop individual States from attempting to settle a dispute by means 
other than Council action, perhaps by negotiations with agreement that the issue 
not be presented to the Council, or referral to a regional organization, the latter of 
which occurred during the Cuban Missile Crisis.146 
The implications of a veto may have influenced the relative strength of resolu-
tions. For example, the Korean War resolutions were only recommendatory in na-
ture.147 More recently, however, the Council has demonstrated the capacity to 
approve decisions under Articles 25 and 48, at least where permanent members 
concur with the action, must abstain/48 or choose to abstain?49 The latter has oc-
curred occasionally in situations related to armed conflict or the potential for 
armed conflict.750 
A more serious problem has been the language of resolutions. Obviously, if a 
resolution recommends certain action, that course is optional with UN Members. 
There have been many affecting the law of naval warfare.151 Equally obviously, if 
the Council "decides" that a State "shall" take certain action, that resolution is 
mandatory. There have been few of these.152 Is a resolution "calling upon" Mem-
bers mandatory? Respectable authority has differed on the point,753 and the record 
of compliance is mixed. For example, the United Kingdom complied when called 
upon to interdict tankers during the Rhodesia transition,754 but the record is 
equally clear that Iran largely ignored Council calls during the Tanker War, per-
haps until forced to comply by outside pressures.155 (To be sure, Iran accepted Res-
olution 598 after prior Iraqi acceptance of it, with a resulting ceasefire?56 Iraq's 
"acceptance" record of these resolutions was better/57 but "accepting" them con-
noted their nonmandatory nature to the belligerents. In the near term, immedi-
ately after passage of a call for action, about the only sure method is to observe what 
States do with the call for action and whether they appear to respond out of a sense 
oflegal obligation. This choice, like Council decisions that are clearly mandatory 
under the Charter, is not an option for a military commander?58 A commander 
must await the executive decision to comply with the call, and how Council calls 
for action and decisions will be implemented, since they are frequently imprecise, 
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and deliberately so, as the Council is addressing a congery of over 180 countries 
with widely varying resources. 
Since the UN's earliest days Council resolutions have been involved with 
maritime and law of naval warfare issues.759 Although nearly all of these resolu-
tions have not carried the binding authority of decisions under Articles 25 and 48, 
they do have a sort of "soft law" weight, which when implemented over an undeter-
mined amount of time, may ripen into custom, the oldest source of international 
law.160 Moreover, to the extent that the Council can act in relative concert and in 
confidence that there will be no veto threat, the future may see more strongly 
worded resolutions that are nonmandatory in nature, or decisions that bind all UN 
Members. The result in the future is that these resolutions, general as they often 
are, may dictate the content of naval warfare in the case of Council decisions, or be 
informed by it, much as self-defense considerations may be informed by the con-
tent of naval warfare.161 
2. Making the Rules and Stating the Principles: The General Assembly 
The Charter gives the General Assembly only recommendatory powers in the 
international peace and security arena, and then only to the extent that the Council 
is not seized of a matter.762 Two practices have developed: recommendations un-
derthe Uniting For Peace (UFP) Resolution, and concurrent action with the Secu-
rity Council. 
a. The UFP Resolution. When the Soviet Union returned to the Council and be-
gan vetoing 763 resolutions connected with the UN Command in Korea's prosecut-
ing that war, the United States led passage of the UFP Resolution, which provides 
that if the Council, 
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ... 
where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, the ... Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to 
making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, 
inc1 uding, in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed 
force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
The Resolution also established a Collective Measures Committee (CMC) to re-
port to the Assembly.164 On at least five occasions after the Korean War, the Coun-
cil resolved to call emergency Assembly sessions, or refer claims to it. Egypt's 
nationalizing the Suez Canal (1956), revolt in Hungary (1956), Lebanon (1958), 
the Congo crisis (1960), and the India-Pakistan war (1971).165 Although it was ar-
gued that UFP was not legitimate under the Charter, most find for its legality; East 
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and West have invoked it in referring disputes from the Council to the Assem-
bly?66 
UFP was employed in several cases. Assembly Resolution 498 found the PRC 
had committed aggression during the Korean War?67 Resolution 500 recom-
mended a weapons and strategic materials embargo directed at the PRC and North 
Korea?68 Resolution 997, voted by the Assembly during Britain, France and Is-
rael's 1956 Suez Canal intervention, did not determine that a threat to or breach of 
the peace had occurred but did note that these States' forces had penetrated, or 
were operating against, Egyptian territory. They were urged to withdraw forces 
and cease hostilities?69 
Castenada, Higgins and others have analyzed these situations, along with those in 
Hungary and the Congo.770 Castenada argues for development of a new customary 
law arising from acquiescence of UN Members?71 Whether these five examples of 
conflict can amount to a new found custom is, of course, highly debatable. 
Casten ada formulates this system of rules from the UFP experience; it is typical of 
arguments for Assembly lawmaking: 
1. The ... Council, having determined that there is a threat to the peace, a breach 
of the peace, or an act of aggression, may recommend the adoption of enforce-
ment measures, including the use of armed force, on behalf of the United Na-
tions, and directed against states or de facto governments, without following 
the procedures and observing the requirements established in Chapter VII of 
the Ch~rter for ... armed force. This means that members can make available 
to the Council armed forces in accordance with procedures different from the 
special agreements contemplated in Article 43; that plans for the use of such 
armed forces need not be drawn up with the assistance of the Military Staff 
Committee, as provided in Article 46; and that the strategic direction of 
armed forces made available for enforcement action need not necessarily be 
the responsibility of the ... Committee, as set forth in Article 47. 
2. The ... Assembly can recommend, when there is lack of unanimity among the 
Permanent Members ... , and when there has arisen in the Assembly's opinion 
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the adoption of 
enforcement measures, including ... armed force in the event of an armed at-
tack or an act of aggression, on behalf of the United Nations and directed 
against states or de facto governments, also without observing the procedures 
and requirements of Chapter VII for ... armed force. 
3. Both the ... Council and the ... Assembly may decide, without a previous de-
termination that a threat to or breach of the peace or an act of aggression ex-
ists, to create a United Nations military force to carry out nonenforcement 
functions, without complying with ... Chapter VII for the use of armed force; 
and they may recommend-but may not legally require-that members con-
tribute contingents to establish it. The functions of a United Nations Force 
may range from mere observation and supervision to the undertaking of typi-
cally military operations, such as engaging in battle with armed groups for ... 
destroying them as combat units, as occurred in the Congo. 
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Up to the present [1969] there has not been a single instance in the practice ofthe 
United Nations that could serve as a legal basis for a new rule authorizing the ... 
Assembly to recommend the use of armed force, without the legal support of the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution, even for nonenforcement purposes. 
The legal effect of the new rule, per se, is the broadening of the competence of both the 
Council and the Assembly to act in a manner different from that originally 
contemplated in the Charter. The degree to which this competence was enlarged is 
indicated by the three principles suggested above. It is possible to speak of a legal 
effect because there has been a modification of a pre-existent legal situation, 
although, from a different point of view, the change in the competence of the organs 
constitutes not the effect but the very content of the new rule created by the practice 
of the Organization. 
The second effect is of a diverse nature. Actually, it is a question here of a legal 
effect directly produced by the resolutions adopted by the ... Councilor ... Assembly 
on the basis of the customary rule created by their practice, rather than a direct effect 
of that rule as such. This effect consists in the temporary suspension of the Charter 
obligation of members to refrain from the use of force against any state, in conformity 
with Article 2(4). That certain Councilor Assembly recommendations concerning 
the use offorce should have as an effect the suspension of the Charter obligation not 
to use it, is a consequence of the new rule created by the practice of the organs}72 
While this statement is useful, it is submitted that Castenada errs in two respects. 
First, it remains clear after the 1990-91 Gulf War that the Council may also "de-
cide" on the use of force and authorize its agent-the Coalition in the Gulf 
War-to proceed.773 Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the Assembly 
may "decide"-in the sense of the Charter, Articles 25 and 48-on anything, such 
that States would be compelled to obey its commands.774 If the Castanada view is 
accepted, that States' acquiescence is enough to create a customary norm, that may 
be true.775 However, that is not what the Charter says, and any international agree-
ments that conflict with the Charter are trumped by the latter.776 Treaties, of 
course, have been a regular feature of peacekeeping operations, whether under 
UFP authority or the Counci1.777 
Moreover, most commentators and courts have said recommendatory resolu-
tions can only restate or evidence customary law. Even Castenada has this view for 
declaratory resolutions.778 The Assembly has promoted many LOAC-related 
norms through the years; some state rules oflaw, some do not (at least according to 
some countries), and some are purely aspirational.779 
b. Concurrent Action with the Council. In several cases the Assembly and the 
Council have issued resolutions during crises or conflicts.780 Where a Council de-
cision 781 adopts a norm stated in an Assembly or Council recommendation, it be-
comes a binding rule oflaw. Where a nonbinding Council resolution adopts such a 
norm, it is further evidence of customary law, unless, of course, the original 
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resolution declared custom, in which case the Council resolution also restates a 
customary rule.782 
c. AppraisalJor the Tanker War. The Council was seized of the Iran-Iraq war from 
the beginning; therefore, the Assembly had no jurisdiction over the conflict.783 
However, countries involved in a Council-seized conflict may try to bring matters 
before the Assembly, which should reject consideration ofthem.784 
The Assembly did promote projects whose subject is applicable to the Tanker 
War, notably the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) 
which created the LOS Convention.785 The same procedure was followed for the 
Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols, a product ofICRC confer-
ences.786 The Council, by citing and incorporating by reference freedom of naviga-
tion, the law of armed conflict, and occasionally specific treaties, e.g., the 1925 
Geneva Gas Protocol or the 1949 Geneva Conventions,787 thereby gave further evi-
dence of these agreements or customary law as norms. Since no binding Article 25 
or 48 decisions incorporated them, these bodies oflaw did not become mandatory 
norms, but Council citation increased the strength of their applicability. Although 
the issue is not free from doubt, Resolution 598 may have clarified the debate as to 
the status of Article 40-based resolutions calling for action, which may be binding 
if the views of the US Secretary of State and other foreign ministers are correct.788 
3. The Constitutive Process oj Decisionmaking in the Charter Era. 
Sub-Parts B.l and B.2 of this Chapter have sketched development of norms of 
conduct by the Council and the Assembly. This Sub-Part examines the methodol-
ogy of implementation of these norms by the Organization and by regional organi-
zations, also contemplated by the Charter. 
a. Implementation: Original Intent and Trends. The Charter contemplates that 
UN Members will agree to make armed forces, assistance and facilities, including 
rights of passage, available to the Council so that it can maintain international 
peace and security.789 These agreements have not materialized.790 The Charter 
also provides for a Military Staff Committee (MSC) to plan for applying armed 
force when the Council directs. The MSC consists of permanent Council mem-
bers' chiefs of staff and would have strategic direction of forces at Council dis-
posa1.791 Owing to the Cold War and other factors such as the lack of Article 43 
agreements, the MSC atrophied.792 
Alternatives to the Charter system have been suggested 793 or implemented. 
One was the "agency" principle, by which the Council has requested a State or a 
group of States to take leadership and command of an operaton on the Council's 
behal£ The United States had this role in Korea, the United Kingdom for Rhode-
sia, and a Coalition in the 1990-91 Gulf War. 794 UFP-based operations have used a 
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Collective Measures Committee for data reporting and dissemination.195 Some 
peacekeeping operations have been given to the Secretary-General for leader-
ship.196 In interdiction/embargo operations for Rhodesia, South Africa, and Iraq 
in the 1990-91 Gulf War, the Council appointed a Committee to review these pro-
cesses.797 
No peacekeeping forces were active in the Gulf area during the 1980-88 war; 
UNIIMOG served after the ceasefire and until the 1990-91 GulfWar.198 The Sec-
retary-General reported on the conflict, at Council direction, but did not administer 
forces.199 Neither the Council nor the Assembly authorized forces' intervention 
similar to the situation in Korea, Rhodesia or Kuwait. The Iran-Iraq conflict and 
its Tanker War component were governed by traditional inter-State relations and 
the law of self-defense. 
b. RegionalArrangements Under the Charter. Article 52 permits regional arrange-
ments or agencies to deal with matters relating to maintaining international peace 
and security "appropriate for regional action." Members of these arrangements or 
agencies should "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement oflocal disputes" 
through these institutions before referring claims to the Council. The Council 
must encourage developing pacific settlement of regional disputes through these 
institutions, whether a matter is referred to the Council or a regional institution 
first.800 The Council can use these arrangements or agencies for enforcement un-
der Council authority.801 It must be kept informed of action taken "or in contem-
plation" by regional institutions, as distinguished from post-attack reporting 
required in self-defense situations.802 
What constitutes an Article 52 regional arrangement or agency has not been re-
solved; the Arab League,803 the OAS804 and the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU)80S qualify.806 Not all regional organizations are Article 52 dispute resolu-
tion agencies; those whose function is self-defense get authority from Article 51 's 
inherent right of collective self-defense provision. 807 There has been use of Article 
52 as an alternative to Councilor Assembly dispute resolution. For example, the 
United States referred the Cuban Missile Crisis issue to the OAS, obtained a reso-
lution denouncing introduction of the missiles, and proceeded with quarantine. 
As Article 54 requires, the Council was notified. 808 A regional organization resolu-
tion was also used in the Grenada crisis.809 
Four organizations, one with Article 52 status (the Arab League),810 the GCC, 
which may have that status,811 the WEU,812 and the ICO,813 which may also have 
that status, were involved in the Tanker War. Although hampered from time to 
time by internal dissension, the Arab League Summits' resolutions condemned 
freedom of navigation violations and urged resolution of the conflict by the 
parties. The Arab League governor-general appeared before the Council in con-
nection with debate on Council Resolution 552, brought by the GCC States, 
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complaining of attacks on freedom of navigation to and from their ports.814 The 
GCC played an active role in the war, evolving from an internal security organiza-
tion to promoting joint action for mutual security.81S The WEU, concerned with 
European security, was cover for several States' Gulf maritime operations. 816 The 
ICO attempted to serve as a mediator, particularly through GCC support.817 
Other regional organizations that could be said to have dispute resolution capa-
bility today, e.g., the European Community, 818 passed resolutions but were not in-
volved because the Tanker War occurred outside their geographic competence.819 
Other governmental organizations not enjoying Article 52 status, e.g. the Group of 
Seven, also passed resolutions in connection with the war.820 None of these made 
law for the conflict, but their "soft law" status further evidences the strength of 
claims they advanced, e.g., freedom of navigation in the Gulf. 
c. The Work of Nongovernmental Organizations and the Tanker War. The princi-
pal nongovernmental organization contributing to the law of the Tanker War was 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a Swiss corporation that 
sponsored conferences leading to 1977 Protocols I and II to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions.821 The ICRC also sponsored conferences leading to adoption of the Con-
ventional Weapons Convention and its protocols in 1980. 822 The Security Council 
cited to the law of armed conflict generally and to the Geneva Conventions specifi-
cally,823 the work of the ICRC was cited in a Council resolution. 824 Early in the war 
Iran accepted and Iraq rejected a proposal to move, under the Red Cross or UN 
flag, 70 ships caught in the Shatt by opening hostilities.82S The standards of 
ICRC-sponsored treaties had impacted norms applicable to the war, regardless of 
citation by the Council. 826 
The International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), International Cham-
ber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) expressed 
concerns over attacks on merchant shipping, and these were transmitted to 
belligerents by the UN Secretary-General.827 
Part C. Maritime Neutrality in the Charter Era 828 
"There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has undergone an almost 
constant process of revision in detail," Jessup concluded in 1936.829 He also be-
lieved that 
... nothing could be more fallacious than the attempt to test the application of 
rules of neutrality by the principles oflogic. Since they are products of compromise 
and of experience, logic has found practically no place in their development and 
cannot properly be used in t~eir application.830 
Over half a century into the Charter era, little would change these observations. 
New considerations have appeared,831 including the Charter itself; the process of 
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analyzing the law of neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter ap-
proach. Indeed, principles of neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be 
less rigid, from an historical perspective, than those for air or land warfare.832 
Some assert that neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence.,,833 A major reason, ac-
cording to those who say that future applications of the law of neutrality will be 
minimal, is the argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the 
old law of neutrality. 834 Another argument is that since the Charter has outlawed 
war,835 therefore there can be no state of war, and therefore there is no need for a 
law of neutrality. 836 (The latter position might be considered in light of the Pact of 
Paris (1928), which outlawed aggressive war.837 World War II began a decade 
later.) 
Many others, reflecting State practice and claims in the Charter era, have 
maintained that the law of neutrality continues to exist. The San Remo Manual rec-
ognizes maritime neutrality.838 The 1992-96 International Law Association Con-
ferences received reports from its Committee on Maritime Neutrality, and the 
1998 ILA conference accepted the Committee's final report.839 Individual re-
searchers assert that neutrality remains a valid legal concept, albeit modified by 
the impact of the Charter and other considerations.840 
Like the reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of the demise of neutrality 
in the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated, as the ensuing analysis 
demonstrates. 
The law of neutrality before World War II and the Charter era has been traced in 
detail by Jessup, his associates and others,841 more analysis is needlessly repetitive. 
However, two groups' research during 1919-39 is worthy of note, particularly for 
their collection and summary of State practice. They had considerable impact on 
State practice as the war widened but before it became global in 1941 with entry of 
the United States and other American countries into the war. 
1. Neutrality, 1928-41, and in the Charter Era; "Non-Belligerency" 
In 1928 the Pact of Paris was concluded. Subject to later agreements such as the 
Charter, the Pact remains in force today.842 The understanding concerning the in-
herent right of of self-defense under the Pact applies in the Charter era and can be 
claimed today, subject to principles of necessity, proportionality, and for anticipa-
tory self-defense, a situation admitting of no other alternative.843 Neutrality prin-
ciples also carried forward into the Charter era, subject to modification by Charter 
law and the usual processes of change in the law Jessup saw in 1936.844 
The Pact did not address the neutrality issue, although other agreements 
contemporaneous with it stated the term without defining it,845 except for the Ha-
vana Convention on Maritime Neutrality, with eight American countries party, 
including the United States,846 and the five-State 1938 Nordic Rules of Neutral-
ity,847 not a formal treaty but published in the LNTS series.848 
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The ILA 1934 meeting approved the BudapestArticles oJInterpretation of the Pact 
of Paris. They provide in part: 
(1) A signatory State cannot, by denunciation or non-observance of the Pact, re-
lease itself from its obligations thereunder. 
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of 
an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact. 
(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact. 
(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one 
signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby commit-
ting a breach of the Pact or of any rule ofInternational Law, do all or any of the 
following things:-
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent 
rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.; 
(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties pre-
scribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in rela-
tion to a belligerent; 
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including 
munitions of war; 
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked. 
(5) The signatory States are not entitled to recognise as acquired de jure any terri-
torial or other advantages acquired de facto by means of a violation of the Pact. 
(6) A violating State is liable to pay compensation for all damage caused by a vio-
lation of the Pact to any signatory State or to its nationals. 
(7) The Pact does not affect such humanitarian obligations as are contained in 
general treaties .... 849 
Although some States 850 and commentators 851 said when the Articles were ap-
proved that no State had adopted them as policy, in 1941 the US Congress heard 
former Secretary of State Stimson's testimony on the pending Lend-Lease Bill; he 
interpreted the Articles as an authoritative statement of the law.852 He echoed 
views of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson 
on the point, that since Axis nations had breached the Pact of Paris, the United 
States could resort to self-defense.853 Besides self-defense, under theBudapestArti-
cles States could adopt a status of nonbelligerency, i.e., decline to observe neutrality 
toward a Pact violator. States could supply a State that was a target of a Pact violator 
with "financial or material assistance, including munitions of war.,,854 (Put 
differently, Pact parties could engage in reprisals involving force or other modali-
ties or retorsions. In the Charter era, reprisals involving use of force by States not 
party to a conflict are inadmissible.855 In the pre-Charter era assisting victims of 
aggression or armed attacks was styled as nonbelligerency, an intermediate step 
between neutrality and belligerency.) 
The Lend-Lease Bill was enacted.856 Congress, by enacting Lend-Lease in this 
context, can be said to have stated US practice at that time,857 and the BudapestAr-
ticles as part of that practice. It is submitted that when the Allies and other neutrals 
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accepted Lend-Lease through bilateral agreements, they ratified and accepted this 
practice.858 The 1940 UK-US destroyers-for-bases agreements 859 were also exatn-
pIes of the United States' assuming nonbelligerent status. 860 These, however, were 
only bilateral arrangements, although the US general pro-Allied stance was then 
apparent.861 
The United States was not the only country to assume a nonbelligerency pos-
ture during 1939-45. For example, Norway's November 1939 charter arrangement 
for 1.5 million tons of tankers with Britain862 favored the United Kingdom against 
the Axis. Others officially or unofficially adopted policies tending to favor one side 
or the other, sometimes before becoming belligerents (e.g., Italy, which supported 
Germany, or American States participating in US Lend-Lease agreements before 
declaring war)863 and in other cases staying out of the war but keeping nonbellig-
erent status (e.g., Spain).864 This World War II practice tends to add support for 
recognizing nonbelligerency as an intermediate position, under international law, 
between neutrality and belligerency. 
The ILA was not the only group of scholars in the interwar years with a view 
that there could be gradations or stages between belligerency and neutrality. The 
1939 draft Harvard Aggression Convention differentiated among aggressors; de-
fending and co-defending States, entitled to all rights of self-defense; and "sup-
porting States," entitled to discriminate against an aggressor by other than armed 
force. A supporting State was entitled to "rights which, if it were neutral, it would 
have against a belligerent." An aggressor retained its duties to those entitled to 
neutrality status. Other States would have had these rights under Articles 12 and 
13: 
A State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a co-defending State, or a 
supporting State, does not, in its relations with the aggressor, have the duties which, 
if it were neutral, it would have to a belligerent, but, against the aggressor, it has the 
rights which, if it were a neutral, it would have against a belligerent. 
Subject to ... Article 7 and 8, a State which is not an aggressor, a defending State, a 
co-defending State, or a supporting State, has, in its relations with a defending State, a 
co-defending State or a supporting State, the duties which, if it were neutral, it would 
have to a belligerent; and has against those States the rights which, ifit were a neutral, 
it would have against a belligerent.865 
The Comment to the "supporting State" definition elaborates on the term in the 
Draft Convention: 
... "[S]upporting State" is used in a special way. A "supporting State" might give 
to a defending State even greater assistance than was given by a "co-defending State" 
but it would do so without use of armed force. 
The action taken by a supporting State to assist a defending State would take the 
form of some kind of discrimination against the aggressor or in favor of the defending 
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State. The State may take such action and assume such status for a variety of reasons 
but presumably its reasons will include a desire to deter, restrain or even perhaps to 
punish an aggressor. The discriminatory action may take the form of economic or 
financial embargoes directed against the aggressor. It might be restricted to a 
withdrawal of diplomatic and consular representatives from that State or to 
participation in the determination that the State violated its obligation not to resort 
to force. It might not take the form of any measures directly against an aggressor but 
might rather be in the form of aid-financial, economic or otherwise-to the 
defending State. 
Recitations of State and League of Nations practice demonstrates that there was 
support among States, great and small, for the form of nonbelligerency not involv-
ing direct use offorce.866 In effect, the Draft Convention's definition of supporting 
State comes close to the armed neutralities of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries and the Napoleonic Wars when neutrals cooperated to get cargoes 
through. 867 This was also almost precisely the circumstance of the United States in 
the destroyers-bases deal,868 its convoy operations in the North Atlantic before en-
try into World War II,869 and Lend-Lease.870 It was the US posture during the 
Tanker War when it convoyed neutral merchantmen to and from Kuwait.871 The 
same was true for States other than belligerents that accompanied or escorted mer-
chantmen flying flags of States other than the belligerents, regardless of who was 
the aggressor during the Tanker War.872 At least one commentator has stated that 
the Budapest Articles principle of aid against an aggressor, or its correlative of sup-
porting State action under the Draft Convention, applies in the Charter era.873 
Most recent commentators say there is no intermediate position between bel-
ligerency and neutrality, i.e., there is no legal foundation, or perhaps need, for 
nonbelligerency. Unlike the Harvard Draft Convention view, nonbelligerents can 
claim no rights from that status.874 However, the problem may lie more in defining 
neutrality, according to Tucker. If neutrality is defined as non-participation in 
hostilities, i.e., as a belligerent or nonbelligerent, a non-participant neutral incurs 
belligerent responses only when, and to the extent, favoritism is shown. Belliger-
ents can respond by non-force reprisals or retorsions.875 If it is assumed that the 
United States and others connected with Gulf commerce in the Tanker War fa-
vored one belligerent over the other, (e.g., Iraq over Iran), Iran could impose pro-
portional non-force reprisals after due notice and opportunity for correction 
necessary in the situation. Iraq could do the same, and either could employ 
retorsions too.876 Iran could not, even under this theory of neutrality, move 
straightway, without notice, to forcible response, e.g., attacks on and destruction of 
neutral shipping. 877 
Besides the US position before entry into World War II and its stance during the 
Iran-Iraq war, nearly every conflict of reasonable duration during the Charter era 
has involved situations of nonbelligerency in maritime warfare. This was true for 
the Korean War,878 with its UN law overtones. It was also true for the Arab-Israeli 
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conflicts.879 The India-Pakistan conflicts were less clear on the point.880 The 
United States materially assisted the United Kingdom in the Falklands/Malvinas 
war, supplying fuel and intelligence; the United States and other countries, 
through economic sanctions, also indirectly assisted the United Kingdom.881 
Moreover, if the view is taken that negative preferences for one belligerent over an-
other, e.g., cutting off arms supplies to one side as opposed to aiding one belligerent 
while embargoing the other, amounts to nonbelligerency, during the Tanker War 
many States had nonbelligerent status: France, most of the Arab States, and the 
USSR. The United Kingdom, with its 1987 export credit agreement with Iraq de-
spite its asserting even-handed strict neutrality, might be said to fall into this cate-
gory.882 
Regardless of the commentators' position, the record of armed conflicts since 
World War II has been that if the confrontation is of any length, States may declare 
and practice strict neutrality, declare neutrality and act as nonbelligerents, or do 
nothing, perhaps ignoring (or being unaware of) the situation.883 The law of neu-
trality has been applied in the Charter era, perhaps not consistently, and claims for 
a right to act as a nonbelligerent, i.e., favoring one or more belligerents at the ex-
pense of others, persist. 
Is nonbelligerency a violation of the law of neutrality, or a status without legal 
standing between the traditional roles of neutrality and belligerency? The re-
sponse today lies not in the traditional analyses, stretching back centuries, but in 
the developing norms under the Charter. The old principles of neutrality have 
been modified by the advent of the Charter.884 The same is true for nonbellig-
erency, where an overlay of Charter law helps define these situations and can give 
them legitimacy, not as an exception to traditional rules of neutrality, whether 
stated in treaties or custom, but as application and interpretation of the Charter.88S 
Responses to aggressors can include proportional reprisals not involving use of 
force and retorsions, and States that are not belligerents whose interests have been 
damaged by belligerent action can invoke these, along with state of necessity. 886 
These alternatives remain as options in the Charter era, and taking such actions 
could demonstrate favoritism for one belligerent because of actions taken against 
the other. In effect, the actor State would have the appearance of being a nonbellig-
erent by so acting. 
Examples from recent conflicts illustrate the point. During the Falklands/ 
Malvinas War, States in Europe attempted to isolate Argentina economically, 
most likely in violation of international obligations. These reprisal actions were 
justified against the aggressor in that war. If actions of the United States and other 
countries supplying economic assistance, intelligence and other information to 
the United Kingdom would be deemed unlawful,887 those actions were also appro-
priate nonforce reprisals under Rio Pact mutual security for Argentina's violation 
of territorial integrity. Governments' actions to convoy, escort or offer protection 
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to neutral ships not carrying warfightingfwar-sustaining goods to belligerent ports 
during the Tanker War 888 were retorsionary in nature. These were unfriendly acts 
directed toward a belligerent thought to have violated international law. 
In essence, the principles oflaw applicable to the intermediate status between 
belligerency and neutrality need not necessarily depend on development of a cus-
tomary practice recogniied as law however the trend may seem to have been since 
1939 and continuing into the Charter era, or upon resolution of the debate among 
the commentators. The Charter-governed norms apply to fill the void to permit 
non-force reprisals and retorsions by neutrals that might have evoked claims of 
nonbelligerency before 1945, neutrals that retain an inherent right of self-defense. 
Moreover, principles of treaty-based informal self-defense arrangements, which 
also continue in the Charter era, permit responses by States not party to a conflict 
involving use of force, provided other criteria, e.g., necessity and proportionality, 
are met.889 One problem with informal self-defense arrangements, like the prob-
lem of aid to a country which is a target of aggression, is the stance the purported 
aggressor may take. If the purported aggressor says, rightly or wrongly, that the 
target is the aggressor, then the aiding State may subject itself to claims, and worse, 
of aiding the aggressor. Another problem with relatively clandestine material aid, 
or with informal self-defense, is notice. Although security treaties sometimes are 
not published, many are, and all can see who is aligned with whom. This is not the 
case with clandestine aid to a target or informal collective self-defense agreements. 
These kinds of transactions carry with them the same kinds of risks of misinter-
pretation and accusations when States act pursuant to them without notifying 
other States of the reasons for their actions. States so acting must take these factors 
into account when assisting target States pursuant to these modalities. 
2. The Law of Neutrality in the Context of UN Action Under the Charter 
Sub-Part C.1 has demonstrated that neutrality, primarily as practiced in the 
Nineteenth Century, has been modified in the Charter era, although the general 
concept of neutrality remains. The further question is the impact that UN actions, 
particularly by the Security Council, may have on this corpus oflaw. As recited ear-
lier, decision making options under the Charter, and practice under the Charter, 
demonstrate that there has been and will be ample room for claims of neutrality or 
nonbelligerency. 
First, although the Council may make legally-binding decisions under Articles 
25 and 48 of the Charter, and therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles 
41-42 to take action that might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality princi-
ples, the Council also may make nonbinding "call[s] upon" Members under Arti-
cles 40-41. It also may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40. 
These recommendations have no more force of law, unless they restate custom, 
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general principles or treaty-based norms, than General Assembly recommenda-
tions under Articles 10-11, 13 and 14. 890 
Thus, Council decisions may compel a State to behave inconsistently with tra-
ditional neutrality practice, either in requiring what would otherwise be belliger-
ent acts or in restricting rights traditionally enjoyed by neutrals.891 Article 50, 
invoked by the Council for States affected by the Council-directed embargo ofIraq 
during the 1990-91 Gulf War, 892 allows it to consult with States finding themselves 
with "special economic problems" arising from carrying out Council-decided pre-
ventive or security measures. Thus even if Jordan and like-status States would 
have lost some or all of their rights and duties as neutrals through initial Council 
decision making in that war, an Article 50 reprieve could have restored some or all 
of these rights and duties. Council action under Article 50 could result in greater 
rights, or lesser duties, than under the traditional law of neutrality. 
Second, Council decisions when first taken may include exemptions that 
would, in effect, allow reversion to traditional neutrality law. For example, sea and 
air embargoes against Iraq in the 1990-91 war and against the former Yugoslavia 
beginning in1991 had exemptions for medical supplies, humanitarian supplies, 
and foodstuffs notified to the Council's Sanctions Committee, which includes rep-
resentatives from all Council members.893 To that extent, and except when other-
wise controlled by other effects of Council decisions-e.g., the Committee-the 
traditional law of neutrality would apply to such shipments. This exception has 
been most apparent when the Council has decided to embargo only a single com-
modity-e.g., petroleum, weapons or military equipment 894_followed by recom-
mendations on, calls for, or decisions on, enforcement. In that situation the law of 
the resolution would apply to selected commodities, while neutrality rules would 
be in force as to other goods if armed conflict is involved. Thus far that situation 
has not arisen. The classic case was Rhodesia (1965) which did not involve interna-
tional armed conflict, and only selective enforcement as to one commodity, petro-
leum.895 As to commodities not stated in a selective Council decision, neutrality 
principles would apply. If Article 42 measures approve use of force for some cir-
cumstances but not for others, and use of force is appropriate in those other cir-
cumstances, the law of neutrality will apply in those circumstances.896 For 
example, if the Council decides on an air-land campaign against an aggressor, with 
no decision on maritime aspects of the crisis, the maritime law of neutrality applies 
to maritime aspects of the situation to the extent that the Council decision's impact 
does not overlap into maritime issues. An example might be air flights over the 
seas. If an air-land related resolution is in force, it would apply to ocean overflights 
to and from the affected State, except as to purely maritime-oriented flights, e.g., 
helicopter resupply from ship to ship. 
The third point is the relative infrequency of application of mandatory Council 
decisions. Of the hundreds of crises since 1945 that have involved a potential for 
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armed conflict or actual conflict and which could be said to risk a "threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,,,897 mandatory Council decisions 
have governed only a handful. 898 In terms of the potential for or actual warfare at 
sea, six crises have produced Council decisions: Rhodesia (1965), the Gulf War 
(1990-91), the disintegration of Yugoslavia (1991), Angola (1992), Liberia (1992) 
and Haiti (1993).899 Even the Korean War evoked only Council calls or recom-
mendations for action before the USSR vetoes, and thereafter General Assembly 
recommendations under the UFP Resolution.900 To be sure, some calls for action 
and recommendations were well-supported,901 but they did not carry the force of 
decisional law. When the Council approves other than decisions, resulting resolu-
tions, although confessedly highly persuasive and authoritatively stated from po-
litical and policy perspectives, are nonetheless recommendatory as a matter oflaw. 
In the latter case-the overwhelming bulk of resolutions the Council has voted to 
date-there has been and will be full opportunity for the law of neutrality to oper-
ate. Widespread compliance with calls for action or recommendations could even-
tually mature into custom, but it is doubtful whether State practice under them 
would be of sufficient duration,902 assuming States accept the action as law. (Sanc-
tions practice against Iraq and the former Yugoslavia may be candidates for con-
gealment into custom, however.) In any event, neutrality principles would exist 
between the precipitating event, e.g., breach of the peace, and Council action.903 
Even if the Council decides on action, the enforcement mechanism has not been 
the Military Staff Committee and special forces the Charter contemplates.904 
Rather, it has often used an agency principle, choosing a State or group of States to 
respond to the crisis, with one nation perhaps chosen for a leadership role-the 
United States for Korea, the United Kingdom for Rhodesia, and a coalition for the 
1990-91 GulfWar.90S In these situations agent State(s) might be involved in en-
forcing the law of neutrality, even though there are overarching Council resolu-
tions. Such was the case for Korea, where the US-declared blockade involved 
observing neutral vessel rights to visit nearby USSR ports and a right of USSR war-
ships to proceed to North Korean ports.906 In recently-ordered embargo opera-
tions, the Council has not designated a leader, resulting in confusion.907 
The Security Council's Tanker War resolutions fell into the first and third cate-
gories of exceptions, i.e., no State including the belligerents was obligated to obey a 
Council resolution, except through calls for action, demands, or recommenda-
tions. Thus the principles of neutrality had full potential play for that war. Other 
conflicts, particularly the ongoing situation that began with the Gulf War of 
1990-91 and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, demonstrate that gaps in 
Council decisions, or its methodology of taking action, leave copious opportuni-
ties for applying neutrality principles. These principles may well not be the same 
as those before the Charter era, since actions in individual and collective self-
defense must be factored in, but neutrality as a concept continues to exist. 
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Moreover, the Council appears to have approved sub silentio the concepts of neu-
trality and perhaps nonbelligerency as well. International agreements concluded 
since 1945, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the most widely accepted 
multilateral treaties of any,908 have continued to use the terms "neutral" and, more 
rarely, "nonbelligerent.,,909 These conventions were cited by the Council during 
the Tanker War, and again during the 1990-91 GulfWar.910 The Council referred 
to "states not party to the hostilities" in Tanker War Resolution 552.911 Further-
more, there is nothing in practice under the Charter to indicate that earlier con-
ventions dealing with neutrality are invalid under the Charter.912 To the extent 
that earlier treaties have crystallized into custom,913 they exist in that mode as a 
valid source oflaw.914 
3. Appraisal o/Neutrality in the Charter Era 
Undeniably neutrality as a general concept has as much vitality today as in the 
pre-Charter era. The claim, that there is a customary right to assert an intermediate 
status of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency, may 
have been strengthened since 1945. The precedents in some cases are almost iden-
tical with those in the last two centuries. Even if nonbelligerency cannnot be as-
serted as a customary norm, the overlay of principles of retorsion, reprisals not 
involving use of force, and state of necessity, apply to support actions at variance 
with a practice of strict neutrality in the traditional sense. Because of options un-
der the Charter for nonbinding resolutions by the Security Council and perforce 
the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions even with a binding Council 
decision, and the relative scarcity of Article 25/48 Council decisions, the opportu-
nity for claims of neutrality-perhaps modified by the new nonbelligerency of the 
Charter era-remains large. "Far from being moribund, these traditional rights 
[of neutrality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions oflimited wars" -the 
type of conflicts that have beset the planet since 1945-"even more rigorously than 
in conditions of total war.',91S 
Part D. Sources of the Law, Principles of the Law of Treaties and 
Treaty Succession 
This Chapter has integrated Charter interpretation principles, notably the su-
premacy of the Charter over treaties,916 the problem of custom or general princi-
ples oflaw contrary to the Charter,917 and the possibility that parts of the Charter 
may restate jus cogens norms, however that concept may be defined.918 This Part 
examines principles of the law of treaties and treaty succession, with a closer re-
view of the effect of war on treaties generally, and the relationship between the 
LOS Convention and the law of armed conflict. 
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1. Principles of the Law of Treaties and Treaty Succession 
Principles of treaty interpretation,919 treaty succession,920 and acquiescence in 
or objection to custom 921 have been noted. The possibility of coercion, e.g., threat 
oruse offorce contrary to Article 2(4) of the Charter, to which might be added vari-
ous forms of error or corruption,922 has been cited.923 (If a treaty is negotiated in 
connection with a State's aggression in violation of the Charter, i.e., an armistice or 
surrender by the aggressor, coercion principles do not apply.924 Economic coer-
cion, e.g. sanctions imposed as nonforce reprisal or retorsion, does not invalidate a 
treaty either.925 If the Security Council decides on sanctions, or calls for them, 
Charter law also trumps a target State's economic coercion claims.)926 
Other assertions of the inapplicability of treaties can arise because of claims of 
material breach,927 impossibility ofperformance,928 or fundamental change of cir-
cumstances.929 Desuetude 930 and state of necessity 931 may vitiate a treaty. In the 
view of some, unequal treaties 932 can also negate a treaty's effectiveness. 
A treaty may be subject to severability. Part ofit may remain in force, part may 
be suspended, part may be terminated, all may be suspended, or all may be termi-
nated, depending on the nature of the treaty's terms.933 
Against these must be balanced the principle of pacta sunt servanda-treaties 
should be observed.934 Moreover, even though a treaty may not be in force, per-
haps because a State is not a party to it, it may restate a customary rule or a general 
principle oflaw.935 These analyses must be considered in addition to the factoral 
approach for sources oflaw.936 Whether these doctrines, e.g., fundamental change 
of circumstances, apply to a given situation, is determined in the United States by 
the executive and not the courts.937 In general, a military commander should refer 
these matters to an operational law specialist, who can check with higher author-
ity; however, commanders should be aware of these doctrines' implications. 
2. War and Termination or Suspension of Treaty Obligations 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties takes no position on the effect of 
war on treaties;938 the issue is left to customary rules.939 War might possibly raise a 
claim of fundamental change of circumstances,940 or perhaps other bases, e.g., im-
possibility of performance. 
Treaties establishing an international organization, such as the United Na-
tions, are not affected by conflicts of the parties.941 States may suspend a treaty's 
operation when they exercise the inherent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense in accordance with the Charter.942 If complying with a Council resolution 
dealing with action on threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggres-
sion conflicts with a treaty or a treaty requirement, States may suspend or end the 
treaty's operation to the extent treaty performance is incompatible with the resolu-
tion.943 The Institut de Droit International has stated that an aggressor shall not 
terminate or suspend operation of a treaty if it would benefit thereby.944 
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There is no general rule as to when or which treaties continue in operation dur-
ing armed conflict.945 A treaty may be subject to severability in this context, i.e., all 
of it may remain in force, part may be suspended, part may be terminated, all may 
be suspended, or all may be terminated.946 Treaties may provide for continued op-
eration during war; the Chicago Convention explicitly says so.947 Because of their 
nature or purpose, some treaties are regarded as operative during armed conflict, 
those governing humanitarian law or neutrality being prime examples.948 In other 
cases, e.g., the Treaty of Rome or NAFT A, a treaty may be suspended during armed 
conflict or when a State's vital national interests are at stake.949 A treaty may de-
clare it does not apply during war.950 As noted above, these principles may well be 
subject to the Charter's clause paramountcy.951 
3. The LOS Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict: 
((Other Rules" Clauses 952 
The 1958 and 1982 LOS Conventions 953 include clauses, sometimes over-
looked in analysis or commentary, stating the rights under these treaties are sub-
ject to "other rules of international law,,954 as well as terms in the particular 
convention. For example, LOS Convention, Article 87(1), which declares high 
seas freedoms, adds that "Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the condi-
tions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law." The 
overwhelming majority of commentators-including the International Law Com-
mission, a UN General Assembly agency of international law experts 955 -has 
stated that the Conventions' other rules clauses refer to the law of armed con-
flict,956 a component of which is the law of naval warfare. Provisions such as Arti-
cle 88 of the 1982 Convention state a truism, i.e., the high seas are reserved for 
peaceful purposes.957 However, high seas usage can be subject to the LOAC, when 
Article 87(1)'s other rules clause is read with Article 88. As in the case of the 1958 
Conventions, 
That provision does not preclude ... use of the high seas by naval forces. Theiruse 
for aggressive purposes, which would ... violat[ e] ... Article 2(4) ofthe Charter ... , is 
forbidden as well by Article 88 [of the 1982 Convention]. See also LOS Convention, 
Article 301, requiring parties, in exercising their rights and p[ er]forming their duties 
under the Convention, to refrain from any threat or use offorce in violation of the 
Charter.958 
This analysis is buttressed by the Charter's trumping clause; no treaty, including 
the LOS conventions, can supersede the Charter.959 The peaceful purposes lan-
guage in Article 88 and other Convention provisions cannot override Charter 
norms, such as those in Article 2(4), but also those in Article 51, i.e., the inherent 
right of individual and collective self-defense.960 Of course, naval forces of States 
not involved in armed conflict may use the oceans for military purposes, although 
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these forces may be restricted in some maritime zones, e.g., the territorial sea.961 
The other rules clauses in the LOS conventions come into force for States engaged 
in armed conflict. 
To the extent that the LOS conventions recite customary norms-and such is 
the case for the High Seas Convention 962 and the LOS Convention's navigational 
articles 963 -the other rules clauses are part of custom and are therefore in force for 
countries not party to one orthe other of the Conventions. For those States party to 
the 1958 Conventions or LOS Convention, the customary status of the other rules 
clause is doubly in force.964 The LOS conventions may inform, i.e., give content to 
gaps in the LOAC, much as the law of self-defense may be informed by the LOAC. 
The law of the sea also can inform the content of Charter law, e.g., Security Council 
resolutions.965 
The conclusion is inescapable that the 1958 Conventions' other rules clauses, 
carried forward into the 1982 Convention, means that these treaties' terms are sub-
ject to the law of armed conflict, of which the law of naval warfare is a part. Since 
the High Seas Convention, parts of the other 1958 Conventions and the 1982 Con-
vention's navigational articles are part of customary law,966 the other rules clause 
is also part of customary law governing oceans law during armed conflict. More-
over, the other rules clauses can also inform, i.e., give content to, Charter law, e.g., 
Council resolutions and the law of self-defense.967 
Part E. Conclusions 
The UN Charter has been invoked in many armed conflicts since the Charter 
was signed in 1945. In some ways this has changed options available to States. Un-
der the majority view, a State cannot use reprisals involving use of force during 
time of peace.968 The doctrine of necessity, i.e., a State may take what action it 
deems necessary for self-preservation, may be of questionable validity today.969 
Article 103 of the Charter declares that all treaties are subject to it; whether cus-
tomary law is equally subject to the Charter is open to question.970 The Charter 
condemns armed attacks and aggression, and Article 51 permits self-defense 
against armed attacks and aggression armee, in the French text.971 This permits re-
sponses for attacks on merchant ships at sea, including those sailing independ-
ently, as most do.972 The Charter also permits the Security Council to make 
binding decisions that have the force of treaty law for UN Members. 973 The Coun-
cil and the General Assembly may also call upon States for action, or recommend 
it; these resolutions have no intrinsic force but may restate law, and practice under 
them may develop into custom.974 
Article 51 preserves the inherent right ofindividual and collective self-defense; 
these options have the same content and scope today as they did before World War 
11.975 States may respond in individual or collective anticipatory self-defense, so 
long as the response is necessary, proportional and admitting of no other option, as 
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perceived by the decisionmaker at the time of response.976 States may also react, 
individually or collectively, in self-defense to attack or aggression, i.e., after the at-
tack or aggression has occurred, so long as the response is necessary and propor-
tional.977 States also may respond with retorsions, i.e., action that is unfriendly but 
lawful, or they may reply with reprisals not involving use of force.978 Rather than 
requesting Security Council action, States may also employ regional organizations 
to maintain international peace and security.979 
Besides Charter standards, an independent, customary norm of the right to 
self-defense exists alongside Article 51. 980 The right to self-defense may havejus 
cogens status today.981 Collective self-defense may be asserted through bilateral or 
multilateral treaties, but nothing in the Charter forbids more informal arrange-
ments.982 If Article 51 supersedes, through Article 103, treaty norms, e.g. those in 
the law of armed conflict, any Article 51 response should receive its content from 
the LOAC.983 By parity of reasoning, any self-defense claims based on custom and 
not on Article 51 as part of a treaty, i.e., the UN Charter, should also receive their 
content based on the LOAC.984 
Besides the appealing symmetry oflogic behind this approach, there are practi-
cal policy reasons for following law of armed conflict standards in any self-defense 
claim. These are illustrated by the Tanker War. 
First, both Iran and Iraq claimed the other was guilty of aggression and that 
therefore the response was in self-defense. Even today, despite the opinion of some 
States through their reactions that Iran was the aggressor, the issue remains unre-
solved, and may remain unresolved for a long time. However, the peripheral legal 
consequences flowing from the initial acts by these States in 1980-e.g., attacks on 
merchant ships-had impact on third States, who had only one known standard to 
observe, i.e., the LOAC. Ultimately, only one State, Iran or Iraq, was guilty of ag-
gression, and only one State, Iran or Iraq, could legitimately claim self-defense. 
The aggressor was bound by LOAC standards.985 Since the issue was and is in 
doubt, the only standard for measuring self-defense was the LOAC. This was how 
the United States behaved with respect to destruction ofIranAjr and the oil plat-
forms and in convoy operations. The IranAjr crew was repatriated, following hu-
manitarian law standards; oil platforms occupants were warned and given an 
opportunity to leave, parallelling Hague IX.986 
Second, this approach is congruent with the longstanding rule, in place long be-
fore the Charter, that humanitarian law treaties or those governing neutrality re-
main in effect during war.987 As a theoretical matter, given Charter supremacy 
under Article 103, a State could act under Article 51 independently of these norms. 
The Security Council held the view that these standards should be observed, re-
gardless of who had a legitimate self-defense claim, in its resolutions condemning 
attacks on civilian centers, merchant ships and in citing the Geneva Conventions 
and the Geneva Gas Protocol.988 Any self-defense claim should be conditioned by 
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LOAC standards and humanitarian law standards in particular, whether that 
self-defense claim is based on Article 51 as treaty law or whether it is grounded in 
custom. The policy, public relations and practical considerations are obvious; that 
is what States and people expect today, regardless of the niceties oflegal analysis. 
Third, observing LOAC treaty norms in the context of Article 51, treaty-based 
self-defense claims is consistent with the policy of pacta sunt servanda, itself a policy 
of the Charter, Article 2(2).989 
The law of neutrality remains in full force and vigor in the Charter era, albeit 
perhaps conditioned by Charter law in given situations. For example, a Security 
Council decision could alter traditional contraband rules.990 Practice of States 
since World War II calls to mind the historic claims for the intermediate state of 
nonbelligerency, between neutrality and belligerency, although whether this has 
ripened into custom is an open question. It could be said that this practice amounts 
in some cases to informal collective self-defense, which is permitted under the 
Charter. In other situations a debate remains as to whether international law rec-
ognizes an intermediate status between belligerency and neutrality. Most coun-
tries, including the United States, say that there is no intermediate stage of 
non-belligerency.991 
Charter considerations apart, decisionmakers must continue to take into ac-
count traditional principles of sources oflaw, treaty interpretation including the 
impact of war, and treaty succession.992 The LOS conventions' other rules clauses 
mean that the conventions are subject to the law of armed conflict.993 
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citing inrer alia Case H, United States v. von Weizsaeker (Ministries Case), 14 Tr. War Crimes Before Nuremberg 
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102. Nicaragua Case,1986 ICJ 103, citing Definition of Aggression, art. 3(g), 13 ILM 713; DINSTEIN 130 (citing no 
authority but saying arL 3 is codified custom); Broms, TheDejinirion, n. 62, 385-88, writing earlier, did not say Article 3 
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110. R1FAAT, n. 23, 272; STONE, CONFLlCf, n. 23, 166;seealso LOS Convention, art. 111; High Seas Convention, arL 
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222 The Tanker War 
604. See Parts V.A.l, V.C.l, V.E.l, V.F.1.b, V.F.2, V.G.2-V.G.3, V.J.l, V.J.3, V.J.S-V.J.7. 
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607. UN Charter, arL 50, invoked by Jordan and other States during the 1990-91 Gulf War. See Walker, Cruis Over 
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208, 254-56; Walker, Anticipatory, n. 289, LIBER A!.UCORUM 385-86, 31 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 358; n. 357 and 
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In relation to a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding may have comple:-: consequences. If it 
is acceptable to all contracting parties, they need only acquiesce. If, however, some contracting parties share 
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declaring state and those who agree with that understanding. See [REsTATEAIENT(THlRD), § 313(2) (c), dealing 
with reservations] •••• However, some contracting parties may treat it as a reservation and object to it as such, 
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Commentators for the Mine and Incendiary Weapons Protocols say little about these provisions; they state the 
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Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian Law?, 105 Mil .. L. REv. 1 (1984); Willam G. Schmidt, The 
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O'CoNNELL, LAW OF THE SEA 1006-08; nn. VI.163-72 and accompanying text. 
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